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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates several core aspects of the management and performance of 
international joint ventures with parent firms from Europe, North America and Australia. 
The focus of the study is the relationships between management control of IJVs, 
autonomy granted to the IJV management, trust between IJV partners, perceptions of 
cultural differences between IJV partners and the performance of IJVs. The study builds 
on the existing literature by examining new data and providing new empirical insights. 
Data was collected by means of an international mail survey using a self-administered 
questionnaire and an e-mail survey. The General Directorate of Foreign Investment 
(GDFI) database in Turkey and the OSIRIS database served to provide two sampling 
frames for the data collection. The perspective of this study is an empirical investigation 
of the nature of management control exercised by the parent firms over the joint 
ventures. This study provides new evidence on the relationships between the dimensions 
of management control and the performance of a sample of JVs. The overall concept of 
autonomy is examined by discussing differences in the management and control of 
decision-making as categorized by operational versus strategic decisions. Furthermore, 
the influence of IJV performance and IJV duration on autonomy is considered. The 
relative importance of both national culture and corporate culture differences on the 
management of the joint venture is considered. The influence of joint venture age and the 
influence of autonomy granted to JV management are investigated with particular 
reference to culture. This study provides a framework of trust by treating perceptions of 
cultural differences as antecedents to trust, the degree of JV autonomy granted as a 
consequence of trust and JV performance as both antecedent to and consequence of trust. 
This study identifies the key determinants of IJV performance as management control of 
IJVs, autonomy granted to the IJV management, trust between IJV partners and 
perceptions of cultural differences between IJV partners. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Research on strategic collaboration between firms has received increasing attention in the 
literature during the last two decades (see Reus and Ritchie, 2004 for a review). The joint 
venture (JV) is one of the most frequently used contractual forms in strategic alliances. 
International joint ventures are a major means of global expansion for multinational 
enterprises (UNCTAD, 2004). Joint ventures are superior to markets and hierarchies 
when firms face uncertainty about future development or when information is inadequate 
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). Nevertheless, the inherent complexity of having two or 
more owners who may be competitors and collaborators leads to certain difficulties in 
management. Such problems are magnified when an international joint venture (IJV) is 
operating in a risky and uncertain setting in which political and opportunistic behavior is 
rife, as this increases the transaction costs due to increased monitoring, communication, 
and negotiation requirements (Beamish and Kachra, 2004; Frayne and Geringer, 1990). 
Thus, joint ventures can only be justified when the benefits of joining outweigh the 
increased governance costs and possible leakage of know-how (Beamish and Banks, 
1987). Maintaining effective and efficient control over operations and sustaining the 
commitment of the partners are therefore the keys to the success of IJVs. 
The present study aims to investigate some core aspects of the management of 
international joint ventures with parent firms from Europe, North America and Australia. 
The focus of the study is the investigation of the relationships between the factors 
influencing the management and the performance of IJVs, including: management 
control of IJVs, autonomy granted to the IJV management, trust between IJV partners 
and cultural difference between IJV partners. It involves a survey of 109 parent firms that 
have formed joint ventures with foreign firms. A distinguishing feature of this thesis is 
that it examines the perspectives of the respondent companies with respect to the 
influence of "soft" variables, such as autonomy, trust and culture, on the effective 
management of these international interfirm relationships. The intention of the study is 
not to develop new theoretical perspectives of joint venture management and 
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performance, but rather to work within the context of prevailing theoretical views. This 
study in part is a replication of the studies conducted with some of the same hypotheses 
examined but with extension to a different data set. The next section provides a brief 
review of the definition of JVs. The third section provides a conceptual model of the 
study. The fourth section provides an outline of the thesis and the fifth section sets out 
the areas of research that the study explores. A summary is provided in the final section. 
1.2 International Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures (JVs) involve two or more legally distinct organizations (the parents), each 
of which actively participates in the decision-making activities of the jointly owned entity 
(Geringer, 1988). If at least one parent organization is headquartered outside the JV's 
country of operation, or if the venture has a significant level of operations in more than 
one country, then it is considered to be an international joint venture (IJV). This entity is 
subject to the joint control of its parent firms, each of which is economically and legally 
independent of the other (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987: 547). A joint venture is further 
defined here as an affiliate where foreign ownership falls between 10 per cent and 90 per 
cent. According to US Department of Commerce and Chowdhury (1992), affiliates with a 
foreign shareholding of less than 10 per cent are considered to be portfolio investments. 
An affiliate with foreign ownership of more than 90 per cent is viewed as a wholly- 
owned subsidiary (WOS). 
Two contractual forms of JV can be identified - equity joint ventures and non-equity joint 
ventures. Equity JVs (EJVs) involve the establishment of a new company - the child - in 
which two or more partners - the parents - hold an equity stake (Harrigan, 1985). Each 
partner will expect to participate in the decision-making activities of the JV and will also 
anticipate a proportional share of dividend and expect representation on the board of 
directors (Harrigan, 1985; Geringer, 1991). Non-equity JVs (NEJVs) in contrast do not 
involve the creation of new firms; rather they are formal long-term agreements between 
partners to co-operate in some activity. The establishment of NEJVs involves the 
allocation of tasks, costs and revenues, and they involve at least a moderate degree of 
inter-organizational dependence (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
2ý 
IJVs are commonly used by firms as a means of competing within multi-domestic or 
global competitive arenas (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Harrigan, 1988). Joint ventures are 
likely to be established by parent companies when the partners are unable to pursue a 
development on their own, either because of lack of expertise or resources, or because 
they cannot dominate the marketplace to a sufficient extent to enable them to buy-in or 
takeover existing sources of expertise (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Harrigan and 
Newman, 1990). Joint ventures represent an effective way of coping with the increasing 
competitive and technological challenges (Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986). 
Among other benefits, IJVs can help firms share costs, enter new markets (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996), supplement their capabilities (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Hitt et al., 2000; 
Lane et al., 2001), seek more radical innovations by integrating knowledge from different 
areas of science and technology (Lubatkin et al., 2001; Nummela, 2003), and create 
common platforms for products and services (Mowery et al., 1998; Caloghirou et al., 
2003). Western firms opt for IJVs as a method for continued growth and survival in light 
of maturing local markets and increased international competition (Morris and Hergert, 
1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Glaister and Buckley, 1994). However, despite their 
increasing number and the strategic advantages they provide, IJVs emerge as a 
problematic organizational form in terms of performance (Beamish and Delios, 1997; 
Robson et al., 2002; Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006) and also bring challenges not found 
within domestic alliances. 
1.3 The Management and Performance of IJVs 
Research on international joint ventures (IJVs) has continued to attract the attention of 
international business scholars in light of the popularity of IJVs and their overall 
unsatisfactory performance (Choi and Beamish, 2004; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Luo, 
Shenkar and Nyaw, 2001; Yan and Gray, 1994). Parkhe (1993) has identified four major 
dimensions of JV study in the prior literature: motives for JV formation, partner selection 
characteristics, control/conflict, and JV stability/performance, and in reviewing these 
lines of study he concludes that researchers have non-cumulatively focused on different 
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dimensions. It is the purpose of this study to attempt to relate two of the four core 
dimensions of JV study identified by Parkhe, those of the management/control of JVs and 
JV performance. The focus of the study is the investigation of the relationships between 
the factors influencing the management and the performance of IJVs. Figure 1.1 provides 
an overall model of the factors for the focus of this study and the predicted relationships 
between them. As shown in Figure 1.1, the factors influencing the management and the 
performance of IJVs consist of: management control of IJVs, autonomy granted to the 
IJV management, trust between IJV partners and perceptions of cultural differences 
between IJV partners. 
Figure 1.1 Model of the management and performance of IJVs 
Management 
Control in the IJV 
The focus of control 
over which parents 
exercise control 
The extent of 
control achieved 
by the parents 
The mechanisms 
the parents use to 
exercise control 
Trust between 
the IJV partners 
Autonomy granted to the IJV 
management 
Perceptions of cultural 
differences between 
the IJV partners 
Performance of the IJV 
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As shown in Figure 1.1, the aim of this study is to address mainly the following 
relationships: (1) Does performance of the IJV vary with the level of management 
control?; (2) Does performance of the IJV vary with the level of autonomy granted to the 
IJV management?; (3) Does performance of the IJV vary with the perceptions of culture 
differences between the IJV partners?; (4) Does autonomy granted to the JV management 
vary with the perceptions of culture differences between the IJV partners?; (5) Does 
performance of the IJV influence trust between the IJV partners?; (6) Do the perceptions 
of culture differences between the IJV partners influence trust between the IJV partners?; 
(7) Does trust between the IJV partners influence the level of autonomy granted to the 
IJV management?; (8) Does trust between the IJV partners influence performance of the 
IJV?; and (9) Does the level of autonomy granted to the IJV management influence the 
performance of the IJV?. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the thesis and as shown, the thesis is divided into 9 
chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the main theoretical perspectives regarding the management 
and the performance of IJVs. The literature review is divided into four sections: control 
and autonomy of international joint ventures, cultural differences between joint venture 
partners, trust between joint venture partners and performance of international joint 
ventures. The sections of the literature review are dictated by the factors influencing the 
management and the performance of IJVs, chosen for the investigation of this study and 
shown in Figure 1.1. The literature review provides a theoretical background to the study 
and considers the previous findings. Chapter 3 sets out the research methods employed to 
collect the data for undertaking the empirical analysis. 
The analysis of the primary data is presented in Chapters 4 to 8. These chapters are 
structured in parallel to the sections of Chapter 2 and are organized as follows: the nature 
of management control in IJVs, the autonomy granted to joint ventures, the perceptions 
of cultural differences and the management of culture, the antecedents and consequences 
trust between joint venture partner firms and determinants of IJV performance. 
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Figure 1.2 Overview of the Thesis Structure 
1. Introduction 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Control and 
Autonomy of 
International 
Joint Ventures 
2.2 Cultural 
Differences 
between Joint 
Venture Partners 
2.3 Trust 
between Joint 
Venture Partners 
3. Research Methods 
4. The Nature of Management Control in IJVs 
5. The Autonomy Granted to Joint Ventures 
2.4 Performance 
of International 
Joint Ventures 
6. The Perceptions of Cultural Differences and the Management of Culture 
7. The Antecedents and Consequences of Trust between Joint Venture Partner Firms 
8. Determinants of IJV Performance 
9. Conclusion 
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The background literature, the research hypotheses of the study, measures of the 
variables, the results and the discussion are detailed in each of the respective analysis 
chapters. The literature review provided in Chapters 4-8 aim to review the main 
published work concerning the hypotheses and to demonstrate how the hypotheses relate 
to and are built upon previous studies. Lastly, Chapter 9 provides a review of the study 
including a summary of its findings. The content covered in each of these chapters is 
described in detail in the next section. 
1.5 Domain of the Study 
Chapter 2, the literature review is divided into four sections: control and autonomy of 
international joint ventures, cultural differences between joint venture partners, trust 
between joint venture partners and performance of international joint ventures. 
Section 2.1 of the literature review considers control and autonomy of international joint 
ventures. This section focuses on the nature and basis of control in IJVs and the options 
available. It begins by discussing why control is such an important issue for IJVs. The 
attributes and dimensions of control are then identified. Distinctions are drawn between 
strategic and operational control. Equity share, bargaining power, and resource provision 
are seen to provide foundations for partner control in IJVs. The literature on joint- 
ventures has emphasized the joint-venture as a "child" of dominant parent organizations 
without paying much attention to the internal processes of managing the joint-venture. In 
particular joint-ventures have the potential to develop strategy of their own and to make 
autonomous decisions. Arguments against and for IJV autonomy are presented. An 
explanatory model of joint-venture autonomy is discussed using resource-dependence 
and transaction cost theories. Finally, the mechanisms available to joint venture managers 
to influence and gain compliance from parent firms are addressed. 
Section 2.2 of the literature review considers cultural differences between joint venture 
partners. This section examines the ways in which culture can impact upon the 
implementation of cooperative strategies. It shows how culture can create barriers to 
collaboration between organizations and yet how, at the same time, the knowledge 
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embodied in cultures can provide a valuable resource for an alliance. Three commonly 
used measures of cultural distance- Hofstede's data dimensions of national culture, the 
Kogut-Singh data index of cultural distance and Ronen and Shenkar's data culture 
clusters- are summarised. The following points are addressed: why culture is relevant for 
cooperative strategy, what specific consequences culture can have and what options there 
are for managing cultural diversity within alliances. The effect of dimensions of national 
and organizational culture differences on international joint venture (IJV) performance is 
examined. Six core organizational practices that differentiate organizations in their 
management orientation suggested by Hofstede are discussed. The influence of cultural 
distance on control of the joint venture is examined. Using Hofstede's five national 
culture dimensions, the fit between management practices and national culture are 
examined. Finally, the limitations of Hofstede's framework are addressed. 
Section 2.3 of the literature review considers trust between joint venture partners. 
Although trust has been identified as a critical factor in alliance management, rigorous 
conceptual and empirical developments of alliance trust have remained elusive. The 
objective of this section is to develop a conceptual understanding of joint venture trust. 
JV trust is defined as reliance on another JV party (i. e., person, group, or firm) under a 
condition of risk (Currall and Judge, 1995). Previous literature on trust is reviewed and 
this shows that trust has been viewed from three different perspectives: structural, social, 
and psychological. This section focuses on two approaches towards managing 
interorganizational relationships. One is based on opportunism and focuses on 
contractual mechanisms (the contract-centred approach) while the other is based on trust 
and focuses on cooperative mechanisms (the relationship-centred approach). A 
framework of the antecedents and consequences of JV trust is discussed. The factors 
considered as antecedents are: prior cooperative relationships, habitualization, individual 
attachment, organizational fit, and assessment of partner competence. Proposed 
consequences or outcomes of JV trust include forbearance, governance structures, 
relationship investments, increases in JV scope, and JV performance. How the two 
concepts of trust and control operate in a parallel fashion to generate confidence in 
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partner cooperation is examined. The complexities of the trust-control relationship are 
explored and the impact of control mechanisms on trust level is discussed 
Section 2.4, the final section of the literature review, considers performance of 
international joint ventures. This section examines the prior literature on JV performance 
and indicates three areas in which major inconsistencies occur. First, whose perspective 
is used for performance measurement-that of one parent, two parents, or the JV 
management? Second, variations occur in performance measures which may range from 
financial performance indicators to subjective perceptions of performance. Third, the 
appropriateness of different performance measures changes as a JV matures. Moreover, 
these inconsistencies make cross-study comparisons and generalisations about JV 
performance particularly problematic. The debate over JV performance measures is 
clearly a sub-set of wider concerns regarding the assessment of organisation performance 
in general, in which the evaluation of JV performance is a particular challenge. The 
controversy about the variables that predict performance and the variables that indicate 
performance is outlined. The factors that have been suggested in the literature as 
potentially important determinants of JV performance are discussed. 
Chapter 3 sets out the research methods employed to collect the data for undertaking the 
empirical analysis. This chapter establishes the background of primary data collection by 
means of a questionnaire survey administered to senior managers in joint ventures with 
parent firms from Europe, North America and Australia. The issues and considerations in 
the process of data collection are reported and the sample characteristics of the collected 
data are provided. An international mail survey using a self-administered questionnaire 
was employed and an e-mail survey was used to follow-up the respondents. The General 
Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI) database in Turkey and the OSIRIS database 
served to provide two sampling frames for the data collection. 
Chapter 4 provides new evidence on the relationships between the dimensions of 
management control and the performance of a sample of JVs. The perspective of this 
chapter is an empirical investigation of the nature of management control exercised by 
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the parent firms over the joint ventures. The main goals of the chapter are to identify the 
dimensions of management control and to test hypotheses on the relationship between 
dimensions of control and the performance of IJVs. Specifically, the following research 
questions are addressed: (1) Do the parent firms focus their control over particular 
activities of the JV rather than attempting to achieve overall control of the joint venture?; 
(2) If the joint venture parent is a minority shareholder, are more of the other mechanisms 
of control derived from this parent?; (3) If the joint venture parent has fewer members on 
the JV management team, are more of the other mechanisms of control derived from this 
parent.?; and (4) Does satisfaction with JV performance vary with the level of 
management control?. The evidence indicates that different parents are more active in 
different functional areas of management. Parents that are minority shareholders appear 
to compensate for their lack of control associated with a relatively small equity 
shareholding by securing other mechanisms of control. Similarly, if the parent has fewer 
members on the management team, more of the other mechanisms of control are derived 
from this parent. Lastly, parents who dominate or have responsibility for management 
control will have a higher perceived level of satisfaction of JV performance than those 
parents who do not dominate or have responsibility for management control. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence on the nature of autonomy in a sample of IJVs. The overall 
concept of autonomy is examined by discussing differences in the management and 
control of decision-making as categorized by operational versus strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, the influence of IJV performance and IJV duration on autonomy is 
considered. The perceptual measure of autonomy shows that the respondents consider 
that there is a relatively high degree of autonomy afforded the IJVs in this study. The 
findings of the study show that there is a spectrum of autonomy across decision-making 
areas. IJV managers have a relatively high degree of operational autonomy but relatively 
low levels of strategic autonomy in decision-making. As performance improves, an 
extension of autonomy is likely to be granted in some decision-making areas. There is no 
relationship found between the age of the IJV and autonomy. In broad terms IJV 
management cannot presume that there will be a simple extension of autonomy of 
decision-making as the venture matures. 
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Chapter 6 considers the relative importance of both national culture and corporate culture 
differences on the management of the joint venture. This study in part is a replication of 
the studies conducted by Dong and Glaister (2007a, 2007b) with some of the same 
hypotheses examined but with extension to a different data set. Specifically, the 
following research questions are addressed from the perspective of the respondent parent 
firms: (1) Is national culture or corporate culture a more important factor contributing to 
different views on the management of joint ventures?; (2) Does the perceptions and the 
effects of culture differences vary with the age of the joint venture? In other words, are 
the respondent managers' perceptions of culture differences moderated by time? Further, 
is there any difference between the perceptions of national and corporate culture 
differences over time?; (3) Do the importance of culture differences on JV outcomes 
differ for those parent firms that have adopted culture management policies and those 
that have not?; (4) Does the impact on JV performance vary with the perception of 
culture differences?; (5) Does the parent firms' satisfaction of JV performance vary with 
the perception of culture differences?; and (6) Does the autonomy granted to the JV 
management vary with the culture differences contributing to different views on the 
management? The first and the second research questions were examined by Dong and 
Glaister (2007a), the third research question was examined by Dong and Glaister (2007b) 
and the last three research questions are new to this study. 
There is strong support that from the perspective of the parent firms, corporate culture 
differences will be a more important factor contributing to different views on the 
management of JVs compared with national culture differences. This study finds that 
alliance age appears to moderate the relationship between cultural diversity and JV 
management for the perceptions of corporate culture differences, but not for perceptions 
of national culture differences. The findings show that the perceptions of national and 
corporate culture differences are reduced in firms adopting culture management policies. 
The last three research questions are new to this study and it appears that corporate 
culture is more significant than national culture in terms of findings. Perceived corporate 
culture differences have a greater impact on JV performance than do perceived national 
culture differences. Perceived corporate cultural differences have a stronger relationship 
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with the satisfaction of parent firms with JV performance than do perceived national 
cultural differences. Corporate culture differences contributing to differing views on JV 
management are more significantly correlated with autonomy granted compared to 
national culture differences contributing to differing views on JV management. 
Chapter 7 provides a framework of trust by treating perceived cultural differences as 
antecedents to trust, the degree of JV autonomy granted as a consequence of trust and JV 
performance as both antecedent to and consequence of trust. Taking a different 
perspective, this chapter highlights the important role of trustees in trust building. This 
study proposes and verifies several contingency variables that moderate the level of trust. 
This chapter develops an empirically testable framework of JV trust with a focus on 
trust's antecedents and consequences. Specifically, the following research questions are 
addressed: (1) Does satisfaction with joint venture performance influence the level of 
trust between joint venture partners?; (2) Do perceived national and corporate culture 
differences influence the level of trust between joint venture partners?; (3) Does the level 
of trust between joint venture partners influence the level of autonomy granted to the 
joint venture management?; and (4) Does the level of trust between joint venture partners 
influence satisfaction with joint venture performance?. 
The findings of the study are, first, the greater the satisfaction with JV performance, the 
greater the level of trust between the parent firms. Second, the findings provided little 
support for the relevance of perceived national cultural differences in trust development. 
On the contrary, this study finds that perceived corporate cultural differences between JV 
parent firms are a predictor of the level of trust building. The findings confirmed that the 
smaller the perceived corporate cultural differences between the parent firms, the greater 
the level of trust between the parent firms. Fourth, the results confirmed the positive 
effect of trust as a driving force in sound IJV performance. The findings showed that the 
greater the level of trust between the parent firms, the greater the satisfaction with JV 
performance. The findings make a contribution by confirming that the greater the level 
of trust between the parent firms, the greater the degree of autonomy granted to the JV 
management. 
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Chapter 8 identifies the key determinants of IJV performance as management control of 
IJVs, autonomy granted to the IJV management, trust between IJV partners and 
perceived cultural differences between IJV partners. A number of authors have noted that 
when conducting or comparing organisational performance studies it is important to 
specify whether it is the variables that predict performance, or the variables that indicate 
performance, that are of interest (Lewin and Minton, 1986; Cameron, 1986). The focus of 
chapter is the investigation of the factors influencing the performance of IJVs i. e. 
performance determinants. The prior literature indicates that there are four key factors 
that have been shown to influence joint venture performance: (1) control; (2) autonomy; 
(3) trust; and (4) cultural differences. While past research has also suggested other factors 
critical to joint venture success, the four factors that have been consistently identified as 
being important to joint venture performance were selected for study. Further, these four 
factors are meaningful to the conceptual framework proposed in this chapter as they 
potentially can have varying effects on joint venture performance. Chapter 8 builds on 
the existing literature by examining new data and providing new empirical insights into 
JV performance. Predicted positive relationships between performance expectations and 
dominant control of the JV, JV autonomy, and trust are supported by the data. The 
predicted negative relationship between performance expectations and perceived national 
culture differences is not supported, but the expected negative relationship between 
performance expectations and perceived corporate culture differences is partially 
supported. 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of the study, identifies the limitations of the study and 
discusses avenues for further research. 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided the context of the study, identified some research gaps in the 
literature, provided a definition of JVs and outlined the chapters that follow. The 
following chapter provides a review of the theoretical perspectives regarding the 
management and the performance of IJVs. 
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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
2.1: CONTROL AND AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The first section of the literature review, as shown in Figure 1.1 on page 4, is control and 
autonomy of international joint ventures. This section focuses on the nature and basis of 
control in alliances and the options available. It begins by discussing why control is such 
an important issue for strategic alliances. The attributes and dimensions of control are 
then identified. Distinctions are drawn between strategic and operational control. Equity 
share, bargaining power, and resource provision are seen to provide foundations for 
partner control in alliances. The literature on joint-ventures has emphasized the joint- 
venture as a "child" of dominant parent organizations without paying much attention to 
the internal processes of managing the joint-venture. In particular joint-ventures have the 
potential to develop strategy of their own and to make autonomous decisions. Arguments 
against and for IJV autonomy are presented. An explanatory model of joint-venture 
autonomy is discussed using resource-dependence and transaction cost theories. Finally, 
the mechanisms available to joint venture managers to influence and gain compliance 
from parent firms are addressed. 
2.1.2 Control 
IJVs are commonly used by firms as a means of competing within multi-domestic or 
global competitive arenas (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Harrigan, 1988). Joint ventures 
provide the opportunity to share costs and risks, to acquire knowledge, to enter new 
markets, and to gain economies of scale or to rationalize operations (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). Despite their potential contributions, IJVs are not without their 
drawbacks. A critical determinant of IJV performance appears to be the control exercised 
by parents over a venture's activities (Rafii, 1978; Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983). 
Although each partner must, by definition, relinquish some control over an IJV's 
activities, such a move is often accompanied by great consternation. A firm may avoid 
relinquishing control over some or all of its activities for reasons intimately related to its 
corporate strategy and objectives. Insufficient or ineffective control over an IJV can limit 
the parent firm's ability to coordinate its activities, to utilize efficiently its resources and 
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to implement effectively its strategy (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Lorange, et al., 1986; 
Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Even if its products or processes are protected by patents 
or copyrights, a firm may nonetheless fear damaging "leakage" of unprotected 
innovations or know-how if shared with partners. Such disclosures, between the partners 
or to organizations outside the venture, may have serious effects on the competitive 
position of a parent or the IJV, possibly creating new competitors or otherwise limiting 
the IJV's or parent's overall efficiency (Parry, 1985; Rugman, 1985; Reich and Mankin, 
1986). 
Control refers to the process by which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the 
behaviour and output of another entity (Ouchi, 1977) through the use of power, authority 
(Etzioni, 1965) and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms 
(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Control plays an important role in the capacity of a firm to 
achieve its goals. Typically, as organizations expand in size, there are concurrent 
increases in the complexity and differentiation of their structures (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967), as well as in the risks of conflicts, opportunistic behaviour and competing goals 
between units. As a result, top management are confronted by the increasingly crucial 
need to monitor, coordinate and integrate the activities of the organization's business 
units, including IJVs (Child, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979). 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) identify three dimensions of control in IJVs that in principle 
apply to all alliances. These are the extent of control exercised over a JV, the focus of 
that control, and the mechanisms by which control is exercised. IJV control is a complex 
and multidimensional concept. The three dimensions or parameters which comprise IJV 
control are not incompatible, but rather complementary and interdependent. They each 
examine a different aspect of IJV control. It appears necessary to consider all three 
dimensions of control in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the control 
phenomenon for IJVs. A further useful distinction is between two levels of control: 
strategic and operational. 
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2.1.3 Control Mechanisms 
The first dimension of IJV control which researchers have examined is the mechanisms 
by which control may be exercised. Initial studies showed that firms frequently relied on 
majority ownership or on voting control to achieve effective management control of an 
IJV's activities (Tomlinson, 1970; Friedman and Beguin, 1971; Stopford and Wells, 
1972). Although these studies showed that a majority position in equity or votes could 
ensure some degree of control over the venture, the same argument might not be valid for 
IJVs where the equity is equally divided between parents or in which a firm has only a 
minority participation role. This latter situation especially concerns firms that, over time, 
are unable to demand full or dominant ownership positions in many international 
investments. 
In order to achieve effective managerial control, the parent companies of IJVs frequently 
rely upon a majority equity shareholding. There is evidence to indicate that equity share 
does in practice convey considerable control leverage (e. g. Tomlinson, 1970; Stopford 
and Wells, 1972; Lecraw, 1984; Child et al., 1997; Child, 2002). There can, however, be 
three limitations to relying on equity holding as a control mechanism. The first, and most 
obvious, is that it may not be available. Several forms of cooperation do not involve the 
creation of equity and the legal rights that accompany it, and even in an equity 
arrangement, majority equity share is not always an available option. The second is that 
the decisions of a JV's board of directors cannot be expected to reflect a majority equity 
position without any qualification. The third is that majority equity share may not be an 
effective means of control at the operational level where the protection of core 
knowledge and its effective use come into play. 
Behrman (1970) as well as Friedman and Beguin (1971) suggested that control was not a 
strict and automatic consequence of ownership. According to these studies, a variety of 
mechanisms were available to firms for exercising effective IJV control: right of veto, 
representation in management bodies and special agreements related to either, technology 
(e. g., licensing) or management (e. g., management services). Companies might also be 
able to rely on their technical superiority and managerial skills as a means of 
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guaranteeing participation in the management of day-to-day operations. The nomination 
of one of a firm's managers as the IJV general manager (Rafii, 1978), as well as 
employment of different ownership structure arrangements (Gullander, 1976), could 
represent further means of exercising managerial control. 
As Schaan (1988) points out, in the absence of safeguards built into the JV contract to 
protect minority interests, majority equity holding ultimately confers control over the 
issues which a board covers. The frequency with which the board meets and the scope of 
its agenda therefore bear upon its effectiveness as a control mechanism for the majority 
partner. The ability of minority partners to influence the management of the alliance will 
be enhanced if they appoint as their board representatives people who have a good 
understanding of the alliance's operational and strategic situation, good negotiating skills, 
and empathy for the partner's culture. 
Where it is available as an option, majority equity ownership can provide for control over 
alliance policy, but it cannot guarantee operational control. According to Child et al. 
(2005), this is because considerable reliance often has to be placed upon another partner's 
managers and staff for the implementation of policy. Child et al. (2005) argue this is 
especially true of alliances whose operations are located in the other partner's country. 
Child et al. (2005) further note that the appointment of key alliance managers to run the 
operation or manage critical functions such as marketing or R&D can be an important 
means for a partner to maintain operational control. This is particularly true in cases 
where the partner is geographically remote or is a minority equity-holder. Formal 
contractual agreements can be made which set out certain rights to the partner relating to 
technology (e. g. licensing) or management (e. g. key appointments, management systems, 
and services). 
Managers in parent companies can enhance their control over an alliance by structuring 
the relationships the alliance has with the parent company. These include the reporting 
relationships upwards from the alliance to a parent company, formalizing its planning 
and approval processes for capital budgeting and resource allocation, and laying down 
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procedures and routines for the alliance to follow. The provision of HRM programmes 
and systems for the alliance, for selection, training and development, career 
advancement, and compensation, can both help to control the quality of the alliance's 
staff and help to lay down the organizational culture (Frayne and Geringer, 1990). 
In addition to these relatively formal methods to improve operational control over an 
alliance, a number of important informal mechanisms are also available. The partner 
company can assign an executive with sufficient time and resources both to monitor the 
alliance's progress and to support this with the necessary personal contact. Technical, 
advisory, and managerial inputs offered to an alliance on a continuing non-contractual 
basis, and accompanied by the maintenance of close relations between the parent and its 
alliance, can have a considerable potential for enhancing operational control. 
Schaan (1983) distinguished negative from positive control mechanisms. Negative 
mechanisms are used by a parent company to stop an alliance from implementing certain 
activities or decisions. These include laying down a requirement for approval of specific 
decisions by the parent or the alliance board, particularly of items such as capital 
expenditure plans and budgets, and nominations of senior appointees. Schaan found that 
negative control depended principally on formal agreements approved by parents and an 
alliance's board of directors or management committee. Positive control was most often 
exercised through staffing, participation in the planning process, reporting relationships, 
and informal mechanisms. 
The use of different mechanisms for controlling alliances is in practice likely to reflect a 
number of considerations. One is the extent to which the performance achieved in an area 
of activity carried out by the alliance can be assessed through direct measures. If an 
activity has a measurable output then control can be exercised through formal monitoring 
systems. If, on the other hand, the outputs or consequences of an alliance's activities are 
not amenable to such precise definition, as is the case with much HRM and marketing 
work, then it is appropriate to employ a mode of control that is primarily based on 
behavioural assessments of how the activity is being carried out (Ouchi, 1978). Control 
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in this case is likely to be more personal, less formal, and less frequently conducted. A 
second consideration is whether the way in which an alliance performs a certain activity 
has a direct bearing upon a parent company's overall international operations and 
standing. Third, a parent company's cultural preferences may well be expressed in the 
modes of control it prefers to install for an alliance in which it is involved. 
2.1.4 Extent of Control 
Most of the studies that have examined its extent have thought of control as being 
dependent upon the centralization or location of the decision-making process. A 
significant contribution of the locus of decision-making perspective to the JV literature 
was Geringer and Hebert's (1989) conceptualizing control as a continuous variable, 
rather than merely an absolute, dichotomous variable representing parents' exercise of 
either total control or no control over the IJV. However, despite this contribution, several 
scholars have criticized the locus of decision-making perspective for presenting a very 
limited and incomplete view of IJV control (Skinner, 1968; Brooke and Remmers, 1978). 
For example, means other than decision-making for exercising effective control over 
IJVs exist. Another criticism of this perspective is its implicit suggestion that parent firms 
seek to control the overall IJV, rather than targeting specific activities or processes 
perceived as crucial for achievement of the IJV's or the parents' strategic objectives 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989). 
Killing (1983) studied control in thirty-seven JVs from developed countries. Building in 
part on the work of Tomlinson (1970), Killing employed interviews of parent company 
executives and JV general managers to examine parent firms' influence on nine types of 
decisions: pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, manufacturing process, 
quality control, replacement of managers, sales targets, cost budgeting and capital 
expenditures. Killing classified each sample venture as either a dominant partner JV 
(where only one of the parents played a dominant role in decision-making), a shared 
management JV (where each parent played an active role in decisions), or an independent 
JV (where the JV general manager enjoyed extensive decision-making autonomy). 
Killing argued that JVs are intrinsically more difficult to manage because of the way they 
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are constituted, with a small number of powerful parents who are liable to disagree on 
many issues. He observed that since the presence of two (or more) parents constitutes the 
major source of management difficulties in JVs, dominant partner JVs, in which the 
venture's activities are dominated by a single parent, will be easier to manage and 
consequently more successful. 
This argument is especially easy to interpret within a transaction cost analytical 
framework, where transaction costs are defined as the costs assumed by firms for the 
enforcement, monitoring and administration of a transaction (Williamson, 1981). 
According to Williamson (1981) firms tend to choose structural arrangements for 
transactions (markets or hierarchies) that minimize these costs. Viewed from this 
perspective, dominant control is a mechanism for reducing the costs associated with 
coordination, potential conflicts and disclosures and, consequently, for minimizing 
transaction costs and stabilizing the IJV. 
The attempt to exercise more control than is necessary will not only incur additional 
direct costs; it could have negative consequences. As Schaan (1988: 5) put it, 'in order to 
ensure the success of a joint venture, managers seek to strike a subtle balance between 
the desire and need to control the venture on the one hand, and the need to maintain 
harmonious relations with the partner(s) on the other hand'. Moreover, if parents either 
singly or together try to control their alliances too much, this may inhibit the flexibility 
which the latter need in order to develop within their own competitive environments 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1993). So, as Ohmae (1993: 42) argues, 'Managers must overcome the 
popular conception that total control increases chances of success. ' 
2.1.5 Focus of Control 
The realization that control in alliances does not have to be an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon has drawn attention to the possibility that parents may seek to focus their 
control on specific activities, decisions, or processes which they perceive to be crucial for 
the alliance's performance or for the achievement of their own strategic objectives 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989). Explicitly defining control as "the process through which a 
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parent company ensures that the way a JV is managed conforms to its own interest" 
(Schaan 1983: 57), Schaan demonstrated that firms tended to seek control over specific 
"strategically important activities" rather than over the whole IJV. Schaan's finding that 
control also had a focus dimension, suggests that the exercise of effective control should 
emphasize selective control over those dimensions a parent perceives as critical, rather 
than attempting to control the entire range of the IJV's activities. This notion of selective 
control raises the prospect of a split control IJV, one in which a parent firm may exercise 
dominant control over only a few dimensions of the venture. 
Geringer's (1988) study of ninety developed country JVs supported Schaan's finding that 
control had a focus dimension, in that parents may choose to exercise control over a 
relatively wide or narrow range of the JV's activities. The research conducted on Sino- 
foreign EJVs by Child et al. (1997) also found that foreign- and local-partner control was 
focused to some extent on those areas of JV activity in which they enjoyed competence 
advantages. However, in a developing country situation like China it is the foreign 
partners who normally bring most of the technology and expertise to alliances, and this 
leads to an overall imbalance between levels of foreign and Chinese control. The 
implication of the focus dimension to control is that it is effective for alliance parents to 
exercise control selectively over those activities and decisions the parent regards as 
critical. This selective approach becomes more sensible in view of the transaction costs 
of exercising control. The costs of managing some areas of alliance activity may be less 
for one partner, because of its acquired competence and familiarity in so doing, than for 
another partner. 
2.1.6 Levels of Control 
There are two levels of control in alliances: strategic control and operational control. 
Strategic control is control over the means and methods on which the whole conduct and 
future direction of an alliance depends. These include its capital, the form of assets in 
which the capital is embodied, and its strategic dispositions such as the markets or areas 
of need to be served, the communities and labour markets in which the organization is 
located, its external relations with suppliers, competing organizations, and government 
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agencies. The ability that partners have to exercise power within their alliances derives 
primarily from control at this strategic level. 
The second level of control, operational control, is over the work done within an alliance. 
The ability to exercise control within an organization at the operational level is largely 
dependent on, and certainly facilitated by, control at the strategic level. The situation can 
therefore arise in which one alliance partner does not have the formal ultimate authority 
to determine its strategy, due to a minority ownership, but -where in practice its technical 
or other expertise relevant to managing the alliance's operations can heavily influence 
strategic decision-making. 
2.1.7 Foundations for Control 
The main theories on the subject of control identify three main factors that provide bases 
for control in strategic alliances. The first is a majority equity shareholding that provides 
the legal voting rights to determine the venture's policies through its board of directors 
unless specific restrictions are placed on those powers. The second factor has been 
identified as an alliance partner's bargaining power. This is assumed to derive from the 
availability of alternative partners, the importance of the alliance for the partner's own 
strategy, and the partner's commitment of resources to the alliance. A partner's ability or 
willingness to commit key resources to an alliance links to the third factor that is argued, 
it can provide a lever for control. This is the advantage a partner has over others in its 
ability to provide resources that are critical to the alliance's success (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). The provision of such resources may bring with it the justification for installing 
the partner's managerial and technical systems, and for the nomination of staff to run 
these, which are themselves further levers for exercising control. 
Blodgett (1991) analyzed data on 279 two-party IJVs between USA and a variety of 
developed- and developing-country foreign partners. She concluded that the possession 
of valued technology appears to give considerable bargaining power to a JV partner 
leading to its acquisition of more equity share, particularly once that partner gains 
familiarity with the local market and environment and so relies less on its local associate 
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for such knowledge. On the other hand, host government persuasion could reverse the 
process, enabling the local partner to increase its equity ownership. 
Killing (1983) examined thirty-seven IJVs, of which thirty-five were alliances between 
developed-country partners, and concluded that ownership and dominance are not 
necessarily related. As explanation, Killing offered the interpretation given by an 
experienced and successful JV general manager-namely, in any alliance that depends on 
the goodwill and cooperation of both partners for its success, the majority owner cannot 
force issues by taking them to a vote. A reasonable conclusion from this pioneering study 
would be that a majority equity share goes a long way towards providing the partner with 
a basis for dominant control over an IJV, but that it is also possible for a non-majority 
shareholder to develop a strong position through the other mechanisms of control. 
Glaister (1995) examined the same issues in a study of control in ninety-four UK JVs 
with partners from Western Europe, USA and Japan. Glaister (1995) found that most of 
the non-equity cooperative alliances operated on a basis of shared control. Their 
management teams tended to be drawn equally from both partners, both partners tended 
to have the right to veto decisions made by the JV management, and management-control 
systems tended to be derived from both partners. In the case of the IJVs, those UK 
partners which owned at least a half share of them not only possessed the control 
advantages associated with being the majority equity-holder, but had also in most cases 
been able to build upon this advantage by deriving several other mechanisms of control. 
Schaan's (1988) conclusion that a JV partner can secure control even while owning a 
minority equity share therefore appeared difficult to realize in this sample. Schaan's 
conclusions were drawn from JVs between companies from developed and developing 
countries. In this latter case, alliances depend quite heavily on the developed-country 
partner for technical and managerial skills, thus providing it with a substantial alternative 
basis for exercising control, even if it has a minority equity holding. 
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Yan and Gray (1994,1996) conducted a qualitative study of partner bargaining power 
and control in four Sino-US equity manufacturing JVs and a complementary qualitative 
study in ninety such ventures. They assessed parent-company bargaining power during 
negotiations to form the JVs in terms of two dimensions: the alternatives each partner 
possessed when negotiating the venture and the strategic importance of the JV to each 
partner. Equity share and the relative provision by parent companies of non-capital 
resources were taken as measures of bargaining power during the operational life of the 
JV. Parent-company control over the JVs was assessed indirectly 'with reference to the 
composition of their boards of directors (as a measure of strategic control), the 
nomination of the general and deputy general managers and the decision-power distance 
between them (as a measure of control over operational issues), and similarities between 
JV and parent-company organizational structures and operational procedures (as a 
measure of structural control). Equity share strongly predicted the amount of control a 
parent company exercised over the IJV's strategy and, to a lesser extent, its level of 
operational control. The more that one parent company provided non-capital resources 
relative to the other(s), the greater tended to be the operational control it exercised. 
There is support for Schaan's argument that the determination of a JV's management 
structure can provide alliance partners with a lever for control in addition to its ownership 
commitment. Because senior appointments are not entirely dependent on equity and other 
resource commitments, the implication is that they can to some extent be negotiated in 
their own right. If there is broad compatibility between the partners' objectives, then it 
should be possible for control, in the sense of influence, to be shared at the strategic 
level, even if one partner clearly enjoys greater operational competencies and should 
therefore exercise the greater control at that level. The proposition, in other words, is that 
cooperation between firms will usually work best if they each perceive that they have a 
sufficient voice over the strategic direction it will take. Within an agreed set of long-term 
goals and priorities, it may then be quite acceptable to all concerned for one partner to 
take the lead in controlling certain operational areas in which it clearly enjoys superior 
expertise, experience, or knowledge. 
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Selekler-Goksen and Uysal-Tezolmez (2007) evaluated the relative significances of 
different control mechanisms in creating control and analyzing the impact of control on 
performance. Investigation of the impact of different control mechanisms on strategic and 
operational control revealed that capital and non-capital resource contributions, and 
particularly the latter, emerge as significant sources of control. While equity ownership 
was positively associated with strategic control, board representation did not have a 
significant relationship with either control type. Rather than `forcing' their partners 
through the legal rights that emerge from ownership or board representation, local 
parents seemed to rely more on their expertise and local connections to `convince and 
lead' them. As far as the relationship between control and performance was observed, 
while strategic and operational control may have affected various financial returns to the 
local parents, they were not creating a difference in terms of goal actualization. Local 
parents were satisfied with the extent to which they have been able to actualize their 
objectives and this seemed to be the case even when they did not exercise high degrees of 
control. 
To deal with the complexity of management control of joint ventures, Kamminga and 
Van der Meer Kooistra (2006) developed a new theoretical model which pays specific 
attention to the characteristics of the parents' contributions and the three dimensions of 
management control of joint ventures. A conclusion from the findings of the case studies 
was that the characteristics of the parents' contributions have an important impact on 
joint venture control. The cases gave support to the basic argument of the theoretical 
model that, due to the low level of information asymmetry, a parent can exercise tight 
control over the joint venture activities which relate to its own contributions. A more 
refined understanding of the exercised control requires more in-depth knowledge about 
the whole range of the parents' activities and expertise as well. When considering the 
theoretical model developed, the different joint venture types have different suitable 
control characteristics. According to Kamminga and Van der Meer Kooistra (2006), if 
there is a good match between joint venture type and control characteristics, all types 
may have a satisfactory performance. 
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Chalos and O'Connor (2004) tested the effects of partner equity ownership, knowledge 
dependence and asset specific investments on JV controls. Controls suggested by the 
joint venture literature have included expatriate staffing, socialization practices, 
delegated decision responsibilities, parent company communications and incentives. We 
examined the hypothesised control determinants from the perspective of both JV 
partners. Based on field visits and survey data, we found that partner equity ownership 
influenced expatriate staffing but none of the other control mechanisms. Relative to 
partner knowledge dependence and specific asset investments, bargaining dominance 
conferred by majority equity ownership appeared to offer little explanation of JV control 
mechanisms. We found knowledge dependency and asset specific transaction costs to be 
determinants of controls to varying degrees for each partner. Beamish and Delios (2001), 
and Dyer and Singh (1998), argue that intangible partner knowledge and specific asset 
contributions determine the control mechanisms of the venture. The different partner 
perceptions of controls that were found are an indication of perhaps unavoidable control 
misalignment between the partners. Partner differences in their perceptions of control 
mechanisms are determined largely by their respective motives. This represents an 
inherent source of instability within the JV (Child and Faulkner, 1998; Yan and Luo, 
2001). The design of the JV control system serves to manage but not eliminate both 
collaborative and competitive forces that are simultaneously at work within the alliance. 
Luo (2001) proposed and empirically confirmed several relationships between strategic 
determinants and equity sharing. First finding of the study was that an MNE's equity 
share in an IJV is positively associated with the proactiveness and futurity the MNE 
seeks from the venture. Second, an MNE's equity share in an IJV is positively associated 
with the extent to which the MNE needs to protect the proprietary knowledge it commits 
to the venture. Third, an MNE's equity share in an IJV is negatively associated with the 
extent to which the MNE needs a local partner's resources, skills, or knowledge. Fourth, 
an MNE's equity share is positively associated with the extent to which the MNE needs 
to maintain global integration of the IJV business. Lastly, an MNE's equity share is 
positively related to the extent to which it pursues long-term economic benefits, but is 
negatively associated with the extent to which it pursues market entry. 
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2.1.8 Autonomy 
The issue of how much autonomy, if any, to grant an international joint venture is 
currently a major issue faced by both researchers and practitioners (Newburry and Zeira, 
1999: 263). This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms, each of which is 
economically and legally independent of the other (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987: 547). As a 
starting point in examining the autonomy literature, it might be helpful to briefly 
distinguish between two dimensions of IJV management which are interrelated and often 
confused - autonomy and control. Autonomy refers to an IJV manager's ability to perform 
tasks independently of its parent companies. This is an informal measure which is not 
based on formal authority, but rather on ability (Newburry and Zeira, 1999). Hill and 
Hellriegel (1994: 596) defined autonomy in a more formal manner as 'the degree of 
decision making latitude allowed to the joint venture management by the partners'. 
A key intervening concept in the distinction between formal definitions of autonomy and 
control is authority (Newburry and Zeira, 1999). Formal control refers to the authority 
that IJV parents have over their IJV, which they allocate between themselves. Formal 
autonomy, by contrast, refers to authority that the IN receives from the parents. The 
distinction between control and autonomy also becomes evident when examining how 
these two concepts have been previously measured. Control studies have generally 
concentrated on obtaining data from parent-level sources. Autonomy studies have usually 
utilized IJV level sources, concentrating on IJVs' abilities to act independently. 
Lyles and Reger (1993: 400) concluded that 'a JV that faces united parents may be less 
successful in gaining autonomy'. As noted by Harrigan (1986) and Hoon-Halbauer 
(1994), IJVs inherently involve a conflict between an IJV's need for autonomy and its 
parents' needs for co-ordination. One reason why this issue has been difficult to resolve is 
that autonomy can be granted for many activities ranging from daily business functions 
to long-term strategic planning. Using Bartlett's (1986) integration-responsiveness 
terminology, it may be the case that certain activities are more important to achieving 
global integration and other activities might be more important to achieving national 
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responsiveness. Therefore, the issue of how much autonomy to grant an IJV might be 
resolved by developing a hierarchy of autonomy situations. 
Buchel et at. (1998: 98-99) conclude that the optimal level of autonomy is that at which 
objectives can be met while total costs are kept to a minimum. Buchel et al. (1998: 100) 
note that the pattern of control and autonomy depends on two variables: strategic 
interdependence and environmental uncertainty. Usually, the greater the strategic 
interdependence, i. e. the dependence of two organizations on each other's inputs and 
outputs, the more control the partners exert over the IJV. The greater the environmental 
uncertainty, the higher the level of autonomy needed by the IJV to make independent 
adjustments to environmental changes. 
Glaister et al. (2003) examined the concept of autonomy in decision-making in a sample 
of UK-European equity joint ventures. The perspective from which an IJV should be 
viewed raises a number of concerns, largely because there are a number of different 
viewpoints on the venture, including the parent firms and the IJV management (assuming 
that the venture has a separate workforce, which is not necessarily the case). This means 
that there might be different views on aspects of autonomy, which may vary between 
partners and between partners and IJV management (Glaister et al., 2003). It is clear that 
autonomy is a concept that is capable of a number of interpretations based on managers' 
differing conceptual understanding partially influenced by cultural differences. Glaister et 
al. (2003) note that a perceptual measure of autonomy across the IJV system provides 
information regarding the extent to which the IJV is viewed as autonomous by the 
respective parents and the IJV management. 
The findings of Glaister et al. 's (2003) study show that there is a spectrum of autonomy 
across decision-making areas. IJV managers have a relatively high degree of operational 
autonomy but relatively low levels of strategic autonomy in decision-making. The 
findings further show that operational decision making by IJV managers takes place 
within the context of a set of constraints established by the partners and decided through 
the board of the IJV. Provided that IJV managers' decisions are within the acceptable 
29 
boundaries of the business plan then partners allow IJV managers decision-making 
autonomy. As long as IJV managers provide the necessary information through the board 
and they act in the way they are expected, they are allowed a relatively high degree of 
operational autonomy. It is necessary, of course, for partners to clearly communicate 
their expectations to IJV managers, and for IJV managers to be aware of the partners' 
goals for the IJV. The business plan is not necessarily `handed down' to the IJV 
management from the partners, but may be developed by the IJV management and `sold' 
to the partners. 
While there has been some attempt in the literature to develop a measure of IJV 
autonomy (e. g. Newburry and Zeira, 1999), in general, studies have not relied on 
perceptual measures of autonomy. This is in contrast with the literature relating to IJV 
performance where concerns over the ability of financial and objective measures to 
effectively capture alliance performance have led several researchers to turn to perceptual 
measures of a parent's satisfaction with alliance performance (Beamish, 1985; Dussauge 
and Garrette, 1995; Inkpen and Birkenshaw, 1994; Killing, 1983; Lyles and Baird, 1994; 
Schaan, 1983). 
2.1.9 Arguments against IJV Autonomy 
As noted by Lyles and Reger (1993), there appears to be a general assumption that IJVs 
should not have complete autonomy in their actions. Harrigan's (1985: 334) research 
revealed that too much autonomy may result in IJV termination when the IJV evolves 
quicker than expected into a strong organization with the ability to stand alone. At this 
point, the IJV may have become too strong for its parents to manage effectively, and 
accordingly the parents may no longer gain the benefits for which the IJV was pursued. 
Parent company involvement in IJV management also allows a parent to protect its 
investment and its technology, as well as guard against their partners' hidden agendas 
(Daniels and Magill, 1993). By limiting an IJV's autonomy, a parent company can guide 
the policy and actions of its IJV as well as monitor, coordinate and integrate the IJV's 
activities with those of the parent (Geringer, 1993). It also allows a parent an easier route 
to implement its own hidden agendas. 
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Child and Markoczy (1993) found that local managers in China and Hungary were 
reluctant to make decisions and to accept responsibility for their actions, largely due to 
constraints, expectations and the reward structure placed upon them by their respective 
systems of industrial governance. These managers were quick to shift blame to their 
foreign partners. Bangert and Poor (1995), after studying 165 small and medium-sized 
IJVs in Hungary, noted that parent company involvement in decision making may be 
perceived by Hungarian IJV managers as one method of avoiding risk. Granting 
autonomy to IJV managers means that they are expected to formulate and/or implement 
policies in uncertain environments, namely, that they are forced to take risks. In high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures, IJV managers may perceive that granting them the 
autonomy to make important decisions without parent company close guidance enables 
their parent companies to blame them for failure instead of assigning blame to the parent 
companies. 
Related to the above arguments, Beamish (1988) found that IJVs operating in less 
developed countries generally received less autonomy than those in developed countries 
due in part to a lack of managerial depth within the country. Thus, an argument for not 
granting autonomy might be made when local management is believed to be incapable by 
the IJV's parent companies. 
2.1.10 Arguments for IJV Autonomy 
Lyles and Reger (1993: 399) concluded that "instead of accepting the premise that JVs 
should be controlled to the same extent as wholly-owned subsidiaries or the assumption 
that control should be divided among parent firms, more fruitful research may begin with 
the notion that significant autonomy should rest with the JV management". In support of 
granting IJV autonomy, Killing (1983) describes a failure cycle "where poor IJV 
performance leads to lower IJV autonomy, subsequently leading to inefficient decisions 
and even poorer IJV performance". Harrigan (1985: 335) found that "experienced parents 
gave their children more autonomy in operating decisions ... than 
did first-time parents". 
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The previous problems are further complicated when decisions regarding a venture must 
be coordinated among multiple parent companies. Killing (1983: 84) noted that 'the 
potential for fighting and confusion and political intrigue increases enormously when two 
parents are involved' in the management of their IJVs. Zeira and Shenkar's (1990) 
findings indicate that when the goals of IJV parents differ, this causes a state of confusion 
within the IJV, especially when one parent's hidden agenda of disarming another parent 
becomes known to the IJV managerial team. As noted by Hoon-Halbauer (1994) and 
Beamish (1988), general managers of JVs are most likely to be loyal to their JV above 
being loyal to their parents. Hence, incompatibility in goals can be managed by 
autonomy because local management generally knows what works best in local 
circumstances, and acts to initiate programmes which are in the best interests of the IJV. 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) stated that usually headquarters' managers lack an 
understanding of the skills and limitations involved in operating in environments 
dissimilar to that of the parent companies and hence headquarters' executives should be 
aware of this shortcoming., This suggests that the higher the environmental 
dissimilarities, the higher the recommended. venture autonomy. Hoon-Halbauer (1994) 
and Harrigan (1986) added that when competition in a market is volatile, flexibility and 
autonomy are essential. Bleeke and Ernst (1991) concluded that autonomy is necessary to 
allow IJVs the freedom of action required to accomplish successfully their goals because 
of confusing directions given by multiple parents and a need to be able to adapt to a 
changing environment. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993: 25) concluded that 'a partnership is best able to resolve or avoid 
conflicts when it has its own management team and a strong board with operational 
decision-making authority'. They also found that allowing an IJV flexibility in 
formulating its strategies and procedures enables it to quickly analyse opportunities and 
threats within its host country environment. Bleeke and Ernst (1991: 132) found that 
'operating decisions are best made by managers whose sole focus is the W. Cauley de la 
Sierra (1995: 92) concluded that "if the executives running a venture are left alone, they 
will take a direct - sometimes even personal - stake in working hard and building a 
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successful business". Hence, parent companies are advised to equip their ventures with 
all the resources needed to operate as an independent entity. Moreover, locating a JV in a 
third country gives the venture the best chance of meeting its objectives and developing 
into a self-sustaining entity. 
As noted by Killing (1983) and Hoon-Halbauer (1994), the parent assuming the dominant 
position should be the one which possesses the capabilities necessary to effectively run 
the IJV. It is suggested here that with the comfort of their own personnel in charge, 
dominant IJV parents will give their IJV managers the ability to pursue actions 
autonomously. Combined with a clear sense of direction (due to the managers' close ties 
to the parent company), it is thus proposed that these IJVs will be more effective. This 
seems to provide benefits to both the parent company and the IJV. For the parent 
company, it allows a feeling of ease that the venture will be run in a manner consistent 
with, the parent company's objectives. For the IJV, it provides the managerial team with 
the freedom and flexibility to adapt to local conditions without headquarters interference. 
2.1.11 Explanations for Autonomy 
One explanatory model for the degree of autonomy of joint-ventures comes from 
resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This theory states that the 
power of one organization to influence decision-making in another organization depends 
upon the extent to which that other organization is dependent upon the first for resources 
(Butler and Sohod, 1995). The joint-venture is dependent upon the parents, usually for 
finance, perhaps also for other inputs, or for providing access to markets for products. 
Hence, the pattern of ownership and the resources the joint-venture derives from the 
parents will give the power base to the parents by which they can exert control over their 
creation. However, a joint-venture may be able to develop some markets for its products 
independent of the parents. 
The greater the dependence of the joint-venture upon the parents the less the autonomy of 
the joint-venture is expected to be and the greater the influence of the parents over 
decision-making (Moxon et at., 1988). This influence may vary across different decision 
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topics or issues, but the parent companies are also dependent upon the joint-venture for 
certain outputs whether these be production of finished products, intermediate 
components, research and development, or other factors. Therefore the net dependence of 
the parents over the joint-venture needs to be considered in order to establish the 
autonomy of the joint-venture over a range of decisions. 
Transaction costs theory gives a different perspective upon the management of joint- 
ventures. Buckley and Casson (1988) identify three aspects of transaction costs theory 
that are relevant to consideration of joint-venture formation: (1) the parents gain benefits 
derived from internalizing a market in one or more intermediate goods or services 
between the joint-venture and the parents; (2) there may be technical indivisibilities 
around which the joint-venture is formed; or (3) there are disincentives to a merger 
between the parents. 
Underlying the transactions costs approach is a theory about the managerial cost of 
making the necessary decisions to maintain control over a joint-venture. The parent 
companies expect to receive a return to their investment from the joint-venture but they 
have the problem of managing the related transactions. According to this theory, 
transactions are more costly to manage as "information impactedness" and "bounded- 
rationality" increase (Williamson, 1975). Information impactedness refers to an 
asymmetry in information concerning a transaction whereby one partner is better 
informed than another about conditions surrounding the transaction and thus the ability of 
the first partner to control the second is increased. If one partner has greater information, 
the other partner has a condition of bounded-rationality (March and Simon, 1958); this 
other partner therefore lacks the necessary information to be able to make well informed 
decisions as regards the partnership. 
Williamson (1985) concentrates upon the nature of the contract between the partners to a 
transaction. When an asset is specific it means that it is relatively homogeneous and can 
be clearly stated in a contract thereby allowing market transactions to be more easily 
governed. Hence, in the case of a joint-venture, a specific contract would require a 
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number of conditions, in particular, a technology which is reliable and relatively 
unchanging, and agreement about the goals of the venture between the parents. When the 
transaction between the joint-venture and its parents can be clearly specified it now 
becomes easier for the parents to delegate autonomy to the joint venture. 
When the objectives of the joint-venture are ambiguous and there is lack of clarity over 
what the joint-venture is doing greater managerial effort is needed on the part of the 
partners and hence less decision-making autonomy for the joint-venture. In Williamson's 
terms this means greater internalization of decision-making and a shift towards a more 
intensive form of hierarchical organization. The ability to write a precise contract clearly 
stating objectives makes management easier and, providing the objectives are reached, 
permits less direct involvement in decision-making and the intermediate joint-venture 
becomes feasible. Ambiguity is also likely to be increased by a high degree of change 
taking place in the operations and its associated technology. 
Combining the two explanatory models, the condition of minimum joint-venture 
autonomy would therefore tend to appear under high resource-dependence and high 
transaction ambiguity, while maximum autonomy would appear under low resource- 
dependence and high transaction specificity. The achievement of the IJV's aims depends 
on linking the IJV closely with the parents to achieve the requisite internal market and 
resource links whilst allowing a certain degree of decision-making freedom to the IJV 
managers who are closest to its environment and internal capabilities. 
2.1.12 Methods to Gain JV Autonomy 
Drawing on both the upward influence in unified structures and the external control 
literatures, Lyles and Reger (1993) identified five distinct categories that capture the 
methods available to JV managers to gain autonomy. These mechanisms originate both 
from the position of JV managers in social and organizational networks and from the 
influence potential of the JV as an organization. Thus, both individual and organizational 
levels of analysis are essential to encompass the variety of influence means suggested by 
the literature. In a JV relationship the parents, through their ownership stakes, possess 
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legitimate authority over the JV. In addition, most new JVs are dependent upon their 
parent firms for a variety of resources including capital, technology, marketing expertise, 
and managerial talent. Therefore, parent firm managers are expected to possess greater 
power vis-a-vis JV managers, especially in new JVs. 
The first two categories, formal and informal relationships with parent firms, constitute 
direct upward influence techniques. Formal relationships with parent firms encompass 
structural reporting lines and dependence on parental resources. Since formal, legitimate 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the JV and its parents do not exist, JV 
managers can influence their parent firms through informal means. For example, it can 
play one parent again the others. Establishing trust, applying pressure, using informal 
contacts, and agenda setting constitute informal methods for upward influence (Jaeger 
and Baliga, 1985; Mowday, 1978; Schilit and Locke, 1982). Lateral influence is expected 
to be more effective than upward influence since legitimate authority does not have to be 
overcome. In IJVs, lateral relations may exist among parent firms, between parents and 
their stakeholders, and between parents and the JV's stakeholders. IJV managers can seek 
support from outsiders by influencing, coalescing, and gaining information from 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, licensers, competitors and government 
(Harrigan, 1985; MacMillan and Jones, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980). 
All of these actions can increase JV managers' ability to negotiate with and influence 
their parents. 
Thirdly, structural independence including independent facilities, internal functional 
areas, separate information systems and remote physical location allows the IJV to use its 
physical segregation to achieve decision-making autonomy. Structural independence 
reduces the IJV's dependency upon the parents for resources and, thus, provides the 
parents with less power over the IJV (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Harrigan (1985) 
suggests that strategic differentiation in terms of products, markets, suppliers, and 
technology also will increase decision-making autonomy. Given the increased 
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding control issues in joint ventures, IJVs provide 
greater opportunity than unified structures for IJV managers to influence decisions 
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(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Thus, IJV characteristics influence the ability of the parent 
to control the JV (Harrigan, 1985; Lyles, 1988,1991; Ouchi, 1977). Finally, the personal 
characteristics of IJV managers affect the ability of JVs to influence parent firms (Fiol, 
1986; Lyles, 1991). It is expected that personal characteristics of the manager will be 
important determinants of IJV autonomy. 
JV managers utilize a variety of individual level techniques to influence the decisions 
made, such as personal interactions with parent firm managers and gaining co-operation 
from those outside the formal authority structure. Influence attempts through these 
relationships may be relatively easy due to the power equivalency expected in lateral 
relationships; that is, JV managers may be more likely to achieve greater co-operation 
from other stakeholders than from parents who are in direct upward relationships (Lyles 
and Reger, 1993). If these stakeholders are dependent upon the JV for products or 
services, they are more likely to aid it than parent firms would. This is because outside 
stakeholders may benefit from the JV's increased independence, but they do not stand to 
lose control as the parents might. 
2.1.13 Summary 
As corporations increasingly utilize alliances such as IJVs as tools for attaining strategic 
objectives, the issue of IJV control is experiencing a corresponding increase in attention 
from academics and practitioners alike. Yet, understanding of IJV management lags 
behind the demands of practice. Although a wide variety of control mechanisms have 
been identified, managers have received minimal guidance about when and how to use 
them, as well as about the potential tradeoffs between alternative control options. Review 
of the literature leaves no doubt that control is a crucial organizational process, for IJVs 
as well as for any other organizational form. It is also a complex and multidimensional 
concept. This feature may help explain why researchers have used different approaches 
to study control in IJVs. These differences are 
conceptualization and operationalization of control. 
particularly evident in the 
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There are three dimensions of control in IJVs that in principle apply to all alliances. 
These are the extent of control exercised over a JV, the focus of that control, and the 
mechanisms by which control is exercised. The use of different mechanisms for 
controlling alliances is in practice likely to reflect a number of considerations. The 
realization that control in alliances does not have to be an all-or-nothing phenomenon has 
drawn attention to the possibility that parents may seek to focus their control on specific 
activities, decisions, or processes which they perceive to be crucial for the alliance's 
performance or for the achievement of their own strategic objectives. There is relatively 
little evidence on control in strategic alliances, or on the factors that provide for control, 
despite its importance for partner companies. Indeed, among the available research 
studies, there is also the complication that some have examined control in alliances 
between partners from developed countries, while others have investigated control in 
alliances between developed and developing country partners. 
The issue of how much autonomy, if any, to grant an international joint venture is 
currently a major issue faced by both researchers and practitioners. One reason why this 
issue has been difficult to resolve is that autonomy can be granted for many activities 
ranging from daily business functions to long-term strategic planning. Autonomy is 
necessary to allow IJVs the freedom of action required to accomplish successfully their 
goals because of confusing directions given by multiple parents and a need to be able to 
adapt to a changing environment. When competition in a market is volatile, flexibility 
and autonomy are essential. Allowing an IJV flexibility in formulating its strategies and 
procedures enables it to quickly analyse opportunities and threats within its host country 
environment. 
An argument for not granting autonomy might be made when local management is 
believed to be incapable by the IJV's parent companies. Too much autonomy may result 
in IJV termination when the IJV evolves more quickly than expected into a strong 
organization with the ability to stand alone. IJV managers may perceive that granting 
them the autonomy to make important decisions without parent company close guidance 
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enables their parent companies to blame them for failure instead of assigning blame to 
the parent companies 
According to one explanatory model for IJV autonomy, the resource-dependence theory, 
the greater the dependence of the joint-venture upon the parents the less the autonomy of 
the joint-venture is expected to be and the greater the influence of the parents over 
decision-making. Underlying the transactions costs approach is a theory about the 
managerial cost of making the necessary decisions to maintain control over a joint- 
venture. When the objectives of the joint-venture are ambiguous and there is lack of 
clarity over what the joint-venture is doing greater managerial effort is needed on the part 
of the partners and hence less decision-making autonomy for the joint-venture. 
Combining the two explanatory models, the condition of minimum joint-venture 
autonomy would therefore tend to appear under high resource-dependence and high 
transaction ambiguity, while maximum autonomy would appear under low resource- 
dependence and high transaction specificity. 
Research on the nature and meaning of IJV autonomy is a relatively neglected area in the 
examination of IN activity. IJV autonomy is a rather fuzzy concept unless the distinction 
is drawn between strategic autonomy and operational autonomy. Giving an IJV 
management enough autonomy to genuinely run an independent business, but at the same 
time making sure that major strategic decisions are taken by equity partners, is a delicate 
task. 
This section, the first section of the literature review, has reviewed the literature on 
control and autonomy of international joint ventures. The next section of the literature 
review considers cultural differences between joint venture partners. 
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2.2: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Cultural differences between joint venture partners is the second section of the literature 
review, as shown in Figure 1.1 on page 4. This section examines the ways in which 
culture can impact upon the implementation of cooperative strategies. It shows how 
culture can create barriers to collaboration between organizations and yet how, at the 
same time, the knowledge embodied in cultures can provide a valuable resource for an 
alliance. Three commonly used measures of cultural distance- Hofstede's data 
dimensions of national culture, Kogut-Singh data index of cultural distance and Ronen 
and Shenkar's data culture clusters- are summarised. The following points are addressed: 
why culture is relevant for cooperative strategy, what specific consequences culture can 
have and what options there are for managing cultural diversity within alliances. The 
effect of dimensions of national and organizational culture differences on international 
joint venture (IJV) performance is examined. Six core organizational practices that 
differentiate organizations in their management orientation suggested by Hofstede are 
described. The influence of cultural distance on control of the joint venture is examined. 
Using Hofstede's five national culture dimensions, the fit between management practices 
and national culture are examined. Finally, the limitations of Hofstede's framework are 
addressed. 
2.2.2 Culture 
Cultural distance has received a great deal of attention in the international business 
literature (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema et al., 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997; 
Morosini et al., 1998; O'Grady and Lane, 1996; Evans and Mavondo, 2002). There is no 
one single definition which encapsulates the term "culture" wholly. It has been referred 
to as a set of shared experiences, understandings, and meanings among members of a 
group, an organization, a community, or a nation (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Mead, 
1998). Culture is also that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, 
morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by men and women as 
members of a society (Low and Leong, 2000). Culture is an ingrained behavioural 
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influence which affects the way collective groups approach, evaluate, and negotiate 
opportunities for international business. Different cultures have different models of 
management and different ideas of the nature of organizations (Hofstede and Hofstede, 
2005). Culture has been identified as a key factor in explaining foreign market 
attractiveness, expansion patterns, the degree of adaptation of marketing and retailing 
strategies, modes of entry, and organizational performance (Evans, 2000). When two or 
more companies start working together, their respective cultures come into contact: the 
local employee must deal with a different, sometimes unknown, foreign cultural 
environment, and likewise for the expatriate employee. The cultures represented in the 
international joint venture may collide and produce culture shock, disrupting the entire 
operation of the newly-formed company. 
2.2.3 Culture Measures 
Hofstede's dimensions of national culture 
Using survey research carried out between 1967 and 1978 within foreign subsidiaries of 
IBM, provided by 88000 respondents from 66 countries, Hofstede (1980) developed 
indices to measure four dimensions of national culture: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and individualism. Four dimensions of national 
culture (Hofstede, 1980) are used to operationalise cultural differences between the IJV 
partners: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity. The 
power distance dimension explains the acceptance of unequal power distribution among 
parties. The uncertainty avoidance dimension regards the extent to which people are 
threatened under uncertain circumstances. 
The individualism-collectivism dimension refers to the tendency to put more values on 
individual interest or group interest. Individual cultures are loosely coupled. Individuals 
are expected to look out for themselves and their immediate families. Status derives from 
individual accomplishment. Collective cultures rely on membership in groups - social 
classes, communities, religions, or extended families - for identity and status. People are 
protected by the group and are expected to act in the group's best interests. According to 
Newman and Nollen (1996), the Anglo countries of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
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Ireland, Canada, and the U. S. are very individualistic cultures. East Asian countries such 
as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong are very collective cultures. 
Lastly, the masculinity-femininity dimension refers to the tendency of whether economic 
success based on accumulation of material wealth is valued or whether interpersonal 
sensitivity based on concern for the welfare of others is valued. Masculine cultures are 
characterized by doing and acquiring rather than thinking and observing, similar to the 
"orientation toward activity" dimension identified by Kluckholn and Strodtbeck (1961). 
Masculine countries include Japan, the U. S. and the Germanic countries. Feminine 
countries are typified by Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Concerned that the distinction in four dimensions might be the result of a questionnaire 
developed by a biased "western mindset, " Hofstede and Bond (1988) subsequently used a 
questionnaire developed by Chinese scientists. They found a unique fifth dimension that 
they labelled "Confucian dynamism, " which captures the extent to which people have a 
future-oriented perspective rather than a focus on the present. Hofstede (1991) later 
renamed this dimension "long-term orientation. " People in societies characterized by a 
long-term orientation know many truths and are dynamic in their thinking (Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988). Relationships are largely ordered on the basis of status. 
Culture is often defined as a system of shared values that serves two critical functions: 1) 
to solve problems of external adaptation and 2) to solve problems of internal integration 
(Schein, 1985; Schneider, 1989). External adaptation is associated with defining the 
objectives and the strategy of the organization, and how opportunities and threats in the 
environment are perceived and responded to. These perceptions and responses are 
influenced by attitudes regarding uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation 
(Schneider, 1989; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991). Internal integration, in contrast, bears 
on the firm's relationship with its employees which, in turn, is influenced by attitudes 
towards power distance, individualism and masculinity (Schneider, 1989; Schneider and 
De Meyer, 1991). 
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Hofstede (1980) clustered the countries in his study on the basis of their placement on the 
four indices. Hofstede provides four defining factors of culture (nationality) backed both 
by theory and empirical evidence. More importantly these four defining factors are 
continuous variables, whereas culture and nationality are discrete variables. Differences 
in national culture are calculated by the absolute difference along each dimension i. e. INI1 
- NI2I where NI, and NI2 represent respective national culture indices of the partners 
from Hofstede's (1997) study. 
A key assumption of Hofstede's work, for instance, Hofstede (1980,1991) is that values - 
the core of national culture - are stable constructs and have been present in the peoples 
from different nations for a long period of time (Schein, 1985). The research resulting in 
Hofstede's four dimensions took place almost three decades ago. Although these 
dimensions have been validated since (Sondergaard, 1994), various researchers have 
endorsed the popular notion that cultures are converging (e. g. Ohmae, 1985; Levitt, 1983; 
O'Reilly, 1991) and have cast doubt on the explanatory power of Hofstede's dimensions 
in later periods (Adler et al., 1986). However, Hofstede's (1980,1991) work suggests that 
such changes concern convergences in so-called practices, superficial appearances of 
culture; they do not necessarily signal a convergence in the values embedded in national 
cultures. Thus, Hofstede's work suggests that differences between national cultures are 
still relevant. 
Kogut-Singh index of cultural distance 
Using Hofstede's indexes, Kogut and Singh (1988) developed a composite index based 
on the deviation along each of the four cultural dimensions- power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity/femininity and individualism- of each country from the United 
States ranking. They found that the mode of foreign direct investment is influenced by 
the cultural distance between the home country of the expanding firm and the host 
country. Their index of cultural distance has subsequently been used in many other 
studies, including Erramilli (1991), Benito and Gripsrud (1992), Loree and Guisinger 
(1995), and Barkema et al. (1996). However, Shenkar and Zeira (1992) have argued that 
this unidimensional index may oversimplify the rich and complex concept of cultural 
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distance. An aggregate index to measure national cultural distance (NCD) following the 
Kogut and Singh's (1988) formula: 
NCDD: 11 {(I; j - lid) 
2/V, } /4 
where I; j stands for the index for the it" cultural dimension and jth country, V; is the 
variance of the index of the it" dimension, d indicates the country of study and NCDj is 
national cultural distance of jth country from country of study. 
Culture clusters 
Considering the cultural diversity of other nationalities, Ronen and Shenkar (1985) 
synthesized country clusters to group non-Japanese cross-border joint ventures on the 
basis of the partners' cultural similarity. Ronen and Shenkar (1985) synthesized the 
results of eight studies and used individual-level data on attitudes and values to cluster 
various countries according to cultural similarity. Examples of these attitudes and values 
include those toward achievement, practical mindedness, sharing information, taking 
initiative, democratic leadership styles and commitment to an organization. Ronen and 
Shenkar developed eight clusters: Anglo, Germanic, Nordic, Latin European, Latin 
American, Near East, Far East and Arabic. 
The use of national units for clustering is logical because national boundaries delineate 
the legal, political, and social environments within which organizations and workers 
operate. Yet, to understand why certain countries cluster, one should look across national 
boundaries for the dimensions underlying the clusters. The principal dimensions 
underlying the country clusters are geography, language and religion. It is apparent that 
countries tend to group together geographically. Indeed, the names of the clusters 
describe geographic areas. There is one striking exception, however, to this geographical 
grouping: the Anglo-American cluster, which contains countries from all five continents. 
A language contains meanings and values that are likely to influence individuals' work 
goals. For the most part, the countries in each cluster share a language or language group. 
Religious beliefs are associated with certain values and norms, and some support for the 
correlation of those norms with employee work goals has been found (Ajiferuke and 
Boddewyn, 1970). Most groupings in the clusters have religion in common. 
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It is apparent that these three dimensions geography, language, and religion- are not 
independent. In fact, it is likely (though not certain) that countries with one of these 
elements in common will share all three. Another dimension, on which countries cluster, 
though less likely to be related to the previous three, is technological development. 
According to Webber (1969), the level of technology and the corresponding level of 
development will affect managerial style and attitudes. Haire et al. (1966) show the three 
developing countries of Argentina, Chile, and India clustered together despite cultural 
differences. 
2.2.4 Culture's Relevance to Cooperation 
Cooperative strategies bring together people from different organizations into a working 
relationship. The organizations from which they come will each have developed their 
own distinctive cultures. These cultures embody shared attitudes and norms of behaviour. 
They encourage people to regard their organization as different from and often superior 
to other organizations and therefore to hold onto their ways of doing things, particularly 
when confronted with those of a new and unfamiliar partner. If the collaborating 
organizations originate from different countries, their members will have a sense of 
belonging to distinct national cultures as well and the sense of difference between 
partners' managers and staff will be exaggerated as a result. When different cultures are 
brought together through a strategic alliance, they can generate barriers to cooperation 
while at the same time offering the potential for each partner to learn from the positive 
aspects of the other's ways of thinking and acting. However, the mutual learning cannot 
take place until the barriers are removed. 
Child and Faulkner (1998) suggest that cultural differences can pose a challenge for 
cooperative strategy in three main respects. First, the degree of difference between the 
cultures of prospective partner organisations may affect the cooperative form in which 
they are willing to engage. Second, a large cultural distance between prospective alliance 
partners is likely to protract the process of forming an agreement to cooperate. Third, 
cultural differences can give rise to operational problems. 
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It has been widely assumed that the degree of distance between the culture to which a 
firm is accustomed and that of the environment in which it is planning to invest will 
influence the kind of organisational arrangement it is willing to accept for that 
investment. However, there are conflicting arguments and inconclusive evidence 
concerning the effect that cultural distance will have (Shenkar, 2001). A high cultural 
distance is likely to generate additional risk and uncertainty in the perceptions of the 
investing company's decision makers, especially if the other culture is unfamiliar to 
them. 
Part of the risk lies in the need, in a culturally different environment, to depend on agents 
and partners whom it does not know well. It is therefore argued that a firm will seek to 
compensate for this risk by exercising greater control in its dealings with foreign agents 
and partners. If the presence of greater cultural distance between prospective alliance 
partners is associated with low levels of trust between them, they might be encouraged to 
seek managerial as well as legal safeguards for their crucial interests (Shane, 1994). This 
implies that in cases of high cultural distance the main investor or provider of key 
resources is likely to prefer direct foreign investment rather than licensing and in forming 
an IJV to hold a majority equity share that provides the right to managerial control. 
The counter argument is that when there is high cultural distance, a firm may prefer to 
rely on a local partner to contribute local knowledge and it will therefore be willing to opt 
for limited control over their cooperative venture. This may be a particularly important 
consideration in the early stages of entering an unfamiliar environment, such as that of 
many emerging economies, in which many parameters of doing business are subject to 
local negotiation (Beamish, 1988). Also insofar as limited control is associated with 
committing limited investment, this alternative will reduce the company's financial 
exposure in an unfamiliar environment. The inconclusive nature of the evidence on this 
issue probably reflects complexities that require further investigation. For example, high 
control may be more efficient when the firm entering a new market through a cooperative 
alliance enjoys a specific advantage that its partner cannot easily imitate or apply 
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(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). A firm that is already experienced in working within 
another culture may feel more confident about assuming a dominant control over the 
management of an alliance. 
A large cultural distance between prospective partners is likely to prolong the process of 
forming an agreement to cooperate. Because cultural differences increase the chances of 
mutual misunderstanding and even personal offence, they have to be transcended before 
a basis for trust can be established. And without mutual acceptance and trust, the risk of 
cheating and non-compliance with contacts is greater (Williamson, 1979). Particularly if 
the representatives and negotiators on behalf of the prospective partners are not familiar 
with each other's organizational and national cultures, the transcending of their cultural 
differences can come about only through a time consuming process of recognising the 
other cultures, demonstrating mutual tolerance and then finding ways of reconciling the 
differences. Additionally, the partner who is not familiar with the country context in 
which the alliance is to operate has to invest further time and effort in finding out how 
the cultural norms and institutional practices of the host country are likely to effect its 
calculations and plans for making the alliance into a profitable operation. 
Thirdly, cultural differences can lead to a good many operational problems. At worst, 
they can lead to a breakdown in the working relations between partners' managers and 
staff. If the partners' cultures convey conflicting priorities and norms of behaviour, they 
will heighten the sense of separateness between staff seconded or recruited by the 
partners to work together. This sense of being different is bound to be present anyway in 
the early stages of cooperation. Alliances are communication intensive and relationship 
dependent and they therefore cannot function well if they are internally divided by 
substantial cultural barriers. If cultural distance is not reduced or at least channelled into 
a form that avoids conflict, it is likely to give rise to serious breakdowns in 
communication of information and integration within the alliance. 
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2.2.5 Managing Cultural Diversity 
When organizations decide to cooperate, they often bring diverse cultures to their 
alliance. The more that the cultures of cooperative partners diverge, the more of a 
challenge it becomes to achieve a fit between them. Fit refers to the extent to which 
different cultures are brought into a workable relationship that permits the alliance to 
operate without undue misunderstanding and tension between the partners or between the 
staff they attach to the alliance (Child and Faulkner, 1998). Cultures that do not match, in 
the sense that they are different, may or may not be fitted together depending on the 
intentions, goodwill and skills of the members of the different cultures. A poor cultural fit 
is likely to breed suspicion and act as a barrier to the building of mutual trust. If actions 
or events damage trust between the partners, this will rekindle their sense of cultural 
difference and of having a separate rather than a common identity. 
In the case of international joint ventures, with evenly distributed ownership, neither of 
the partners can unilaterally impose its own cultural values on the venture. Together the 
partners must develop what Olie (1994, p. 385) called "a third culture composed of a 
combination of the two original cultures or, at least, a strongly modified version of one of 
the original cultures. " Faced with this dynamic process of cultural interchange or 
blending, the international joint venture is likely to generate individual and collective 
conflicts that can ultimately jeopardize the venture's, durability. The absence of a 
dominant reference culture requires that a strong cultural congruence should be promoted 
among the partners, although such an approach is often neglected (Zahra and Elhagrasey, 
1994). 
In seeking to develop a common culture for their alliance, the partners should attempt to 
analyse the strengths of their own organizational and national cultures and build these 
into the norms and behaviours adopted by their cooperative venture (Child and Faulkner, 
1998). The partner needs to maintain an active link with the venture, which the 
maintenance of a shared identity, as well as regular reporting procedures can both 
symbolise and underwrite. These links are a necessary complement to the development of 
the alliance's own culture. They enable the strengths of partner cultures to feed into the 
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alliance culture while, at the same time, reducing the risk of the alliance forming an 
identity and pursuing objectives that become at odds with those of its parents. It is 
beneficial to have a diversity of cultures among organisational members because this 
offers a stimulus to learning and sensitivity to local environments but at the same time 
there is a need to manage the cultures so that they become forces for integration rather 
than division. 
A corporate culture can be an important resource available to the leaders of organizations 
(Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Hampden-Turner, 1990; Brown, 1995). Because a shared 
culture encourages people to accept a common goal and to identify with each other, it can 
also facilitate the processes of coordination and control within an organization. By giving 
the members of an organization common reference points and ways of interpreting 
reality, a shared culture can reduce uncertainty and promote consistency of effort. In 
providing meaning to their work and to their membership of an organization, an 
appropriate and cohesive culture can also be an important source of motivation for 
employees. For these reasons, an alliance between partner companies should benefit if 
they permit and indeed encourage, it to develop its own culture. 
2.2.6 Cultural Durability 
According to Meschi (1997), not all forms of cultural difference can be considered equal: 
the ethnic specificity within each group of employees will tend to disappear faster than 
the organizational differences. Organizational culture indeed seems to be far more 
"durable" than national culture. For the sample of JVs, Meschi (1997) studied in 
Hungary, the culture inherited from organizational experience was clearly found to be 
more rigid and "solid" than the ethnic or national culture, which was found to be far more 
flexible and malleable. The notion that different types of culture should present levels of 
durability comes as no surprise. Earlier studies have largely validated this observation 
(Sathe, 1983,1985; Nabavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Buono and Bowditch, 1989). 
Certain studies have addressed the question of cultural durability (Deal and Kennedy, 
1982; Sathe, 1983,1985). Three major characteristics have been determined: the extent, 
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dissemination, and hierarchy of the fundamental cultural elements (i. e. beliefs, values, 
assumptions, and customs shared) throughout the company. Buono and Bowditch (1989, 
p. 147) point out that "the greater the degree of shared beliefs and values, the stronger the 
culture's influence. " It can be considered that organizational beliefs, values, assumptions, 
and customs held by the different groups of employees in the IJV are more widely shared 
within the individual organizational entity than within the national community as a 
whole. This confirms a widely held notion that organizational culture tempers the 
influence of national culture (Maurice et al., 1980; Adler, 1986). Under this line of 
reasoning, Adler (1986, p. 46) assumed that "employees working for the same 
organization, even if they are from different countries are more similar than different. " 
2.2.7 Cultural Distance and Joint Venture Performance 
Hofstede et al. (1990) found that, whereas organizations from different nations differ in 
fundamental values, organizations from the same nation differ only in organizational 
practices. The authors therefore concluded that when both national and organizational 
cultures are examined, the former should be operationalized in terms of values, and the 
latter in terms of core organizational practices. As such, although national and 
organizational cultures have been regarded as separate constructs, it is also widely 
accepted that organizational culture is nested in national culture. 
In the context of both mergers and joint ventures, scholars have generally argued that 
alliances between culturally similar partners are more likely to be successful than 
alliances between culturally dissimilar partners. Cartwright and Cooper (1993: 57) state 
that in alliances "selection decisions are generally driven by financial and strategic 
considerations, yet many organizational alliances fail to meet expectations because the 
cultures of partners are incompatible". Different culture types create different 
psychological environments for the joint venture or the merged company, and differences 
in practices have a negative influence on performance (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993). 
Thus, "the degree of culture fit that exists between combining organizations is likely to 
be directly correlated to the success of the combination" (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993: 
60). 
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National Culture Distance and IJV Performance 
Cross-national joint ventures have been reported to suffer from communication, 
cooperation, commitment, and conflict resolution problems caused by partners' value and 
behaviour differences, which in turn cause interaction problems that adversely influence 
joint venture performance (Harrigan, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Parkhe, 1991; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Values and behavioural differences between culturally 
distant partners influence interpretation and responses to strategic and managerial issues, 
compounding transactional difficulties in international joint ventures (Park and Ungson, 
1997). For example, cooperation-generating mechanisms vary between individualist and 
collectivist cultures because of the differences in their instrumental and expressive 
motives (Chen et al., 1998; Wagner, 1995). 
Commitment generating mechanisms are also different among different cultures, and 
cultural differences make it difficult to generate commitment between partners in joint 
ventures (Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano, 1995). For example, Cullen et al. (1995) found 
that while both U. S. and Japanese partners related their level of commitment to perceived 
benefits (satisfaction and economic performance); they differed in their perception of 
satisfaction. The Japanese partners perceived long-term organizational performance as an 
indicator of satisfaction and emphasized the nature of relationships as an important factor 
for commitment, while the U. S. partners were concerned with more immediate results. 
Further, on the assumption that personal relationships based on trust would lead to 
commitment, the Japanese managers, in contrast to the Western managers, preferred to 
personalize business practices and de-emphasize formal contracts (Cullen et al., 1995). 
Shenkar and Zeira (1992) argued because priorities and expectations of their parent firms 
may be different, managers of joint ventures are prone to role conflict. Methods of 
resolving conflicts may also vary across different cultures (Henderson, 1975). For 
example, whereas American managers prefer to use direct and confrontational legal 
tactics in dealing with other firms when other methods fail, Japanese executives prefer to 
be flexible in responding to unfolding problems and to avoid using formal, detailed 
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contracts that stress strict performance and enforcement (Henderson, 1975). Research 
also suggests that conflict resolution methods cannot be applied effectively from one 
culture to another. 
In previous studies, differences in the cultural backgrounds of the partners have generally 
been perceived as a threat to the survival of IJVs (Brown et al., 1989; Harrigan, 1988; 
Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Woodcock and Geringer, 1991). Consistent with this view, 
various studies (Barkema et al. 1996,1997; Li and Guisinger, 1991) have found that the 
chances of survival of IJVs are lower when the cultural distance between the home 
country of the expanding firm and the host country is large. In their study, Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1997), developed hypotheses about which differences in national culture are 
most disruptive for IJVs, as shown in Table 2.2.1. The hypotheses were tested on 
longitudinal data about 828 foreign entries of twenty-five Dutch multinationals in 
seventy-two countries between 1966 and 1994. The hypotheses regarding which 
differences in the cultural backgrounds of partners are particularly disruptive for IJVs are 
discussed below using Hofstede's five dimensions. 
Differences in uncertainty avoidance are difficult to cope with in the case of international 
cooperation (Hofstede, 1989). Organizations in countries characterized by high 
uncertainty avoidance tend to respond to uncertainty in the environment by building up a 
system of high formalization and hierarchy (Hofstede, 1980). In countries where 
uncertainty avoidance is low, however, people feel much more attracted to flexible, ad 
hoc structures which leave much room for improvisation and negotiation. In sum, 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) argue that differences in uncertainty avoidance lead to 
differences in how partners perceive and respond to events in the environment of the IJV, 
which will likely breed disagreement and dispute between the partners, and have a 
detrimental impact on the IJV's chances of survival. 
Power distance and individualism directly bear on issues of internal integration and 
influence relationships with personnel, such as the organization's choice of control forms, 
reward systems and so on (Hofstede, 1980; Kim, Park and Suzuki, 1990; Lebas and 
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Weigenstein, 1986). However, management of personnel is usually one of the first 
activities to be left to the local partner to organize (Hofstede, 1991; Rosten, 1991; 
Stopford and Wells, 1972). Furthermore, Hofstede (1985) and Shenkar and Zeira (1992) 
suggest that having partners from both feminine and masculine cultures may even benefit 
the IJV. The aggressive attitude of one partner (aimed at individual achievement and 
performance) and the relationship orientation of the other may complement each other 
rather than collide (Hofstede, 1980). 
Differences in the long-term orientation of the partners will likely lead to differences in 
objectives and in perceived opportunities and threats in the environment of the IJV 
(Schneider, 1989; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991). Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) note, 
one partner may have a sense of urgency and favour quick results, while the other has a 
long-term view and is more oriented towards investments in financial assets and in 
building up a relationship with the partner. Such differences will likely breed tensions 
and increase the probability of untimely dissolution of the IJV. As summarised in Table 
2.2.1, Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) conclude that differences in long-term orientation 
and uncertainty avoidance cause problems in IJVs, while differences in power distance, 
individualism and masculinity do not necessarily lead to problems. 
Overall, the underlying uncertainty due to cultural differences makes it costly to 
negotiate and transfer management practices and firm-specific technologies. Since 
national culture is perceived to be the fundamental differential factor in an IJV, even 
superficial differences might result in the partners choosing national culture as a primary 
form of identity (Salk and Brannen, 2000). A salient social identity leads to accentuation 
of similarities and differences between partners, perhaps causing individual differences to 
be associated with nationality (Salk and Brannen, 2000). Accordingly, IJV partners from 
different national cultures experience greater difficulty in their interactions (Lane and 
Beamish, 1990), which would adversely influence joint venture performance. 
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Organizational Culture Distance and IJV Performance 
Hofstede et al. (1990) suggest six core organizational practices that differentiate 
organizations in their management orientation: process versus result; employee versus 
job; parochial versus professional; open versus closed system; loose versus tight control; 
and normative versus pragmatic. The process versus result orientation dimension opposes 
a concern for means (process oriented) with a concern for goals (result oriented), which 
are respectively associated with Burns and Stalker's (1961) mechanistic and organic 
systems (Hofstede et al., 1990). While mechanistic systems focus on rigid division and 
allocation of tasks, organic systems focus on the overall task, allowing variations in the 
organization of sub-tasks. When partners in a joint venture differ on this dimension, they 
differ in the methods and practices adapted towards communication, goal achievement, 
career systems, power structures, and they face a conflicting set of job roles, expectations 
and practices. These differences lead to conflicting behaviours that would adversely 
influence joint venture performance. 
The employee versus job orientation dimension contrasts a concern for people (employee 
oriented) with a concern for getting the job done (job oriented). Hofstede et al. (1990) 
relate this dimension to the managerial grid developed by Blake and Mouton (1964). The 
position (9,1) on the grid represents the task management style in which a manager is an 
exacting taskmaster who expects schedules to be met and people to do what they are told. 
Disagreements are ruled out and suppressed rather than settled (Pugh and Hickson, 
1989). On the other hand, the position (1,9) on the grid represents the employee 
management style, in which managers do not push people for production and overlook 
their mistakes because members are considered to be doing the best they can. 
The parochial versus professional orientation dimension analyzes organizations based on 
whether employees derive their identity from the organization (parochial) or from the 
type of job (professional), which corresponds to internal versus external frames of 
reference (Hofstede et al., 1990). These two types of organizations represent two 
different forms of governance that are suitable and efficient in contrasting environments: 
"clan" form for parochial and "market" form for professional (Ouchi, 1980). When IJV 
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partners differ on this dimension, conflicts in their job structure, job expectation, reward 
systems and coordination mechanisms would result in conflicting behaviours from 
members and adverse consequences for IJV performance. 
The open versus closed systems orientation dimension differentiates organizations based 
on their communication climate (Hofstede et al., 1990). Differences in organizational 
practices are reflected in the communication climate and vice versa in an ongoing 
dynamic process of structuration where communication climate and organizational 
systems evolve continuously (Poole, 1985). Thus, in an IJV, when the communication 
climate is strained due to incongruent organizational practices between partners, 
differences in partners' expectations lead to conflicting behaviours and cause a mismatch 
in interaction processes (Jablin et al., 1987). 
The loose versus tight control orientation dimension classifies organizations based on 
their amount of internal structuring and management control (Hofstede et al., 1990), and 
represents a conflict between individual autonomy and organizational control (Hofstede, 
1967). Excessive differences between control orientations of partners would influence 
their patterns of communication. These patterns often become rigidly circumscribed and 
formalized, fostering negative attitudes, suspicion and dissociation between groups 
(Putnam and Poole, 1987). Thus, a mismatch in the levels of organizational control may 
cause interaction problems between joint venture partners. 
The normative versus pragmatic orientation dimension separates organizations into rule 
oriented (normative) and customer oriented (pragmatic) organizations (Hofstede et at., 
1990). The organizations in pursuit of excellence, according to Peters and Waterman 
(1982), stick to the principle of staying obsessively close to the customer and organize 
their systems and practices accordingly. Organizations differ in their practices depending 
on how committed they are to implementing this principle. The differences are all 
encompassing, influencing members' behaviour in every aspect of the business (Peters 
and Waterman, 1982). In joint ventures, differences in implementing this principle also 
cause pervasive differences in the partners' practices, resulting in conflicts between them. 
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In summary, organizational culture differences differentiate partners based on their 
management practices, which are deemed essential for the functioning of their respective 
organizations. Differences in practices represent conflicting expectations and 
incompatible organizational processes. Partners with dissimilar organizational cultures 
may expend time and energy to establish managerial practices and routines to facilitate 
interaction and may incur high costs and more mistrust than culturally similar partners 
(Park and Ungson, 1997). Brown et al. (1989) also concur that compatibility in partners' 
organizational cultures and practices could be a significant determinant of the 
performance of IJVs. Research on organizational climate similarity and performance also 
indicates that firms selecting a partner that has a similar organizational climate will have 
superior performance (Fey and Beamish, 2001). According to Ozorhon et al. (2008), 
differences in organizational culture have a greater impact on IJV performance than 
differences in national and host country culture. Ozorhon et al. (2008) also conclude that 
similarity between the national cultures of IJV partners has a negative effect on IJV 
performance. 
2.2.8 Cultural Distance and Control 
Scholarly work has examined the influence of cultural distance on entry mode choice, 
expatriate staffing, and level of ownership as it relates to control of the foreign subsidiary 
by the multinational corporation (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Boyacigiller, 1990; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Agarwal, 1994; 
Shane, 1994; O'Grady and Lane, 1996; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Anand and Delios, 
1997; Erramilli et al., 1997; Morosini et al., 1998; Hamilton and Kashlak 1999; Calhoun 
2002). Some scholars link cultural distance with the need for cooperative arrangements 
(Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Others 
submit that cultural distance problems can best be addressed with strong hierarchical 
control (Shane, 1994; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Erramilli et al., 1997). Thus, little 
agreement has been forthcoming with respect to the influence of cultural distance on 
control issues. 
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One stream of research, using the transaction cost approach, hypothesizes that 
multinational corporations increase their level of control in response to increasing 
cultural distance (Davidson and McFeteridge, 1985; Root, 1987). The implicit, 
underlying assumption is that high control modes are necessary because cultural distance 
and agency costs increase concurrently. The transaction cost approach posits that it will 
be more difficult to verify claims by culturally distant agents, since the agents will make 
claims rooted in an unfamiliar environment while buffered from enforcement by an MNE 
(Shenkar, 2001). Because internalization is a means of increasing operational certainty 
and a way to verify the claims of agents (Williamson, 1981), firms respond to increasing 
cultural distance by implementing high modes of control. 
This perspective has been supported by several studies. In their research on U. S. service 
firms with international operations, Erramilli and Rao (1993) found the level of control 
increased as cultural distance increased, while Anand and Delios (1997), using Japanese 
FDI data, found that joint ventures were more likely to form in culturally proximate 
countries. Boyacigiller (1990), in a study of a U. S. bank with 84 branch offices in 43 
countries, found the percentage of expatriates used in staffing foreign subsidiaries 
increased with cultural distance. Finally, both Padmanabhan and Cho (1996), who 
studied Japanese MNCs in 36 countries, and Pan (1996), who examined U. S., EU, and 
Japanese joint ventures in China, found percent ownership of the foreign subsidiary by 
the parent firm to be directly related to cultural distance. However, Pan (1996), found 
that cultural distance did not have any impact on percent ownership once the parent firm 
had achieved a controlling share in the subsidiary (50% or greater). 
In contrast, a second stream of research links increases in cultural distance with the 
loosening of control as a method for reducing uncertainty and information costs 
(Alpander, 1976; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Goodnow and Hansz, 1972). This 
perspective has received empirical support in a number of studies that reported low 
control modes at high cultural distance levels (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 
1992). For example, Kogut and Singh (1988) found that greater cultural distance 
increased the likelihood of greenfield IJVs over both greenfield WOSs and the 
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acquisition of a controlling stake in an existing operation. Their study was based on 228 
entries into the U. S. market from a variety of triad countries, as well as Malaysia and 
South Africa. This was the case even after removing Japan from the analysis. In addition, 
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) found the percent ownership of the foreign subsidiary by 
the U. S. parent firm to be inversely related to cultural distance for one category of 
countries. 
At least two studies have failed to find links between cultural distance and subsidiary 
control. Erramilli (1996) found no significant relationship between cultural distance and 
mode choice, while Richards (2001) found that cultural distance did not have an impact 
on the use of expatriates in staffing foreign subsidiaries. 
As shown in Table 2.2.1, Wilkinson et al. (2008) hypothesized that the impact of cultural 
distance on the control relationship between the subsidiary and the parent firm diminishes 
and eventually disappears as managers in the parent firm establish relationships and 
develop trust, gain knowledge of the host culture and design more appropriate control 
systems and culturally appropriate managerial practices, and provide better cultural 
training for expatriates and improved training for local employees. The impact of cultural 
distance on the control issues of expatriate staffing and the level of foreign ownership 
was moderated by the age of the subsidiary. Thus, for older subsidiaries, national cultural 
distance did not play a role in the assignment of expatriates or the level of ownership in 
the foreign subsidiary. Based on their results, they concluded that the impact of cultural 
distance on foreign subsidiary control appears to be temporary. 
These findings are in accordance with organizational learning theory (Barkema et al., 
1996; Shenkar and von Glinow, 1994) and the international process model (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977,1990). Familiarity with the host country occurs incrementally as firms deal 
with new kinds of problems and gain country-specific knowledge (Pennings et al., 1994). 
Experiential knowledge gained as the subsidiary ages allows firms to internalize country- 
specific knowledge (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), reduce costs and uncertainty (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1990; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988) and overcome the "liability of 
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foreignness" (Zaheer, 1995). For these reasons, the loosening of subsidiary control can be 
seen as the natural outcome of incremental adjustments made by the firm as it ages. 
Although greater cultural distance may initially necessitate high control modes (Davidson 
and McFeteridge, 1985; Root, 1987), the culture related problems that result can be 
overcome through this incremental adjustment process. As the firm adapts, the need to 
maintain tight control over the subsidiary lessens, eventually resulting in looser forms of 
control. 
2.2.9 National Culture and Management Practices 
Child's (1981) observation that national culture was underdeveloped conceptually for 
comparative research has been addressed in recent years with several attempts to 
conceptualize and measure differences in cultures among nations and to relate cultural 
differences to differences in management practices. There is ample empirical evidence 
that national cultures vary and that a variety of management practices, including strategic 
decision-making (Schneider and DeMeyer, 1991), leadership style (Dorfman and Howell, 
1988; Puffer 1993), and human resource management (Luthans et al., 1993) differ by 
national culture. 
National culture is a central organizing principle of employees' understanding of work, 
their approach to it, and the way in which they expect to be treated. National culture 
implies that one way of acting or one set of outcomes is preferable to another. When 
management practices are inconsistent with these deeply held values, employees are 
likely to feel dissatisfied, distracted, uncomfortable, and uncommitted. As a result, they 
may be less able or willing to perform well. Management practices that reinforce national 
cultural values are more likely to yield predictable behaviour (Wright and Mischel, 
1987), self-efficacy (Earley, 1994) and high performance (Earley, 1994) because 
congruent management practices are consistent with existing behavioural expectations 
and routines that transcend the workplace. 
The competitive advantage derived from correctly adapted management practices comes 
from alignment between key characteristics of the external environment (national culture) 
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and internal strategy, structure, systems, and practices (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Chatman and Jehn, 1994; Powell, 1992; Prescott, 1986). For managers of multinational 
corporations, the implication is that adaptation to local cultural conditions is necessary to 
achieve high performance outcomes. 
Newman and Nollen (1996) analyzed financial performance outcomes for work units in 
eighteen countries on three continents. They described the fit between a variety of 
management practices in these work units and several dimensions of the national cultures 
in which they operate. In this research, they examined empirically the effect of 
congruence between Hofstede's five national culture dimensions and analogous 
management practices. They found that in most cases, work units whose management 
practices fit better with the national culture have higher financial performance than work 
units where the fit is not as good. As summarized in Table 2.2.1, Newman and Nollen 
(1996) advocate that management practices should be adapted to national culture for high 
performance. 
2.2.10 Limitations of Hofstede's Framework 
Sivakumar and Nakata (2001) argue that Hofstede's work has been the subject of 
considerable debate and they summarise the debate in the following way. Researchers 
adopting a more emic perspective may argue that national culture, in all its complexity, 
cannot be captured quantitatively and reduced to four variables. Others may be uneasy 
with Hofstede's use of a single multinational corporation as a basis for his conclusions 
about national culture. And still others may point out that national culture is changeable 
and, even if understood at any single point in time, it is heterogeneous within any given 
country. All these views suggest that Hofstede's theory and findings fall short of being 
useful. Despite an awareness of these limitations, business researchers have applied 
Hofstede's work in dramatically increasing numbers, making it the dominant culture 
paradigm. Hofstede's indexes are the most comprehensive set of value measures 
available, and national culture is believed to change slowly. 
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Countries are often chosen to represent opposites on a culture dimension (high vs. low), 
though the degree of difference may not be always be clear or well specified. Countries 
may in fact be close on a culture dimension, but be placed in different groups based on 
the median or mean score or an arbitrary cut-off. Many studies treat the culture factors 
independently, ignoring other factors despite their potential impact. It has been pointed 
out that the major weakness of theory-driven cross-cultural studies, along with item bias, 
is alternative explanations for the observed cross-cultural differences (Van de Vijver and 
Leung, 1997, p. 292). 
The challenges faced in selecting two countries for hypothesis testing of the effect of 
culture can be illustrated with Hennart and Larimo (1996). They test hypotheses 
regarding the role of power distance and uncertainty avoidance on the nature of market 
entry strategies using data for two countries, viz., Japan and Canada. Although they 
control for several other contextual variables (such as firm size), it is not possible to 
demonstrate the main effects of power distance and uncertainty avoidance separately nor 
is it possible to rule out the role of other culture factors. There are several other studies 
that state a hypothesis involving two countries (as opposed to culture factors) but use the 
role of culture to justify the hypotheses (e. g., Rao and Hashimoto, 1996). Although a few 
researchers use a large number of countries to obtain variation in given culture factors 
(e. g., Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1996), studies have not tried to systematically rule out 
explanations based on other culture factors nor studies that have tried to examine 
interaction effects between two culture factors (Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001). 
2.2.11 Summary 
Culture differences between joint venture partners have usually been considered a major 
factor that might influence venture failure or unsatisfactory performance (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1993; Harrigan, 1985). Joint venture research has focused primarily on the 
influence of national culture distance and has not adequately examined the role of 
organizational culture distance. By simultaneously studying cultural distance at both 
levels, (1) the findings at one level are not confounded with potential effects of the other 
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level; and (2) the relative effect of organizational versus national cultural distance on IJV 
performance can be assessed. 
The task of coordinating and integrating different national and organizational cultures is 
the most demanding, complex, and problematic challenge in the management of 
international joint ventures. To effectively manage the cultural differences within an 
international joint venture, a special effort must be made to identify and assess the 
specific cultures (national as well as organizational) of each partner. It is important that 
cultural differences should be understood before the respective groups are brought into 
contact, since the management of the international joint venture must handle the 
underlying causes of cultural clash as early as possible. If the cultural characteristics of 
the partners are left unattended, the consequences can be highly unpredictable. Barriers 
may be formed between employees, with a variety of problems emerging in the newly 
combined entity. 
In the realm of culture, there are too many factors that fall beyond the scope of 
management control. Many researchers have supported this view, pointing out that 
"culture may manage us much more than we can manage it" (Buono and Bowditch, 1989, 
p. 163). Although management lacks complete control over the question of cultural 
difference, this does not mean that all forms of management control are impossible. As 
Ohmae (1989, p. 150) has observed, "the problem with joint ventures is that parent 
companies behave as parents everywhere often do. They don't give their children the 
breathing space or the time they need to grow. " It is thus clear that cultural differences 
will never be properly managed unless an appropriate amount of time and autonomy are 
granted to the process. 
This section, the second section of the literature review, has reviewed the literature on 
cultural differences between joint venture partners. The next section considers trust 
between joint venture partners. 
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2.3: TRUST BETWEEN JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Trust between joint venture partners is the third section of the literature review, as shown 
in figure 1.1 on page 4. Although trust has been identified as a critical factor in alliance 
management, rigorous conceptual and empirical developments of alliance trust have 
remained elusive. The objective of this section is to develop a conceptual understanding 
of joint venture trust. Previous literature on trust is reviewed and this shows that trust has 
been viewed from three different perspectives: structural, social, and psychological. This 
section focuses on two approaches towards managing interorganizational relationships. 
One is based on opportunism and focuses on contractual mechanisms (the contract- 
centred approach) while the other is based on trust and focuses on cooperative 
mechanisms (the relationship-centred approach). A framework of the antecedents and 
consequences of JV trust is discussed. The factors considered as antecedents are: prior 
cooperative relationships, habitualization, individual attachment, organizational fit, and 
assessment of partner competence. Proposed consequences or outcomes of JV trust 
include forbearance, governance structures, relationship investments, increases in JV 
scope, and N performance. How the two concepts of trust and control operate in a 
parallel fashion to generate confidence in partner cooperation is examined. The 
complexities of the trust-control relationship are explored and the impact of control 
mechanisms on trust level is discussed. 
2.3.2 The Nature of Joint Venture Trust 
Trust is based on a set of mutual expectations or anticipations regarding each actor's 
behaviour and each actor's fulfilment of its perceived obligations in light of such 
anticipation (Thorelli, 1986). Trust does not mean the "naive belief in the honesty of 
other actors but rather the probability of violation of implicit or explicit agreements" 
(Bromiley and Cummings, 1993: 10). In other words, trust is the perceived likelihood of 
the other not behaving in a self-interested manner. Following Currall and Judge (1995), 
joint venture (JV) trust is defined as reliance on another JV party (i. e., person, group, or 
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firm) under a condition of risk. Reliance is volitional action by one party that allows that 
party's fate to be determined by the other party (Zand, 1972). 
Risk means that a party would experience potentially negative outcomes, i. e., injury or 
loss (Isen et al., 1988; March and Shapira, 1987; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992), from the 
untrustworthiness of the other party. Risk is a precondition for the existence of trust, and 
the trustor must be cognizant of risk (Mayer et al., 1995; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). In the 
absence of risk, trust is irrelevant because there is no vulnerability. The greater the risk, 
the higher the confidence threshold required to engage in trusting action. In the world of 
business cooperation, trust means having sufficient confidence in a partner to commit 
valuable know-how or other resources to transactions with it despite the fact that, in so 
doing, there is a risk the partner will take advantage of this commitment (Inkpen and 
Currall, 1998). 
According to Child et al. (2005), firms incur a number of risks when they enter into 
strategic alliances. One is the risk that their partner(s) will act opportunistically; in other 
words take advantage of them if and when the opportunity arises. When forming an 
alliance, it is difficult to distinguish between a partner who will behave opportunistically 
and one who will not. A joint venture will often involve the exposure of key knowledge 
and technology resources to a partner. In this situation, there is risk that a partner will 
appropriate the resources as the basis for eliminating partner dependence and making the 
JV bargain obsolete. The reputation of the prospect partner firm for reliable behaviour 
can therefore be quite significant factor in deciding whether to proceed further. 
Each partner is vulnerable to opportunism (Williamson, 1975) potentially engaged in by 
its counterpart, and it is difficult, if not impossible, for each party to sort out ex ante who 
will be an opportunistic partner. Therefore, gaining management control can be 
considered as both a defensive and a proactive strategy. Used defensively, control can be 
exercised by a partner to overcome opportunism possibly engaged in by other partners 
(Hansen and Hoskisson, 1996). Since the partners do not have complete information 
about each other or about the future of the prospective IJV at its formation (Kogut, 1991; 
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Chi and McGuire, 1996), their initial relationships resemble an arm's-length market 
transaction in which competition and prevention of opportunism are the norm 
(Williamson, 1991). The potential for opportunism exists until the partners develop a 
reputation of trustworthiness with each other (Parkhe, 1993). 
A second type of risk is associated with the resources and efforts devoted to building a 
cooperative relationship. As Smith and Barclay (1997) note, these resources and efforts 
will probably have no external value, and cannot be recovered if the JV terminates due to 
the untrustworthiness of the partner firm. A third type of risk involves the inability of a 
partner firm to execute its share of the JV bargain. Before the partners have worked 
together, they have little information about each other's skills. The partner may intend to 
honour its side of the agreement, but not have the ability to do so. It is therefore 
important when an alliance is formed for each partner to assess the other's competence, 
and then decide how tasks are to be jointly performed. If one firm misleads the other into 
believing it can perform certain tasks when it cannot, it may be impossible to achieve the 
objectives set out by the JV agreement. 
One of the hybrid characteristics of alliances arises from the paradox that they often 
combine elements of cooperation and competition, or at least the attempt to formulate 
common goals on the basis of not wholly complementary objectives (Hamel, 1991). The 
combination of mutual reliance between alliance partners with residual or potential 
elements of competition or conflict between them can set up a game-theoretic dynamic 
that adds to the risk and precariousness of the cooperation. Trust between the partners is 
required to help overcome this threat, yet at the same time the source of the threat inhibits 
the development of trust. Most managers involved in alliances are very aware of the 
significance of trust, though they also realize it is not an easy thing either to create or to 
preserve. Das and Teng (2002) argue that trust is complementary to the social networks 
and social exchange that can importantly facilitate alliance formation and operation. 
Equally the presence of such networks provides assurances and guarantees against 
opportunistic behaviour and therefore provides beneficial conditions for trust to develop 
between new alliance partners. 
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Child et al. (2005) note that trust between partners should make them more willing to 
share information and so better inform their actions and decisions (reduce bounded 
rationality). Furthermore, they argue that mutual trust should make it safer for the 
partners to invest assets in their alliance which cannot readily be used elsewhere (asset 
specificity) and should reduce the temptation for either partner to take advantage of the 
other (opportunism) because of the goodwill it represents. If trust can introduce these 
positive features into a partnership, it will render the cooperation more genuine, reduce 
the need to spend time and effort checking up on the other partner, and help to direct the 
partners' attention and energies towards longer-term goals of mutual benefit. This is why 
so many alliance managers consider trust to be essential. 
2.3.3 A Multilevel Phenomenon 
Currall and Inkpen (2002) argue that trust has to be thought of as occurring at three levels 
within an alliance. One level is that of the partner company; another is at the level of 
groups such as a group of partner managers; the third level is that of the individual. The 
importance of making these distinctions can be seen when the various arrangements that 
may help promote trust within an alliance are considered. For instance, a formal 
agreement, such as a JV contract, can provide a basis for trust, based on the assurances 
and commitments it contains. However, such an agreement may not be sufficient if the 
groups and individuals who have to work together within the JV do not trust each other. 
For if trust is lacking at their level, they may as well breach the terms of the formal inter- 
organizational agreement in order to secure an advantage and/or to protect what they see 
as their own interests. 
The development of interpersonal trust between the managers within the partner 
organizations who are directly responsible for coordinating and monitoring the alliance 
can have a very significant effect on promoting trust at a group level, such as between 
collaborating departments in the two partner companies, as well as at the organizational 
level represented by boards of directors. It is therefore important that the formal 
provisions, such as contracts, to foster an alliance relationship are complemented by 
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efforts to ensure that informal and interpersonal relations proceed on a basis of trust as 
well. This implies that care needs to be taken to select suitable people and to offer them 
appropriate briefing and training. Boersma et al. (2003) developed a process model of 
trust building in IJVs, and found that different types of trust play different roles in the 
process. 
2.3.4 The Treatment of Trust in the JV Literature 
JV trust as a structural property 
The structural component refers to the complementarity of the resources contributed. 
Such complementarity provides the basis for the exchange and the potential for value 
creation within it. As a structural characteristic of the JV relationship, JV trust is based 
on the underlying assumption that trust can exist between the partner finns. This 
perspective connotes a firm level unit of theory and downplays the interaction between 
managers. Although firms cannot, strictly speaking, trust one another, just as they cannot 
cognize nor have attitudes (James et al., 1988), firm-level treatments of trust are widely 
used in the JV literature (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Madhok, 1995). The primary 
concern of those viewing trust as a structural concept is partner-opportunistic behaviour 
that reduces the value of collaboration. In the structural perspective, trust is linked with 
partner strategic motives, and efficient cooperation is associated with the generation of 
inter-firm trust (Buckley and Casson, 1988). Beamish and Banks (1987) argued that with 
a foundation of trust, JV partners will be more willing to exercise the tolerance and 
perseverance necessary to see the JV through difficult times. According to Gulati . 
(1995: 105), observing inter-firm alliances over time suggests that repeated ties between 
firms engender trust that is manifested in the form of the contracts used to organize 
subsequent alliances. 
JV trust as a social property 
The social component refers to the intrinsic quality of the relationship itself, which has a 
strong impact on the nature of exchange within it (Jones, 1983). The social dimension of 
JV trust, as described by Madhok (1995: 120), is based on the history of interactions 
between the partners that provides the social "glue" within which economic exchange 
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occurs. There are two key differences between the social and structural views. The first 
deals with the partnership implications associated with a lack of trust. In contrast to the 
structural view, which emphasizes that the lack of inter-firm trust leads to opportunistic 
actions, the social perspective emphasizes that a lack of trust can lead to ineffective firm 
interactions and the absence of cooperation, resulting in poor JV performance. The 
presence of trust can facilitate the continuation of the relationship during intermittent 
periods of inequity (Madhok, 1995), and can make cooperation easier to implement 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). A second difference is that, under the structural view, trust is 
embedded in the partner relationship and, to some degree, can be a chosen characteristic 
of the JV based on a risk-based calculation. In contrast, trust as a social property is a 
product of ongoing interactions (Powell, 1996). From this perspective, a social view of 
trust is a reflection of closely interwoven relationships that develop incrementally over 
time (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
JV trust as a psychological property 
Some studies have examined the psychological underpinnings of trust between individual 
JV managers, the individuals who provide the linking mechanisms across organizational 
boundaries, namely, boundary role persons (Adams, 1976; Currall and Judge, 1995). 
Thus, the unit of theory is the individual JV manager. Nooteboom et al. (1997) note that 
relational risk associated with a partner organization is considered from the perspective 
of the individual manager who enacts the relation with the partner firm. The 
psychological approach to JV trust is consistent with recent interaction models whereby 
inter-firm collaboration is studied in the context of a specific relationship between 
individuals (Heide and Miner, 1992; Kumar et al., 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
The key assumption underlying the psychological perspective is that JV trust is based on 
strong cognitive and emotional bases that result from close interpersonal relationships. 
Therefore, trust in collaborative arrangements is largely dependent on the managers who 
have responsibility for the management of the arrangement. Macaulay (1963: 63) 
described how close personal ties between individuals in firms contracting with each 
other could "exert pressure for conformity to expectations". Ring and Van de Ven (1989) 
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suggested that informal connections across organizations played an important role in the 
governance structure of inter-firm transactions. Parkhe (1993) concludes that as 
individual managers of partner firms develop trust in each other, the partnership structure 
may change as the relationship takes on more hierarchical characteristics, with less 
emphasis on formal coordination and compliance measures. 
2.3.5 Relationship and Contract-Centred Approaches 
In general, the criticism against the contract-centred approach is that it concentrates 
narrowly on the economic aspects of exchange and neglects the social context within 
which the relationship is embedded. The preoccupation with minimizing the costs within 
the exchange devalues the benefits from the relationship and fails to recognize the 
potential for effective reduction of the associated costs through social mechanisms. 
Whereas the contract-centred approach attempts to reduce uncertainty and manage the 
flow of information more formally through the legal form of the transaction, the 
relationship-centred view attempts to do so through the social processes underlying the 
transaction (Mattsson, 1987; Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). 
According to Williamson (1975), the probability of some actors being opportunistic some 
of the time and not knowing who will act when and how in his self-interest results in 
precautionary adoption of the assumption of opportunism by all actors at all times and a 
consequent investment in safeguards. Others argue that opportunistic behaviour by any 
one actor, or fear of such behaviour on the part of the other actor in a relationship, lowers 
the quality of the interaction and not only increases the cost of maintaining safeguards 
but also results in the withholding of contributions beyond the very minimal required 
(Hill, 1990). This then diminishes the value of the relationship. 
Williamson's (1975) point is that high uncertainty and asset specificity expose parties to 
opportunism. The way for parties to protect themselves is to internalize the transaction. 
Such a solution, however, entails high fixed costs. Hence it is only feasible if transactions 
are frequent, or recurrent, because then the cost per transaction decreases and becomes 
more reasonable. Johanson and Mattsson's (1987) argument is that, where transactions 
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are frequent, cultivation of the relationship results in more efficient interaction. Thus, 
though the emphasis of the two is different, the objectives are convergent. However, the 
relationship-centred approach goes beyond just economizing and cost minimizing and 
lays emphasis on the value generated through the relationship process. This is basically 
ignored by the contract-centred approach. The two approaches also converge in that both 
are interested in gaining flexibility in decision making through effective coordination and 
conflict resolution mechanisms: one through authoritative mechanisms and the other 
through creation of the appropriate social atmosphere. It is evident that not everything 
can be contracted and therefore there is an implicit level of trust in every exchange. 
Though both the contract and the relationship are important, the balance in emphasis 
between the two seems to shift with successful prior interaction (Madhok, 1995). With a 
stranger, there is greater emphasis on the contract and the role and focus of the contract is 
more in terms of legal specifications and rules. At the same time, given the risk element 
inherent in trust, the contract is still considered to be important in a situation of 
successful past interaction, in spite of trusting one another. However, there is a subtle 
shift in emphasis and the role of the contract is more in the nature of a routine or a 
standard operating procedure. Here, the social aspects take on a more important role and 
the contract becomes less focal though nonetheless still important. Bradach and Eccles 
(1989) argue trust through the social exchange process in and of itself does not replace 
other forms of governance but complements them and can be combined with them to 
govern economic exchange. 
According to Madhok (1995), conflict is managed through mechanisms operating at three 
levels. First is the complementarity of strengths, which forms the structural basis of the 
relationship and intrinsically provides a common interest. Second is the contractual 
mechanism, which refers to the formal document governing the relationship. It is 
especially important during the creation stage of the JV. Third are the informal and 
normative coordination mechanisms which result in flexibility and compromise. While 
the mutual need for each other provides the initial basis for the relationship, constant 
interaction and communication, which results in greater sharing of information and 
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creates greater understanding and knowledge of one another. A long-term perspective is 
conducive to this shared orientation. This is also facilitated by the knowledge that, should 
things not work out, the divorce mechanisms are fair. In a sense, a contract provides 
certain decision rights while relational norms provide a safeguard against exploitative use 
of these rights (Heide and John, 1982). 
Application to the JV 
Arguments against the use of JVs due to the associated problems of coordination and 
control imply that internalization would solve these problems. However, this does not 
recognize that headquarter-subsidiary relationships are also mixed motive dyads similarly 
characterized by independent and interdependent interests (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989). 
The incremental costs of managing JVs arise partially from the costs of maintaining 
safeguards against the possibility of self-seeking behaviour arising from divergent 
objectives. A positive social dynamic between partners is important, since it facilitates 
the building of trust within a relationship. According to Jarillo (1990), neither pure 
market nor pure hierarchical relations are critical for sustaining a relationship: trust is. 
The argument that nurturing the social dimension increases flexibility and tolerance, 
especially in a situation of ambiguity, is especially relevant in entities such as Ns, which 
involve team production by two actors contributing their respective inputs for mutual 
benefits (Beamish, 1985). The alignment of incentives through the sharing of ownership 
is not adequate to ensure desirable action by the partner. Madhok (1995). argues the 
critical issue is not that of the formal distribution of the residual income in line with the 
percentage of equity ownership but, rather, that of equity and fairness with respect to the 
process of the relationship itself. This perception of equity is important to encourage 
mutually oriented action, beyond the very minimum under the terms of the agreement. 
The critical initial decisions are agreed to contractually in the negotiation phase, but 
sustenance of the relationship is based on trust and commitment. This commitment 
develops through interaction, and results in a trust-based relationship that more closely 
resembles an internalized mode than a contractual one (Cory, 1982). This implies a shift 
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from control through the ownership structure to influencing behaviour through 
interaction and the nurturing of relationships (Beamish, 1988). The need for control is 
positively correlated with lack of information which then heightens the level of risk 
perceived by an actor and consequently affects the choice of governance structure (Ring 
and Van de Yen, 1992). 
It is important to recognize the difference in orientation between the structural and social 
dimensions of trust within a relationship. For the former, the incentive to abstain from 
behaving in a self-interested manner, i. e., to mutually forbear (Buckley and Casson, 
1988), is that it would be costly to do otherwise. Here, both firms are in a mutual hostage 
situation. On the other hand, from the social perspective, mutually oriented behaviour is 
more positive in nature and occurs not to prevent value depletion but to enhance the 
relationship's value. The two together lower the perceived probability of opportunistic 
behaviour or, conversely, increase trust. Both these dimensions have the common 
objective of obtaining flexibility and efficiency in the conduct of the multinational firm's 
operations. The important issue perhaps is not that of ownership per se but, rather, that of 
superior coordination and conflict resolution. 
2.3.6 Antecedents of N Trust 
As a starting point, Doz (1996) emphasizes that negotiating and forming a JV initiates a 
dynamic relationship that, to be successful, will have to go through a series of transitions. 
Over time, as the partners and partner managers learn about each other and the JV 
becomes an operating entity, the level of inter-partner trust will change. Trust requires 
familiarity and mutual understanding and, hence, depends on time and context 
(Nooteboom, et al., 1997: 314). As the relationship ages, previous successes, failures, and 
partner interactions will influence the level of trust in the JV. Unlike most economic 
commodities, trust may grow rather than wear out through use (Hirschman, 1984). Trust 
may also decrease over the life of the relationship. For example, when a JV is formed, 
there is a subjective probability that a partner will cooperate. Experience will lead to 
adjustment of the probability, which in turn may lead to a shift in the level of trust. 
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Prior Cooperative Relationships 
When a new JV organization is created, the partners may have initial uncertainties about 
working together, particularly if they have had no prior cooperative relationship. On the 
other hand, new JVs that start with an existing stock of "relationship assets" may begin 
with a honeymoon period that effectively buffers the firm from early dissolution 
(Fichman and Levinthal, 1991). Previous cooperative ties between JV partners can 
generate an initial base of inter-partner trust and also shape the form of subsequent 
alliances (Gulati, 1995). If firms have worked together in the past, they will have basic 
understandings about each other's skills and capabilities (Heide and Miner, 1992). A 
history of relations between firms can shape the context for new exchange by reducing 
uncertainty. Experienced partners can forgo the relationship building processes that will 
be necessary for partners working together for the first time (Parkhe, 1993). Parkhe 
(1993) found that the presence of a prior history of cooperation between alliance firms 
limited their perception of expected opportunistic behaviour in new alliances and, as a 
result, reduced the necessity for contractual safeguards. 
Habitualization 
The familiarity and mutual understanding that develop through interactions based on 
social exchange has been termed habitualization (Nooteboom et al., 1997). The key 
elements in habitualization are repeated interactions and the length of time the parties 
have worked together. In contrast with the prior relationships variable, which deals with 
interactions that occurred before JV formation, habitualization reflects the ongoing and 
continuing relationships associated with the current 1V. 
Interaction over time may lead to commitment (Deutsch, 1962) and to the development 
of relationship-specific assets, such as a partner's knowledge of the other's procedures 
and values (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991). This implies that when firms repeat 
transactions with partners over time, as they will in a typical JV, an opportunity is created 
for the development of inter-partner trust. The passage of time lays the foundation for 
future expectations based on shared norms and values and hence, greater trust (Fichman 
and Levinthal, 1991; Granovetter, 1985). According to Parkhe (1993: 803), "The older a 
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relationship, the greater the likelihood it has passed through a critical shakeout period of 
conflict and influence attempts by both sides. " 
Individual Attachment 
Individual attachment reflects the socialization by individuals during their involvement in 
exchange activities. Personal relationships between JV managers can serve to shape and 
modify the evolving structure of inter-organizational collaboration (Jarillo, 1988; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994) and should be viewed as critical to the establishment of trust 
between partner firms (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). JV managers, responsible for the 
day-to-day operations of relationships between the JV partners, foster trust by building 
one-on-one relationships with partner managers and by developing a familiarity with the 
partner's strategy, organization, and culture. A high turnover of managers can lead to a 
loss of relationship continuity and a reduction in individual attachment. Seabright, et al. 
(1992) suggested that individual attachments are important early in a relationship but 
diminish in significance with persistence of the relationship. A potential problem 
associated with attachment is that when alliances rely on trust based on personal bonding, 
problems may arise if personal loyalties deviate from organizational interest 
(Nooteboom, et al., 1997). 
Organizational Fit 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) introduced the concept of organizational fit to describe the 
similarities between organizations in terms of organizational culture, human resource 
policies, and administrative processes. In the JV context, Saxton (1997) argued that 
organizational similarities between the partners help establish trust and enhance the 
appropriability of knowledge necessary to form the basis for a common frame of 
reference. In turn, learning can help offset cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1996) that 
often exist in IJVs. Inkpen (1995) found that a lack of compatibility between JV partners, 
particularly with regard to expectations about venture profitability, frustrated learning 
processes, which, in turn, contributed to breakdowns in trust. 
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Organizational fit and partner compatibility will evolve from a variety of factors, 
including similar corporate cultures and values, compatible control and decision-making 
systems, common time horizons for performance assessment, and convergence of 
strategic goals for the JV. A problem with the concept of partner compatibility is the 
difficulty of measurement, given the range of factors that contribute to organizational 
compatibility (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). 
Assessment of Partner Competence 
Brockner et al. (1997) suggested that because trust is based on the expectation that the 
trustee will perform certain desired behaviours; the trustor must believe that the trustee 
has both the desire and ability to perform the behaviour in question. Without that belief, 
trust will be absent. This perspective can be extended to the N context. Before a firm is 
willing to rely on another firm to perform critical JV tasks, there must be an assessment 
of that firm's competence and skills. If the firm is viewed as competent, there may be a 
willingness to trust. A firm viewed as incompetent will be too high a risk and, as a result, 
trust will likely not develop. 
Hill (1990) suggested that parties will try to avoid entering an exchange with another 
party who has a questionable reputation and, if the reputation is questionable, additional 
security may be required to offset the additional risks. Although knowledge of the 
reputation associated with a potential firm's past behaviours is desirable to obtain, 
frequently this information will not exist in the public domain (Parkhe, 1993). For IJVs in 
particular, it is often difficult to obtain reliable information about potential partners. In 
the absence of information on partner past behaviour, it will be difficult to form an 
assessment of partner competence. 
2.3.7 Consequences of JV Trust 
Forbearance 
The risk of partner opportunistic behaviour plays a pivotal role in all alliances, not 
because all economic agents behave opportunistically all the time, but because it is 
difficult to differentiate those that do from those that do not (Parkhe, 1993). The risk 
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stemming from opportunism has two dimensions: the probability that Partner 1 will 
behave opportunistically, and the extent of loss incurred by Partner 2 if Partner 1 does 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). It is the alliance managers that must make the decision, on 
behalf of the partners, to refrain from acting opportunistically. Forbearance, like trust, 
evolves through interactions between alliance managers. Buckley and Casson (1988) 
argued that a party with a reputation for forbearance gives partners a greater incentive to 
forbear themselves, because it increases the likelihood that, if they forbear, the venture as 
a whole will be a success. Trust can lead to forbearance, which in turn can lead to 
increased trust. 
Governance Structures 
The nature and form of JV governance structures evolve over time as the JV strategy 
evolves and partners interact. The level of trust between the partners will influence the 
choice of governance structures. Non-contractual safeguards are more likely when there 
is a high level of trust between the partners. Governance costs under conditions of 
distrust will be greater and procedures will be more formal, such as more detailed 
contract documentation, more frequent board meetings, closer scrutiny by lawyers, and 
more communication between partner headquarters and the JV. These procedures will 
result in additional transaction costs to the JV partners (Dyer, 1997). Parkhe (1993) found 
support for the hypothesis that elaborateness of safeguards and the perception of 
opportunistic behaviour are directly related. 
As the fear of opportunism fades because of the development of mutual trust, there may 
be a reduction in coordination and monitoring costs. Dyer (1997) argued that trust itself 
should be viewed as an efficient governance mechanism in interfirm relationships. Gulati 
(1995) made a similar argument, suggesting that fines may substitute trust for contractual 
safeguards when they form repeat alliances. Nooteboom et al. (1997: 318) challenged this 
view, stating that "trust can only be considered an instrument of governance in a limited 
sense: it contributes to risk reduction, but it cannot be instituted instantaneously. If trust 
is not already present, it has to be built by developing bonds or shared norms and values. " 
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The optimal governance structure will depend on various factors, such as alliance 
objectives, the level of investment, technological conditions, and partner time horizons. 
Relationship Investments 
The formation of a JV requires an investment in relation-specific assets. The risk 
associated with some of these JV assets is that they may have limited alternative uses in 
the event of JV termination. Although investing in specific assets is always a gamble, 
without them, the JV may be unable to develop the necessary complementary 
competencies for success (Nooteboom et al., 1997). In the absence of detailed 
understanding of the partner, firms may be unwilling to make commitments to a JV 
without demanding an economic "hostage" (Williamson, 1983). In many IJVs, the 
foreign partner's technology often becomes a hostage because, in the event of JV 
termination, the local partner may be able to preserve asset values by employing the 
technology in an autonomous operation. The foreign partner's hostage may be its access 
to local knowledge (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Since hostages provide initial protection 
from opportunistic behaviour, the presence of hostages will usually create an 
environment in which trust has a better chance of developing. Nevertheless, when 
hostages are unilateral or one partner believes that a hostage was "demanded, " probably 
by the stronger partner, a hostage may have the appearance of an exercise of power. 
Subsequent to the N formation, the partners often will be faced with additional . 
investment decisions involving expansion or shifts in strategic direction. Inkpen and 
Currall (1998) propose that the willingness of JV partners to make subsequent 
investments in relation-specific assets will be related to the level of inter-firm trust that 
has developed over the life of the JV. There are two differences between initial 
investments prior to JV start-up and subsequent investments. First, young alliances often 
rely on hard, formal, deterrent-dominated governance since they have yet to develop a 
soft, informal, trust-based understanding between the partners (Parkhe, 1993). By the 
time subsequent relation-specific investments are required, the partners will have worked 
together and a high or low level of trust will be established. Therefore, subsequent 
investments will be able to take into account the relationship history. Second, subsequent 
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investments, unlike initial investments, will have less of a "make or break" impact on JV 
performance. 
Increases in JVScope 
When a JV is formed, the agreement will establish the strategic breadth of the entity, 
partner tasks, interface design, and usually, the expected duration of the agreement. Doz 
(1996) described this stage as the alliance initial conditions, the conditions that establish 
the alliance scope. In turn, the scope will influence the JV structure, assignment of 
management, the establishment of administrative policies, and the initial relationship 
between the partners. After start-up, the scope and objectives of JVs often change as 
strategic priorities shift and as trust, between the partners, increases. Initially, partners 
may be uncertain about their partner's competence and reputation. As the JV ages and 
trust develops, the partners may decide to increase the JV scope. Often, firms place limits 
on the scope of their JVs because of market uncertainties and limited information about 
their partner (Doz, 1996). 
JVPerformance 
Trust ensures a sound and cooperative working relationship between the JV partner 
firms. The higher the trust, the more efficient the JV will be in transforming an input of 
cooperation into a collaborative output (Buckley and Casson, 1988). Madhok (1995) 
suggests a foundation of trust, although time-consuming and expensive to create, can 
contribute to the sustained continuation of cooperative relationships. Parkhe (1993) 
argues as trust increases and the fear of opportunism fades, there is a declining role for 
contractual safeguards, leading to lower compliance and coordination costs. A lack of 
trust in a cooperative relationship can lead to a situation in which one or both partners 
believe their alliance efforts are unproductive, resulting in a downward spiral of poor 
performance, and dissatisfaction with the relationship (Smith and Barclay, 1997). 
Recently, Li et al. (2006) also found that the development of trust in overseas 
headquarters among local senior managers in uncertain environments is important for IJV 
performance, and Wang and Nicholas (2005) suggested that process-based trust affects 
the performance of contractual joint ventures. 
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Yan and Gray (1994) suggested that performance may have a feedback effect on trust. 
Poor performance may cause distrust between the partners, which leads to poor long-term 
JV performance (Killing, 1983). A firm's review of past JV results, in comparison with 
expectations, can lead to a firm's prediction of the extent to which the partner firm will 
follow through on its current promises (i. e., is trust in the partner warranted? ). If JV 
performance is worse than expected, JV partners are likely to question the competence 
and capabilities of their partners. The level of trust in the relationship will therefore 
suffer accordingly. Inkpen and Currall (1997) found support for the argument that trust 
has an indirect effect on performance mediated by forbearance. Both Park and Ungson 
(1997) and Saxton (1997) found a positive relationship between antecedents of trust and 
alliance outcomes. 
Although it is commonly accepted that trust is a critical variable in the success of IJVs 
(Beamish, 1993; Fryxell et al., 2002), it may have different effects on outcomes 
depending on the internal and environmental factors with which it interacts. Zaheer and 
Zaheer (2006) argued that levels of trust differ across international borders, and hence 
both the nature of trust and the institutional and cultural support for trust can vary across 
national contexts. They developed a model that suggests that collaborative partners from 
different countries are likely to bring either symmetric or asymmetric conceptions of trust 
to a business relationship, and thus the effect of trust on firm performance is not always a 
direct relationship. 
Luo (2002) examined the trust performance link in international strategic alliances 
(ISAs) and argued that the trust-performance link varies according to its underlying 
contingency variables such as alliance age, risk commensuration, market uncertainty, 
resource interdependency, and reciprocal commitment. The analysis of 255 ISAs in 
China suggested that trust plays a stronger role in improving ISA performance such as 
sales and profitability when an alliance is younger, risk is more commensurate between 
parties, market is less volatile, interpartner dependency in resources is greater, and 
commitment to the ongoing partnership from each party is higher. Cultural distance 
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between alliance parties did not moderate the trust-performance link but influenced the 
level of trust. 
Nielsen (2007) considered the relationship between subjective, multidimensional 
measures of joint venture performance and predictors of success both before the alliance 
is formed (pre-alliance formation factors) and during the operation of the alliance (post- 
alliance formation factors). The empirical study, based on a web-survey, investigated a 
sample of Danish partner firms engaged in 48 equity joint ventures and 70 non-equity 
joint ventures with partners from around the world. The results showed a significant 
relationship between alliance performance and trust. 
Ng et al. (2007) examined the role of trust between the parent companies of IJVs and 
suggested that trust between parents is not only a major predictor of the achievement of 
financial and non-fmancial goals by IJVs as reported in the literature, but also moderates 
the relationship between IN performance and certain contextual factors. Based on the 
responses of senior executives of IJVs and their parent companies in China, they 
concluded that trust influences IN performance. The moderating effects of trust on the 
relationships between IJV performance and local reliance and the experience of 
executives were confirmed for the senior executive sample. 
2.3.8 Trust-Control Relationship 
The three dimensions of control; the extent of control, the focus of control and control 
mechanisms were discussed in section 2.1 of the literature review on IJV control and 
autonomy. Child and Mollering (2003) suggest that bringing control in an uncertain 
context helps establish familiarity and predictability, which are the necessary conditions 
for trust development. One view regarding the relationship between trust and control is 
that trust is simply a specific type of control mechanism. Another point of view is that 
trust itself is not a control mechanism but is a substitute for hierarchical control in 
organizations (Aulakh et al., 1997; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). As Leifer and Mills 
(1996: 129) put it, "While trust might be seen as a reason not to use objective controls, 
trust is not, in and of itself, a control mechanism". Ring and Van de Ven (1994) discuss 
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the substitutive relationship between formal legal contract (control) and psychological 
contract (trust) in interfirm cooperation. 
Madhok (1995) also argues that managing opportunism and relying on trust are two 
alternative approaches in managing joint ventures. Because trust involves a positive 
attitude about others' motivations, conceptually, it is not about influencing and affecting 
others' behaviour but is about believing that others will perform whatever serves the 
trustor's best interests, even in the absence of control. Thus, trust not only cannot be a 
control mechanism but it also implies the exclusion of deliberate control over the 
behaviour of others. In fact, to trust and to control seem to be two completely different 
kinds of approaches. When it is possible to fully trust a partner, there is no need to 
control its behaviour. Control comes into play only when adequate trust is not present. 
Although many researchers have treated trust and control as substitutes, an implicit 
assumption in the literature is that there is a complementary relationship between the 
two-that is, the more there is of trust, the less there is of control, and vice versa (e. g., 
Inkpen and Currall, 1997; Leifer and Mills, 1996), as elaborated below. 
The selection, development and implementation of control mechanisms, such as budgets, 
planning systems, and cost-accounting systems can be expensive (Simons, 1991). Trust is 
not free either; trust building is a planned activity and takes considerable resources from 
organizations over time. Creed and Miles (1996) have made it explicit that one has to 
simultaneously consider costs of control mechanisms, costs of failing to reach minimal 
levels of trust, and costs of trust building. Since both trust and control are costly to come 
by and jointly contribute to the level of confidence, scholars have argued that 
organizations will not pursue an excessive level of confidence in any given situation. For 
strategic alliances this means that to reach a minimum level of confidence in cooperation, 
partners can use trust and control to complement each other (Beamish, 1988). 
Despite the merits of this cost-based argument, a complementary relationship between 
trust and control may not be useful in a general sense, because there is no common level 
of confidence that is minimally acceptable to everybody. Partner firms will demand 
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different confidence levels that they feel are needed, and these levels will be affected by a 
number of factors, including partner firms' risk propensity (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sitkin 
and Weingart, 1995), the type of knowledge involved (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), the 
amount of resources committed (Blodgett, 1991), the objective in the alliance (Bleeke 
and Ernst, 1995), and the type of alliance. Thus, the level of trust and the level of control 
may not be related in a strictly inverse manner, if the confidence level fluctuates from 
partner to partner and from case to case. 
A supplementary relationship, by comparison, seems to describe the dynamics more 
realistically (Das and Teng, 1998). That is, the trust level and the control level jointly and 
independently contribute to the level of confidence in partner cooperation, which may 
vary greatly for different partner firms. A higher trust level does not automatically dictate 
a lowering of the control level, and vice versa. All it means is more confidence in partner 
cooperation predicated upon certain levels of trust and control functioning as parallel 
phenomena. 
2.3.9 Effect of Control Mechanisms on Trust Level 
The relationship between control mechanisms and trust is far from clear in the literature. 
In essence, the dispute is about whether the deployment of control mechanisms damages 
trust among exchange members. Argyris (1952) notes that control mechanisms imply that 
one party does not trust the other. Since trust has the characteristic of reciprocity, this 
may evolve into a vicious cycle, tending toward trust dissolution. Following this logic, 
control mechanisms will undermine the trust level in strategic alliances. Nevertheless, 
those holding the contrary viewpoint maintain that control mechanisms, if used properly, 
may help build mutual trust (Goold and Campbell, 1987). The basic argument here is that, 
because control mechanisms provide a "track record" for those who perform well, trust 
between the parties may eventually be nurtured and strengthened. Thus, a track record 
and an objective evaluation process are more conducive for generating trust than a 
subjective evaluation process. 
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Sitkin and Roth (1993) report limited effectiveness of legalistic remedies (i. e., formal 
rules and contracts) for building trust. Hence, it appears that the nature of formal controls 
is at odds with a trusting environment, which suggests a negative relationship between 
formal control and trust level. This is also the case with strategic alliances. When 
extensive contractual safeguards, such as lawsuit provisions, are featured, a sense of 
suspicion rather than trust tends to dominate the relationship. Each alliance has a contract 
but the difference is in terms of the degree to which process and conduct are specified. In 
their study of IJVs, Cullen et al. (1995) found no support that formal control led to more 
commitment in alliances. Also Sitkin and Stickel (1996: 209) found that formal control 
systems "can lead to escalating distrust if they are ill-suited to the task at hand". The 
implication is that poorly designed formal control mechanisms can undermine trust. 
Social control in alliances often takes the form of socialization, interaction and training. 
Some natural by-products of socialization and interaction are better understanding and 
shared values, which then lead to interfirm trust (Creed and Miles, 1996; Madhok, 1995). 
Moreover, social control often provides a supportive environment for partner firms to 
understand the process and objective of alliance management, which is often ambivalent 
at the beginning (Doz, 1996). Thus, considerable overlaps exist between social control 
mechanisms and trust building. Scholars have found empirical support for a positive 
relationship between social control and trust level (Aulakh et al., 1997). With the 
presence of inter-firm trust, control is less likely to backfire, as partners understand each 
other better and are more willing to exercise mutual forbearance. Although a good level 
of control requires the presence of trust, trust per se is unlikely to be a direct attribute of 
control (Leifer and Mills, 1996). 
Inkpen and Currall (2004) explore the relationship between trust, control and learning 
within joint ventures, as they develop over time. They argue that the presence of clearly 
defined collaborative objectives will foster the initial development of trust between JV 
partners. The greater the initial level of trust between partners, the more they can rely on 
informal social controls and the lower will be the initial costs of monitoring and 
controlling the JV. If a heavy reliance on formal controls can be avoided, this in turn is 
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likely to foster the development of trust. Repeated interactions between the JV partners 
and their staffs that are viewed as successful will enhance their mutual trust. As the 
partners learn more about each other, the more likely they are to reduce their emphasis on 
formal JV controls and this should also enhance mutual trust. 
2.3.10 Summary 
Companies are increasingly pooling their costs, risks, and rewards in international 
alliances, which have emerged as a major competitive weapon. The relations between 
companies are now marked less by frontal attacks between direct competitors, and more 
by the potential for flank attacks and hidden agendas, in short, ties where trust will play a 
growingly important role as a counterweight to the potential hazards in forming alliances. 
Consequently, understanding trust in international alliances, and using this understanding 
to effectively build trust, have become crucial management tasks. The simultaneous 
popularity of IJVs and dissatisfaction with their performance indicates the need for 
greater attention to, and a more sophisticated understanding of, the process of governing 
them. 
The structural arguments of the ownership-centred approach were examined and showed 
that relationship-oriented approach, revolving around trust, is largely consistent with the 
ownership-centred arguments. Overemphasis on the contractual aspects of the exchange 
results in inadequate attention being paid towards management of the social dimension. 
Where the contract-centred approach emphasizes the attainment of efficiency and 
flexibility, in making decisions through more direct and legalistic means of control, the 
relationship-centred approach emphasizes the attainment of flexibility and efficiency 
through more subtle normative mechanisms. In spite of their differences, the two 
complement one another and neither one can be neglected. A more comprehensive 
definition of transaction costs which includes the costs associated with not only the 
contractual opportunism-avoidance orientation but also with the more cooperative value- 
creation orientation, and the interrelationship between the two, would facilitate a shift in 
this direction. 
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One of the key questions for partners in strategic alliances is whether to trust or to 
control. Trust and control are two alternative sources in developing confidence in partner 
cooperation, although the two are not linked by a simple complementary relationship. 
Although some theorists have suggested that trust is itself a control mechanism, the 
existing literature is unclear on this point and it was argued trust cannot be a control 
mechanism. Trust was defined as a positive expectation about others' motives, and 
control as the process of regulating others' behaviour to make it more predictable. A more 
appropriate construction of the relationship would be of a supplementary character, 
which would disentangle the tightly coupled conception of the trust-control relationship 
evident in the literature, thereby facilitating the consideration of the two concepts on their 
own terms. 
Although trust and control are parallel concepts, they are not completely independent in 
the sense of being isolated from each other. In fact, the deployment of control 
mechanisms may either enhance or undermine the trust level, depending on the specific 
type of control mechanisms, partners use. Furthermore, trust level plays a moderating 
role between control mechanisms and control level. In other words, trust level will 
facilitate the deployment of control mechanisms, even though some of these very 
mechanisms may be suggestive of a lack of trust. The conventional wisdom is that one 
should employ control mechanisms when adequate trust' is wanting. In fact trust should 
be developed whenever it is deemed appropriate. However, trust building can be costly, 
for considerable organizational resources are necessary, in some form or other. 
In the literature, trust between partners is suggested to be an important factor that 
contributes to the success of INs (Currall and Inkpen, 2002; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; 
Madhok, 2006). Beamish (1993,2006) supported the view that trust is important for the 
success of joint ventures in developing countries, and as trust can be easily managed, it 
can be viewed as a means to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of an IJV 
(Sheppard and Tuchinsky, 1996). However, large-scale empirical studies on the role of 
trust in transitional economies have rarely been conducted (Beamish, 1993; Lane et al., 
2001). The phenomenon of trust has yet to be fully comprehended and doubts continue 
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with regard to the sufficiency of social sanctions based on trust (Carson, Madhok, and 
Wu, 2006) and the complementary versus substitutional relationship between trust and 
contract (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
This section, the third section of the literature review, has reviewed the literature on trust 
between joint venture partners. The next section considers the performance of 
international joint ventures. 
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2.4: PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Research on international joint ventures (IJVs) has continued to attract the attention of 
international business scholars in light of IJVs' popularity and their overall unsatisfactory 
performance (Choi and Beamish, 2004; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Luo, Shenkar, and 
Nyaw, 2001; Yan and Gray, 1994). Lee and Beamish (1995, p. 638) point out that JV 
performance is an important issue partly because of the costs of poor performance 
imposed on the parent firms, but also because of the social costs of poor performance 
which have to be borne by the country in which the JV activity occurs. Poor performance 
in JVs according to Beamish and Delios (1997b) may be attributed to lack of congruity 
(alignment) of objectives in performance measures at the time of JV formation. Efforts to 
identify variables associated with IJV performance, and that might thus be managed in 
order to influence venture outcomes, have been constrained by continued disagreements 
regarding the comparability and reliability of alternative performance measures, and the 
methodology for collecting such data. 
Yan and Gray (1994) note that the prior literature on JV performance indicates three 
areas in which major inconsistencies occur. First, whose perspective is used for 
performance measurement that of one parent, two parents, or the JV management? 
Second, variations occur in performance measures which may range from financial 
performance indicators to subjective perceptions of performance. Third, the 
appropriateness of different performance measures changes as a JV matures. Moreover, 
these inconsistencies make cross-study comparisons and generalisations about JV 
performance particularly problematic. The debate over JV performance measures is 
clearly a sub-set of wider concerns regarding the assessment of organisation performance 
in general, in which the evaluation of JV performance is a particular challenge. 
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2.4.2 Measures of Performance - Objective versus Subjective 
The definition and measurement of organisational performance has been a controversial 
topic for theorists from a variety of fields, as well as for management practitioners in all 
sorts of organisations (Kanter and Brinkerhoff, 1981; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986; Mohr, 2006). Prior research evidences significant differences in the 
operationalization of IJV performance. Early studies used a variety of financial indicators 
typically employed in business research, such as profitability, growth and cost position 
(Tomlinson, 1970; Good, 1972; Renforth, 1974; Dang, 1977; Lecraw, 1983). Others have 
used objective measures of performance such as the survival of the IJV (Franko, 1971; 
Stopford and Wells, 1972; Raveed, 1976; Killing, 1983; Geringer, 1990), its duration 
(Harrigan, 1986; Kogut, 1988), instability of (significant changes in) its ownership 
(Franko, 1971; Gomes-Casseres, 1987), and renegotiation of the JV contract (Blodgett, 
1987). Yet, these financial and objective measures embody potential limitations that are 
critical to evaluation of IJV performance. 
The multitude of measures used by academic researchers to assess JV performance is 
indicative of the way parent companies and JV managers evaluate JV performance, 
which in turn is a reflection of the variety of reasons for establishing JVs (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Glaister and Buckley, 1996). Two of the main 
objective performance measures used to assess JVs between firms from advanced market 
economies have been survival (i. e. whether the JV has been terminated or not), and 
duration or longevity of the venture. Both of these measures are subject to criticism; for 
instance, termination of a venture may indicate successful completion of the JV task and 
not JV failure (Gomes-Casseres, 1987), and duration of the venture may be prolonged in 
the hope of "making it work" rather than because it is operating successfully. In any 
event a sole indicator of performance, where many objectives may exist for the JV, 
cannot indicate the extent to which all of the objectives have been achieved for the JV. 
Anderson (1990) notes that JVs may be more commonly used in highly uncertain settings 
with a very long term performance horizon and no current performance baselines for 
comparison. In high risk or uncertain settings short-term financial measures would tend 
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to indicate poor performance, although the venture may be making satisfactory progress 
towards long-term goals, or achieving current non-financial goals. In this respect, it 
should be recognised that JVs may not be intended to fulfill standard financial objectives 
such as profit generation, but are instead formed to achieve a range of objectives, for 
example, to enhance parent learning (Kogut, 1988), or to improve the strategic 
positioning of the parent firms (Contractor and Lorange, 1988) including a presence in 
new markets (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). Anderson (1990) argues that parents need to 
recognise that most JVs should be evaluated more subjectively over a longer time 
horizon than is typically used. Resorting to formal, financial measures of performance is 
likely to lead to early termination before a JV has had enough time to realise its potential. 
There is also the problem of not reporting financial data concerning joint venture 
performance. Even if they are reported, they are likely to be in consolidated corporate 
data which may not be used for the assessment of the joint venture concerned. Geringer 
and Hebert (1991) also argue that parent firms usually have different objectives and 
means of generating financial returns, including supply contracts, management fees, 
technology licensing fees, royalties, and transfer pricing. If available, these figures are 
seldom incorporated into calculations of IJV performance. Financial measures may also 
fail to reflect the extent an IJV has achieved its short and long-term objectives (Killing, 
1983; Artisien and Buckley, 1985; Anderson, 1990). This is particularly pertinent for 
developing country joint ventures, because IJVs formed in these countries may not be 
able to generate financial profit for a long time. 
Due to potential limitations and difficulties associated with the ability of financial and 
objective measures to gauge the efficacy of IJVs, as well as the difficulty in obtaining 
such measures, several researchers turned their attention away from objective measures 
towards subjective measures of -parent managers' satisfaction with IJV performance 
(Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983; Beamish, 1984). The performance measure Yan and Gray 
(1994) used, for instance, was the extent to which a JV's partners had achieved their 
strategic objectives in initiating the JV. Killing (1983), Schaan (1983) and Beamish 
(1984) used a single-item perceptual measure of a parent's satisfaction with an IJV's 
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performance (e. g. "To what extent has the IJV met the expectations of your firm? "). The 
main advantage of perceptual measures is their ability to provide information regarding 
the extent to which the IJV has achieved its overall objectives. A key contribution of the 
study by Geringer and Hebert (1991) is the comparison of objective and subjective 
measures of JV performance. They found that subjective satisfaction measures of JV 
performance and performance relative to initial objectives were significantly positively 
correlated to objective measures of JV performance. 
Subjective performance measures are also subject to criticisms; these types of measures 
have suffered accusations of serious limitations and biases. As these measures are 
subjective and rely on the judgement of managers, the respondents' frame of reference 
and personal values may severely influence the evaluation of IJV performance, for 
example, some managers may be reluctant to recognise the extent to which things are 
going wrong when they are actually going wrong (Schaan, 1983: 339). Also, the 
performance criteria used by the respondents to assess the level of IJV success may not 
necessarily be the same. It may be argued that, despite their shortcomings, the subjective 
performance measures are a better reflection of underlying JV achievement than the 
objective performance measures discussed here. This is because, in a sense, the 
subjective measures are a more direct measure of performance in that the respondents 
should be aware of the goals of the venture and, therefore, should be able to make an 
assessment of the performance of the venture in light of these goals. 
2.4.3 Determinants of JV Performance 
A number of authors have noted that when conducting or comparing organisational 
performance studies it is important to specify whether it is the variables that predict 
performance, or the variables that indicate performance, that are of interest (Lewin and 
Minton, 1986; Cameron, 1986). Similarly, Anderson (1990: 21) argues that a major 
reason for the controversy stems from a lack of clarity about what an indicator of 
performance is and what a determinant of performance is. To exemplify this situation, 
Anderson (1990) gives an example of employee satisfaction which is often used as an 
indicator of a high performing organisation. However, others classify satisfaction as a 
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determinant of performance, and still others ignore satisfaction entirely on the grounds 
that it is neither indicator nor determinant. 
Many factors have been suggested in the literature as potentially important determinants 
of JV performance (Glaister and Buckley, 1999). These include partner- and task-related 
variables, firm and industry related factors and managerial and host country related 
factors. Partner- and task-related factors found to have an impact on JV performance 
include: partner needs, trust and commitment (Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1988; Cavusgil 
and Zou, 1994; Jarrillo, 1988); partner asymmertries and the extent to which the 
businesses of partner firms are related, and their influence on JV success (Harrigan, 
1988; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). 
Industry related factors considered to have significant influence on JV performance are 
technology level and stage of industry development, i. e. if the industry is in the 
embryonic, growth or mature stage (Thorelli, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1988). The 
managerial factors include ownership, control exercised by partners and operational 
autonomy (Schaan, 1983; Rafii, 1978; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1984; Kogut, 1988; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Blodgett, 1991). Joint ventures formed with host country 
governments were found to be more profitable than those formed with private sector 
enterprises (Beamish, 1984). The environment under which JVs operate was also found 
to influence performance. This may encompass the host country political system, 
economic development, legal system, national culture and government policy towards 
foreign investment (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 1992). 
In research relating to firm-related variables, some researchers have suggested an adverse 
effect of parents' firm size asymmetry on joint venture performance, due to a mismatch 
of strategic priorities and influence. However, this has not been consistently substantiated 
empirically (Harrigan, 1988; Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1988). The past joint venture 
experience of the parent firms was postulated to have a positive influence on 
performance. Experience would lead to an accumulation of knowledge about doing 
business in host countries, with positive consequences for joint venture performance. 
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However, the empirical evidence is conflicting (Blumenthal, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; 
Makino and Delios, 1996). The resource complementarity of partners is a prime reason 
for the formation of collaborative joint ventures (Hamel, 1991; Geringer, 1991; Beamish 
1984) and has been extensively researched. Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, and Takenouchi 
(1996) found that partners' complementarity contributed to the building of trust in the 
joint venture for the U. S. partner, but not for the Japanese partner. 
The impact of country-related factors, such as cultural differences on a firm's preference 
for international collective ventures, has been examined (e. g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Shane, 1994). Their impact on success and failure of a JV has also attracted attention 
(Franko, 1971; Li and Guisinger, 1991; Parkhe, 1991; Geringer and Hebert, 1991) but 
findings are not conclusive. Li and Guisinger (1991) found positive relationships between 
cultural dissimilarities and failure rates, which was contrary to Franko's (1971) findings. 
The different and often crude methods of measuring cultural distance seem to be 
responsible for these conflicting and inconclusive results. Franko (1971) subjectively 
ranked countries according to their cultural proximity to the US, while Li and Guisinger 
(1991) categorised countries as similar or dissimilar using Hofstede (1980) indices, 
which might be dated. 
Hatfield and Pearce (. 1994) concluded that (using data from US firms involved in 
manufacturing joint ventures) to evaluate the performance of a joint venture one must 
measure achievement of multiple goals, many of which are non-financial in nature. 
Multiple goals capture the diversity of motivations between partners, which is very 
important because partner goals are partner-specific, that is, the goal set varies by partner. 
Goal achievement offers promise as a non-traditional planning and evaluation method for 
evaluating performance of joint ventures that face high levels of uncertainty and long 
delays in reaching net positive cash flows and profitability. 
The strategic management literature strongly supports the notion that organizational 
performance and survival can be understood more fully by examination of the top 
management decision-making process, which is a firm's primary means for making 
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crucial operating and strategic choices (Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967). Pearce (1997) 
focuses on explaining JV performance and survival in terms of the top management team 
(TMT) decision-making process within the JV firm. According to the transaction cost 
analysis presented, the JV form of governance is less efficient than the more traditional 
hierarchy, that is, ceteris paribus, governance costs are higher for JVs. Pearce (1997) 
explains how the essential nature of the JV organizational form makes it relatively more 
susceptible to both bargaining costs and the onset of extreme forms of political behaviour 
within the TMT. By building on the position of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Pearce 
(1997) argues that both political influence and bargaining activity are antagonistic to 
efficiency in the TMT decision-making process, undermining adaptability, performance, 
and survival. 
Congruity of objectives 
In seeking an explanation for the persistently reported poor performance of IJVs, 
Beamish and Delios (1997) identify a partial explanation in parent and IJV congruity in 
defining performance. They argue that there is a strong theoretical basis for the study of 
the relationship linking objective congruence and performance. Beamish and Delios 
(1997) point out that negative performance outcomes from a lack of goal congruity 
among managers has long been identified (for example, Child, 1974) and empirical 
disagreement among managers about the objectives of the organisation has been found to 
impair performance (for example, Bourgeois, 1980). Beamish and Delios's (1997) 
anecdotal empirical evidence highlights the importance of establishing congruity in 
performance objectives when establishing an IJV. Beamish and Delios (1997) conclude 
that when partners exhibit a consensus, or congruity, about the objectives and strategies 
of the IJV, higher performance is observed. Conversely, where congruency has not been 
established, poor performance results. 
Interdependence of resources 
From a resource-based view, the advantage of JVs is based on the adequate integration of 
the resources provided by the various partners for their common use. Hence, the way 
these resources are linked will have a significant influence on the performance of the 
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relationship (Das and Teng, 2000; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Research indicates the 
importance of firms complementing each other in terms of resources and capabilities 
when formalizing a cooperative partnership (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hill and Hellriegel, 
1994). The complementarity of resources creates mutual interdependency and facilitates 
the effectiveness of alliances (Harrison et al., 2001; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Parkhe, 
1991). Complementarity may be understood as the degree to which partners can provide 
the JV with resources and capabilities that could collectively generate higher rents than 
when put to use by each individual firm separately (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Parent capability 
The value of the partners in a relationship depends on resources in the form of assets, but 
also on their capabilities in the alliance context (Nooteboom, 1999). Capabilities and 
familiarity of the partners with the tasks that are the subject of cooperation must be 
considered (Killing, 1988). The greater the capabilities of the partners in relevant areas of 
the cooperation activity, the less complex will be the task that they are undertaking and 
performance of the JV will be enhanced (Killing, 1988; Shamdasani and Seth, 1995; 
Stuart, 2000). The past JV experience of the parent firms is likely to have a positive 
impact on performance (Sim and Ali, 1998). For example, if the partners of a JV are 
shown to have experience and a high level of competence and reputation in managing a 
JV the more likely it will be successful. Firm size has been found to be an important 
variable affecting firm performance (Pan and Chi, 1999; Smith, Guthrie and Chen, 1989; 
Merchant, 2000; Pan and Li, 2000). Resources are defined as inputs to the production 
process, while capabilities are the ability to co-ordinate and deploy resources to perform 
tasks (Kazanjian and Rao, 1999). Resources are closely linked to firm size and 
consequently firm performance. This is because large firms are likely to have better 
access to financial resources that are required to hire managerial expertise and to support 
research and development which enhances the firm's competitiveness and performance. 
JV management capabilities 
Management capabilities are key contributors to the entire bundle of firm resources that 
enable some firms to generate rents (Castanias and Helfat, 1991,2001; Combs and 
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Ketchen, 1999). Managerial capabilities represent some of the most valuable, unique and 
hard-to-imitate resources and, consequently, their quality has important implications for 
firm performance (Castanias and Helfat, 1991,2001; Peng, 2001). In particular, as the 
executive who is ultimately responsible for organizing and directing the resources of the 
JV, the JV general manager has the potential to create rents by using his or her human 
capital to make and implement strategic and operational decisions. In addition, the 
general manager will perform the difficult task of maintaining cohesion within the group, 
acting as a mediator in resolving conflicts. In this way, his or her leadership and 
negotiation capabilities will provide an incentive for the active behaviour of the members 
and will contribute to an appropriate level of cohesion inside the group, which will also 
have a positive effect on the JV performance. 
Control and Autonomy 
"IJV control and autonomy" was discussed in section 2.1, the first section of the literature 
review. Control in an IJV can be defined as the process through which parent companies 
ensure that the way the JV is managed conforms to their interest (Schaan, 1983). 
According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), control is a complex concept involving several 
dimensions: (i) mechanisms of control (equity ownership, representation in management 
bodies, technical superiority, and management skills, etc); (ii) extent of control (whether 
one or more partners play an active role in decision-making); and (iii) focus of control 
(the scope of activities over which parents exercise control). These dimensions are 
complementary and interdependent (Hu and Chen, 1996). While many tests of the 
relationship between control and performance in joint ventures have been conducted 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Hebert, 1994; Yan and Gray, 1994; Mjoen and Tallman, 
1997), the empirical results have been conflictual, and there lacks a unifying theoretical 
rationale for explaining this relationship. 
Killing (1983) suggests that dominant control JVs tend to be more successful than 
equally shared management ventures. Shared ownership often inflicts managerial 
conflicts (Gomes-Casseres, 1989), thus exerting a negative effect on performance. Both 
transaction costs theory and agency theory predict that the partner with greater control of 
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the IJV will use the common pool of resources to pursue its own interests (i. e., to achieve 
its own objectives) rather than those of its partner or the best interest of the IJV overall. 
Co-ordination between partners entails significant costs that make many alliances 
transitional rather than stable arrangements (Porter, 1990). Reducing the risks associated 
with co-ordination can minimise transaction costs and stabilise the JV (Inkpen, 1995). 
Dominant ownership, therefore, provides a mechanism for keeping transaction costs to a 
minimum and achieving JV stability (Hennart, 1988). 
Killing (1983) found that there existed a common pattern of shared management IJVs in 
decline: poor venture performance leads the partner firms to monitor the IJVs' activities 
closely, which lowers the autonomy of IJV managers. Low autonomy of IJV managers 
and high intervention from the partners are likely to slow and confuse the decision 
making process in the IJVs, which may cause performance to worsen further. This in 
itself encourages the partners to become even more closely involved and therefore the 
downward cycle continues. The study by Zhang and Li (2001) and Killing's work (1983) 
have revealed a critical issue in IJV management: independence (or autonomy) and 
success are twins in IJVs from a dynamic view. Indeed, these two studies describe the 
same coin from different sides. While Killing (1983) found that low autonomy may cause 
failure and failure further lessens autonomy, the study by Zhang and Li (2001) suggested 
that high independence will lead to success and success further enhances independence. 
However, Zhang and Li's study has advanced Killing's (1983) study by addressing how 
an IJV evolves across the three types of IJV control designs while Killing's study focused 
on shared management IJVs. 
The relationship between equity control and IJV performance has continued to receive 
much attention as equity ownership is recognized as an essential mechanism to maintain 
control (Lu and Hebert, 2005). A basic premise of ownership control is that a full or 
majority ownership provides the parent company with the ability to secure desired 
performance outcomes by aligning the IJV with corporate company objectives (Das and 
Teng, 2001). A high control parent will have a greater onus of responsibility for the 
performance outcomes of the JV than is the case for a low control parent. According to 
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Glaister and Buckley (1998), the high control parent is, therefore, more likely to associate 
its degree of control with JV performance and will, in consequence, be inclined to adopt 
a more favourable perspective on the performance outcomes of the JV. The importance 
of control on performance increases as organizational size and complexity increase. IJVs, 
as a complex organizational form, require the close attention of managers to monitor, 
coordinate, and integrate the activities of the organization. Dominant control is a 
mechanism for reducing the risks associated with coordination and opportunistic 
behaviour, and, consequently, for minimizing transaction costs. 
However, the suggested relationship between dominant ownership and success as 
observed by Killing (1983) has not always been consistent with empirical evidence. 
Beamish (1984) reported that among twelve IJVs formed in less developed countries 
performance was negatively related with the level of control from foreign partners. In a 
study on JVs in developed countries, Kogut (1988) found no relationship between control 
and performance. Tomlinson (1970) reported that when parents showed a more relaxed 
attitude to control over JVs, the level of profits were higher. Franko (1971) also found 
that JVs were more stable when parents demanded less control. Blodgett (1991), using 
ownership to measure control and stability to measure performance, found that 50-50 
shared management arrangements had a greater chance for long life than majority owned 
ventures. Also using financial ownership as the indicator of decision-making control, 
Bleeke and Ernst (1991) concluded that JVs with an even split of ownership were more 
likely to succeed than those in which one partner held a majority interest. When partners 
have equal ownership, there will be pressure on both sides to make accommodation to the 
JV to protect their investments and therefore, both partners will be committed to making 
the JV successful. In a majority owned JV, one partner may have the ability to configure 
the venture in a manner that is undesirable to the other partner(s). 
Despite inconsistent evidence to date, the association between ownership control and IN 
performance seems undeniable (Lu and Hebert, 2005). While Yan and Gray (1994) found 
that the pattern of management control was directly related to JV performance in a case 
analysis of US-China JVs, this was not consistent across all cases. A number of variables 
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that might moderate the direct relationship between control and performance were 
identified by Yan and Gray: the level of trust between the partners, the commonality of 
their strategic objectives, and the level of institutionalisation of these objectives, i. e., 
whether or not they are contractual. The nature of management control exercised by 
parents will be a function of the age of the JV, with different configurations of control 
operating across the life cycle of the venture. 
Cultural Distance 
"Cultural differences between join venture partners" was discussed in section 2.2, the 
second section of the literature review. Several authors have shown or hypothesized that 
different national cultures embody different attitudes, values and beliefs that find their 
materialization in distinct business cultures, styles and practices (England, 1975; 
Hofstede, 1980; Davidson, 1982; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1985; Schneider, 
1988). For example, Ouchi (1981) examined the U. S. and Japanese business cultures and 
described them as mostly incompatible. The presence of dissimilarities between parent 
firms' national cultures may be more likely to lead to differences in parent firms' 
objectives for an IJV, as well as in their approaches to coordination, operating methods 
and strategy implementation (Root, 1982; Sullivan and Peterson, 1982; Geringer, 1988; 
Brown, Rugman and Verbeke, 1989). These dissimilarities may also lead to differences 
in the partners' perceptions of each other and the IJV and result in a lower degree of 
agreement regarding IJV performance. 
In contrast, in IJVs where parents are from the same national culture or nation, a 
tendency toward greater agreement among the parents and the IJV management 
regarding the venture's performance is expected. As shown by Anderson and Weitz 
(1989), cultural similarity promotes communication between business partners. With 
regard to alliance performance, internationalisation theory would tend to suggest that an 
alliance would be more likely to fail the greater the cultural distance between the home 
base of the partners. This reflects one branch of the literature which has maintained that 
similar cultural values can reduce misunderstanding between partners and that culturally 
distant alliances experience greater difficulty in their interactions. Communications 
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between culturally distant partners can be difficult, for example, compounding the co- 
ordination problems that exist in any partnership, leaving alliances vulnerable to 
managerial conflicts and early dissolution (Camerer and Vesalainen, 1988, Brown et al. 
1989, Lane and Beamish 1990). 
Other studies have reached a somewhat different conclusion. Park and Ungson (1997), 
for example, found that cross border joint ventures with partners from culturally distant 
countries have longer durations and are less likely to end than are domestic joint 
ventures. More specifically, with the effects of other variables controlled for, Park and 
Ungson (1997) found that larger cultural distances were related to a lower joint venture 
dissolution rate. However, when taking into account the interactive effect between prior 
relationships and cultural distance, the effect of cultural distance on joint venture 
dissolution became insignificant and the interaction term became significant. Sirmon and 
Lane (2004) argued that organizational culture differences will tend to be more disruptive 
than national culture differences. Similarly, Ozorhon et al. (2008) found that differences 
in organizational culture have a greater impact on IJV performance than differences in 
national and host country culture. Ozorhon et al. (2008) concluded that similarity 
between the national cultures of IJV partners has a negative effect on IJV performance. 
Park and Ungson (1997) maintain that this significant interaction effect implies that a 
prior relationship between firms may provide a powerful counterbalance to cross-cultural 
differences negating the conflict and misunderstanding caused by cultural distance 
between cross-border partners. They maintain that this is consistent with Harrigan's 
(1988a) findings, with Bleeke and Ernst's (1993) case study result that cross-border joint 
ventures can overcome early difficulties caused by cultural differences, and with 
Barkema et al. 's (1996) suggestions that learning between partners may offset cultural 
differences. Whether similarities or differences in partner culture will produce better 
alliance performance is therefore hedged with a degree of uncertainty. 
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Trust 
"Trust between joint venture partners" was discussed in section 2.3, the third section of 
the literature review. In the literature, trust between partners is suggested to be an 
important factor that contributes to the success of IJVs (Currall and Inkpen, 2002; Inkpen 
and Currall, 2004; Madhok, 2006). Trust ensures a sound and cooperative working 
relationship between the JV partner firms. The higher the trust, the more efficient the JV 
will be in transforming an input of cooperation into a collaborative output (Buckley and 
Casson, 1988). A foundation of trust, although time-consuming and expensive to create, 
can contribute to the sustained continuation of cooperative relationships (Madhok, 1995). 
As trust increases and the fear of opportunism fades, there is a declining role for 
contractual safeguards, leading to lower compliance and coordination costs (Parkhe, 
1993). A lack of trust in a cooperative relationship can lead to a situation in which one or 
both partners believe their alliance efforts are unproductive, resulting in a downward 
spiral of poor performance, and dissatisfaction with the relationship (Smith and Barclay, 
1997). 
Development of trust among IJV partners can have a direct positive effect on 
performance. For example, if both partners exhibit what Barney and Hansen (1994) refer 
to as "strong form trust, " they can reduce the costs of governance mechanisms that 
would be required for lesser forms of trust and exploit exchange opportunities afforded 
by it, thereby gaining competitive advantage. Strong form trust is exogenous to an 
alliance's governance structure and is derived instead from values, principles, and 
standards that the partners share. Thus, it is akin to Lewicki and Bunker's (1996) 
"identity-based trust. " The presence of such trust should enable the parties to work out 
ambiguities in the contract, correct errors, cope with uncertainty, solve problems better 
(Crocker and Masten, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 1994), and work to achieve integrative 
outcomes that allow all parties to satisfy their objectives (Pruitt and Lewis, 1977; Fisher 
and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986). 
Yan and Gray (1994) suggested that performance may have a feedback effect on trust. 
Poor performance may cause distrust between the partners, which leads to poor long-term 
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JV performance (Killing, 1983). A firm's review of past JV results, in comparison with 
expectations, can lead to a firm's prediction of the extent to which the partner firm will 
follow through on its current promises (i. e., is trust in the partner warranted? ). If JV 
performance is worse than expected, JV partners are likely to question the competence 
and capabilities of their partners. The level of trust in the relationship will therefore 
suffer accordingly. 
Using perception of opportunistic behaviour as a proxy for trust, Parkhe (1993) found a 
strong relationship between perception of opportunistic behaviour and alliance 
performance. Inkpen and Currall (1997) found support for the argument that trust has an 
indirect effect on performance mediated by forbearance. Both Park and Ungson (1997) 
and Saxton (1997) found a positive relationship between antecedents of trust and alliance 
outcomes. Mohr and Spekman (1994) found evidence of the effects of such trust 
satisfaction with profit in strategic alliances between automobile manufacturers and 
dealers. Similarly, Saxton (1997) demonstrated a positive relationship between shared 
decision making (indicative of trust) and performance. Recently, Li et al. (2006) also 
found that the development of trust in overseas headquarters among local senior 
managers in uncertain environments is important for IJV performance, and Wang and 
Nicholas (2005) suggested that process-based trust affects the performance of contractual 
joint ventures. Ng et al. (2007) suggested that trust between parents is a major predictor 
of the achievement of financial and non-financial goals by IJVs. 
Although it is commonly accepted that trust is a critical variable in the success of IJVs 
(Beamish, 1993; Fryxell et al., 2002), it may have different effects on outcomes 
depending on the internal and environmental factors with which it interacts. Another way 
that trust can operate in IJVs is via an interaction effect with control. If trust is present, it 
can cut transaction costs by reducing the need for formal contracts (Bromiley and 
Cummings, 1995) and serve as an alternative mechanism to guard against opportunism 
(Hill, 1990; Barney and Hansen, 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Both trust and 
control contribute to partners' confidence that their counterpart will "pursue mutually 
compatible interests in the alliance, rather than act opportunistically" (Das and Teng, 
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1998, p. 491). Consistent with this, Nooteboom et al. (1997) showed that trust reduced 
the probability of perceived loss for alliance partners 
It appears, then, that control and trust may interact to affect performance. Moreover, trust 
may influence performance differently under different control conditions. In shared- 
control IJVs, where trust is necessarily higher, control may be sufficient to predict 
performance. In dominant-control IJVs, however, trust may be a necessary companion of 
control, if high levels of performance are desired. This relationship was confirmed by 
research that found a positive association between trust and quasi-integration between 
independent insurance agencies and insurance companies (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995). It is important to note, however, that trust between the IJV partners can change 
over time (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994) and that its relationship to IJV 
performance may be reciprocal longitudinally (Killing, 1983; Gulati, 1995; Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). 
Previous Relationships 
The desire and willingness to expend resources in the development of long-term 
relationships are closely linked to a firm's prior experiences with that partner and the 
extent to which positive or negative expectancies have been fulfilled. Hence, experience 
earned from prior engagement serves as evidence to justify subsequent risky steps 
beyond the accumulated evidence (Das and Teng, 1998). A further benefit of prior 
affiliation is that it allows the partner firms to know each other better thus facilitating a 
greater understanding of the respective capabilities and resources they are seeking to 
access and combine (Saxton, 1997). In addition, prior relationships indicate a history of 
repeated interaction, which may lead to relational advantages and stability (Gulati, 1995). 
Thus, from a game-theoretic perspective, giving incumbents an advantage in the next 
round serves as a signal to the partner that the focal firm is playing a long-run "repeated 
game" (Fundenberg and Levine, 1998). 
Although affiliation has been empirically demonstrated to affect alliance behaviour and a 
propensity to engage with a firm (Gulati, 1995; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Nielsen, 
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2003), its impact on subsequent performance is less clear. For instance, Saxton (1997) 
found prior affiliation to be positively related to initial satisfaction but not to long-term 
benefits to partners. Arino, de la Torre and Ring (2001) found prior experiences to be a 
critical determinant of future levels of relational quality. These direct experiences are 
likely to influence the parties' views of each other's capabilities and trustworthiness in 
the face of internal or external challenges. In JVs, where the likelihood of failure due to 
dissimilarities is high, this source of information about characteristics of the partner firm 
can save valuable time and agony in the early states of alliance formation. Hence, prior 
experience with a partner may increase the likelihood of predicting accurately expected 
behavior of the partner and thus reduce the potential for conflict. 
Other Long-term Relationships 
Kogut (1989) found that the likelihood of alliance termination is decreased when partners 
to the venture have other ongoing agreements. Kogut (1989) rationalises this finding by 
arguing that 'mutual forbearance' (Buckley and Casson, 1988) is enhanced when 
disrupting the venture may affect other transactions. This finding also supports the 
transaction cost explanation of hostage positions stabilising economic relationships 
(Kogut 1988,1989). Kogut (1989) points out that an alliance is frequently only a part of a 
multiplicity of contracts between the partners. In order to understand the focal alliance it 
is therefore necessary to analyse it from the perspective of the total relationship, if not 
from its position in the wider co-operative network of the partners. According to Glaister 
and Buckley (1998) it would be expected that where other long term relationships exist 
between partners alliance performance would be better than in those alliances where the 
partners had no other long term relationships. 
Partners Actively Compete 
A common feature of much of the alliance activity over the past two decades has been the 
propensity for competing firms to establish alliances (Harrigan 1988b). The tensions 
faced by a parent firm in attempting to manage both a co-operating strategy and a 
competing strategy with a partner may, however, prove too difficult to reconcile. 
According to Glaister and Buckley (1998), if competitive rivalry should come to 
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dominate the co-operative relationship between the partners, for instance because of 
intensification of competition in a market that both partners serve, the desire of one to 
win in the competitive arena against the other may reach a higher level of priority than 
sustaining the benefits of the alliance. Therefore, Glaister and Buckley (1998) argue that 
the extent to which the parents actively compete in markets has the potential to de- 
stabilise the alliance relationship and ultimately worsen alliance performance. Also, 
where parent firms actively compete, this may also affect respondents' attitudes to the 
nature of the alliance and its perceived level of success. 
Behaviour/Performance of Partner 
It is clearly difficult for one parent to know with certainty if the `right' partner has been 
selected. Glaister and Buckley (1998) note that through the course of the operation of the 
venture, however, during which time the actions and the attitude of the partner can be 
observed, it should be possible for a parent to come to a view on this. To the extent that 
one partner considers the other partner is the `right' one for the venture the more likely it 
is that the alliance will be a success and the more the first partner will be satisfied with 
the performance of the alliance (Glaister and Buckley, 1998). This point could of course 
be argued in the converse manner: to the extent that one partner is satisfied with the 
performance of the alliance the more likely it is that this partner will consider the other 
partner is the 'right' one for the venture. Thus while a correlation is expected between 
satisfaction of performance and the choice of the 'right' partner the causality of the 
relationship is ambiguous. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that performance of the venture 
would be considered satisfactory by one partner if the other partner were not considered 
the 'right' one for the venture. 
Partly underpinning the notion of whether the appropriate partner has been chosen and 
the success of the venture will be the extent to which one parent believes that the views 
and attitudes to the management of the venture are compatible between the partners and 
furthermore on the perception of appropriate behaviour/performance in the activities 
undertaken by the foreign partner during the course of operation of the venture. This may 
be related to the degree of similarity between the partners in terms of organisational 
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processes. Saxton (1997: 447) has noted that the literature on diversifications has 
concluded that organisations must have similar cultures and approaches to strategic 
decisions (i. e. organisational fit) in order to achieve synergies. 
Integration of the Alliance 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) suggest that another aspect of the relative importance of the 
alliance to the partner firms is the extent to which the alliance is integrated into the 
operations of the partners. The more an alliance is integrated into the operations of the 
partner the more the relative importance of the alliance is likely to be to the partner 
(Inkpen and Birkenshaw, 1994). The fact that the alliance is more important for the 
parent may have no implications for its performance: The performance will be more 
important for the parent, but not necessarily better or worse. However, the perception of 
the overall success of the alliance is likely to be related to the extent of the integration of 
the alliance into the operation of the partner firm. 
2.4.4 Summary 
A large array of evaluating criteria have been used by previous researchers to assess joint 
venture performance which include a number of aspects, ranging from financial 
indicators to the meeting or fulfillment of expectations. A broader conceptualization of 
business performance would include emphasis on indicators of operational performance 
(i. e., non-financial) in addition to indicators of financial performance. The inclusion of 
operational performance indicators takes us beyond the "black box" approach that seems 
to characterize the exclusive use of financial indicators and focuses on those key 
operational success factors that might lead to financial performance. Concerns about the 
ability of financial and objective measures to gauge effectively international alliance 
performance, as noted above, have led several researchers to turn to perceptual measures 
of a parent's satisfaction with alliance performance. 
Parkhe (1993) has identified four major dimensions of JV study in the prior literature: 
motives for JV formation, partner selection characteristics, control/conflict, and JV 
stability/performance, and in reviewing these lines of study he concludes that researchers 
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have non-cumulatively focused on different dimensions. It is the purpose of this study to 
attempt to relate two of the four core dimensions of JV study identified by Parkhe, those 
of the management/control of JVs and JV performance. As stated in section 1, the focus 
of the study is the investigation of the relationships between the factors influencing the 
management and the performance of IJVs. This study aims to incorporate the responses 
from parent firms to analyse the management of IJVs on a range of topics including 
control and autonomy of IJVs, trust between partner firms, cultural differences between 
partner firms and performance of IJVs. 
While many tests of the relationship between control and performance in joint ventures 
have been conducted, the empirical results have been conflictual, and there lacks a 
unifying theoretical rationale for explaining this relationship. There are likely to be a 
number of moderating variables which will affect the direct relationship between 
management control and performance. Development of trust among IJV partners can 
have a direct positive effect on performance. Moreover, trust may influence performance 
differently under different control conditions. In shared-control IJVs, where trust is 
necessarily higher, control may be sufficient to predict performance. It appears, then, that 
control and trust may interact to affect performance. Whether similarities or differences 
in partner culture will produce better alliance performance is hedged with a degree of 
uncertainty. 
This section, the final section of the literature review, has reviewed the literature on 
performance of international joint ventures. The third chapter, which sets out the research 
methods of the study, follows. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
This study examines the management and the performance of international joint ventures 
(IJVs). Chapter 2 reviewed the main theoretical perspectives regarding the management 
and the performance of IJVs. This chapter sets out the research methods employed to 
collect the data for undertaking the empirical analysis. 
In conducting research, the most appropriate research methods should be considered prior 
to data collection (Saunders et al., 2002). Several data collection methods can be used for 
collecting survey data, including interviews, participant observations and self- 
administered questionnaires. Each of these data collection methods has advantages and 
disadvantages, as noted by Churchill (1987), Zikmund (2003) and Malhotra (1996). 
Consequently, it is maintained that the appropriateness of a data collection method 
depends mainly upon the overall research objectives, the research hypotheses formulated 
for testing and the characteristics of the population (Cragg, 1991). 
This chapter outlines the advantages and the disadvantages of the research instrument, a 
self-completion questionnaire. This section also provides an overview of the 
questionnaire design process. The General Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI) 
database in Turkey and the OSIRIS database served to provide two sampling frames for 
the data collection. An international mail survey using a self-administered questionnaire 
was employed and an e-mail survey was used to follow-up the respondents. 
3.2 Primary Data Collection 
Given the nature of the information being sought, as well as cost and time constraints, it 
was decided to employ a questionnaire survey to obtain the requisite level of detail for 
this study. Nardi (2006) argues that self-administered questionnaires are best designed for 
(a) measuring variables with numerous values or response categories that are too much to 
read to respondents in an interview or on the telephone, (b) investigating attitudes and 
opinions that are not usually observable, (c) describing characteristics of a large 
109 
population, and (d) studying behaviours that may be more stigmatizing or difficult for 
people to tell someone else face-to-face. 
Given the nature of the study, particular characteristics of the mail questionnaire method 
militated strongly in favour of collecting survey data through this procedure. First, the 
study had limited financial support which meant that the cost of data collection had to fall 
within an extremely tight budget constraint. The cheapness of the self-completion 
questionnaire is especially advantageous for a sample that is geographically widely 
dispersed. When this is the case, a postal questionnaire will be much cheaper, because of 
the time and cost of travel for interviewers. Thus it was considered advantageous to use a 
questionnaire survey to collect data due to its low costs of administration (de Chernatony, 
1990). Second, the study had to be completed within a reasonably rigid time frame. 
Zikmund (2003) notes that questionnaire surveys can be sent out through the post or 
otherwise distributed in very large quantities at the same time and when respondents are 
difficult to contact (for instance owing to their work or social commitment), mail 
questionnaires save the considerable expense of call-backs (de Chematony, 1990). A 
thousand questionnaires can be sent out through the post in one batch but even with a 
team of interviewers, it would take a long time to conduct personal interviews with a 
sample of that size. 
Third, questionnaire surveys permit more flexibility for respondents to consult 
documents and complete the questionnaire. It is expected that questionnaire surveys can 
increase response validity as the respondent can take time to organise thoughts before 
responding (Faria et al., 1990). Additionally, compared with a telephone survey or 
interviews where instantaneity is important, a respondent would be more likely to 
allocate more time working through a self administered questionnaire (Jobber, 1991). 
Answers achieved through a questionnaire survey may be more honest than those from 
interview where political correctness may be an issue preventing the exposition of real 
thoughts. Moreover, interviewee errors such as the mis-recording of answers, non- 
uniformity in asking questions, differential probing and questionnaire falsification are 
greatly reduced (Jobber and O'Reilly, 1996). 
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The choice of the mail questionnaire to collect primary data was therefore largely 
influenced by cost and time constraints of the study and the nature of information being 
sought. Although Yeung (1995) puts forward a very convincing case for the use of 
personal interviews in international business research, for this research project this would 
have necessitated travelling to several European countries, North America and Australia. 
Mail surveys often remain the only feasible primary data collection method for research 
in more than one country (Harzing, 1997). Hence, given the constraints of the study, it 
was decided to administer a mail questionnaire to elicit the required information from as 
large a sample as possible. The many advantages of the mail questionnaire make it a very 
attractive data collection method; nevertheless the weaknesses of this research method 
which have been identified in the literature (see Churchill, 1987; Zikmund, 2003; Nardi, 
2006) are recognised. 
3.3 Development of the Questionnaire 
It is the purpose of this study to attempt to relate two of the four core dimensions of JV 
study identified by Parkhe (1993), those of the management/control of JVs and JV 
performance. The focus of the study is the investigation of the relationships between the 
factors influencing the management and the performance of JVs. The factors influencing 
the management and the performance of JVs consist of: management control of JVs, 
autonomy granted to the JV management, trust between JV partners and cultural 
difference between JV partners. 
In order to alleviate may of the common pitfalls associated with questionnaire design, the 
research instrument was developed by adopting some of the guidelines suggested 
in the 
literature (Churchill, 1987; Foddy, 1994; Oppenheim, 1992). In conceptualising and 
structuring the survey questionnaire, it is suggested that an emphasis 
be placed on 
specifying the independent, dependent and extraneous variables (Gill and 
Johnson, 
1997). Additionally, it is important to consider the control of extraneous variables in 
designing the survey questionnaire so that the requirement of appropriate statistical 
techniques can be accommodated (Gill and Johnson, 1997). 
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From a review of the international business literature the main issues relating to the 
management control of JVs, autonomy granted to the JV management, trust between JV 
partners and cultural difference between JV partners were identified. Other 
questionnaires dealing with the similar issues were also consulted (see for example, 
Glaister and Buckley, 1996; 1997; 1998; 2002; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1996; 1997; 1998; 
Dong and Glaister, 2007). This provided a sketch of the key questions to be asked. The 
preliminary questionnaire instruments were discussed with two academicians in the 
relevant field who had also the experience of questionnaire survey. Based on their 
comments, the draft questionnaires were subjected to a series of tests and revisions to 
arrive at the final forms. 
The choice of the language of the questionnaires (English) was motivated by both the 
budget constraint (different nationalities with different languages were included in the 
survey) and a number of substantive reasons. The latter included the assumption that 
CEOs / Presidents in multinational firms would at least have a working knowledge of 
English and the fact that it would not be possible to determine the native language of the 
respondent with any certainty (Harzing, 1997). 
The questionnaire addressed to the parent companies of the joint venture was grouped 
under five sections: (1) general background, (2) the management of the joint venture, (3) 
culture, (4) trust, (5) performance of the joint venture. This questionnaire consisted of 60 
questions and composed of multiple parts. Figure 3.1 provides a diagram of the sequence 
of the sections to be answered by the respondent. 
Fink and Kosecoff (1985) assert that closed questions are more efficient and ultimately 
more reliable. Their efficiency derives from the fact that they can be easily used and 
analysed by computer. In addition, their reliability is enhanced because of the uniform 
data they provide since each participant responds in terms of the same options. It was 
therefore concluded that the most satisfactory way of collecting and analysing data for 
this research was closed questions. This was reinforced by the nature of the research aim 
and objectives for this study. 
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Figure 3.1 Sections of the Questionnaire 
The General Background 
The Management of the Joint Venture 
National Cultural Differences 
Corporate Cultural Differences 
Trust between partner firms and managers 
Performance of the Joint Venture 
The questionnaire was carefully designed to be easy to complete. The questions 
incorporated are broadly of two types: categorical questions of a factual nature and 
questions designed to measure the attitude and perceptions of the respondents. 
Categorical questions were mostly placed in the background section and asked for factual 
data (e. g. respondent's job title, year of foundation, etc. ). In line with prior research all 
the other questions were of an ordinal nature. Ordinal classification of attitude and 
perception was considered a more realistic task for respondents than the use of interval or 
ratio measures (Geringer, 1991). While there are a number of different rating measures to 
choose from, given the limited available time of senior executives to complete the 
questionnaires, an easily understood Likert-type scale appeared to be feasible. 
Questionnaires were restricted to 5 point scales since it felt that more numerous response 
categories would exceed the respondent's ability to discriminate, leading to `noise' rather 
than more precise data. 
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A pilot study in the UK was conducted in order to confirm understanding of the main 
research issues on the part of potential respondents and to make sure that the items of the 
questionnaires were clear and unambiguous. Saunders et al. (2002: 308) state that "the 
purpose of a pilot test is to refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no 
problems answering the questions and there will be no issues in recording the data". It is 
noted that pilot surveys are standard practice and widely used in social science research. 
Participants of the pilot study included three UK firms involved in international joint 
venture operations. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with the senior 
managers from each of the UK firms to evaluate the questionnaires. Of the three firms, 
two are headquartered in London with partner firms from France and the Netherlands. 
The other firm is headquartered in Manchester and is involved in JV operations with a 
French company. 
Each of the managers interviewed in the pilot study possessed detailed knowledge of the 
joint venture that the firm had established. Issues of the management control, autonomy, 
trust, cultural differences and performance were discussed. Each of the interviews lasted 
about one hour. Pilot respondents provided information on behalf of the business and 
from the perspective of their role in its operation. The interviews helped identify 
particularly sensitive questions and helped decide whether elimination of such questions 
or perhaps framing them in less objectionable ways still allowed the study objectives to 
be accomplished. Another useful insight gained was whether one person can fill out the 
questionnaire or whether it must be attended to by several people. 
3.4 Respondent Selection 
Since the desired information was highly specific in nature, the study required 
respondents with specialised knowledge of all facets of JV activity, ranging from 
management control, autonomy granted, perceptions of national and corporate cultural 
differences, nature of trust, to performance issues and preferably respondents who have 
been involved in the joint venture from the start-up. The strategic and policy issues with 
which the thesis is concerned all require parental board-level approval. These 
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requirements identify respondents as senior executives who had intimate involvement in 
JV activities and had access to the requisite data. The senior executives are also in the 
best position to delegate the completion of the survey to the appropriate person within the 
parent firm. These persons were identified after a long and thorough assessment of their 
personal information given by each company's website. Therefore, for each company one 
or two persons were selected and included in the survey sample. Most of the executives 
were holding positions within their organisations as chairman, chief executive officers, 
business development managers, managing directors and commercial managers. 
Although it would be ideal to obtain responses from each joint venture partner, this is 
highly problematic and difficult to achieve. Given cost and time constraints, data were 
obtained from only one set of parent firms and could not be collected from both parents. 
The question of whether to obtain data from a single or multiple respondents in each 
organisation is an important methodological issue. It was recognised, however, that a 
multiple informant study would be time consuming and expensive. The decision was 
taken, therefore, to administer the relevant questionnaire to a single respondent in each 
organisation. 
3.5 Mail Survey 
The most frequently considered advantage of mail surveys is their ability to collect data 
from large industrial populations thus allowing quantitative analysis in the testing of 
inferences and also the potential to generalise the findings (Cragg, 1991). Undoubtedly, 
the most serious problem of the mail survey is that of non-response, since it has 
implications for both the quantity and quality of the data obtained. A high response rate 
provides confidence in any findings derived from a mail survey and thus various 
techniques have already been suggested in the literature for enhancing response rates (see 
for example Dillman (1978), de Chernatony (1990), Churchill (1987), Jobber and 
O'Reilly (1996)). In their comprehensive review of the literature, Diamantopoulous and 
Schlegelmich (1996) identified the various design and implementation factors studied in 
the past. They summarised the individual issues addressed in the literature and organised 
the associated findings under eight main headings, ranging from studies relating to 
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survey sponsorship to investigations focusing on the impact of non-monetary incentives. 
Their summary of the suggested guidelines is shown in Table 3.1. The extent to which 
this study conformed to the suggested procedure is also indicated in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Guidelines for Mail Survey Design and Implementation 
Motivate potential respondent by Used in 
this study 
Survey Having study approved by an organisation valued by Yes 
sponsorship the respondent. 
Cover letter Personalising the cover letter by having it individually Yes 
typed and signed, personally addressed to respondent 
and stating the researcher's job. 
The questionnaire Requesting information of personal interest of No 
respondent, preferably easily accessible and not of a 
confidential / controversial / sensitive nature. 
Anonymity / Providing assurances that anonymity / confidentiality Yes 
Confidentiality will be maintained. 
Contacts Pre-notifying the respondent by telephone, letter or fax. Yes 
Conducting the study at "normal" periods. Yes 
Postage Providing a stamped addressed return envelope. No 
Possibly using first class postage (if funds are not a 
great problem). Yes 
Monetary Provision of financial incentives. No 
incentives 
Non-monetary Promising a summary of the study's results without Yes 
incentives requesting surrender of anonymity. 
Source: Adapted, from Uiamantopoulos ana, )'cregeimucn (i yyo: az /) 
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The nature of the full procedures used in the study are summarised below: 
Contacts (warm-up letter): To ensure good quality responses and to enhance the response 
rate, a warm-up letter was sent prior to the mailing of the survey questionnaires. This 
letter identified the researcher, explained the research purpose and assured 
confidentiality. This brief letter was personalised with the University of Sheffield 
letterhead, address and signature. The purpose of this letter was to provide a positive and 
timely notice that the recipient would be receiving a request to help with an important 
study. Research has shown consistently that a pre-notice will improve response rates to 
mail surveys (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Fox et al., 1988; Dillman et al., 1995; Dillman, 
1991) but it is unclear whether the effect stems from the fact it is one additional mailing 
and the more contacts the higher the response rate or whether it is a unique type of 
contact. A sample copy of the warm-up letter is produced in Appendix A. 
The Cover Letter: The cover letter was limited to one page, including certain critical 
pieces of information. The cover letter started by describing the topic of the inquiry and 
its academic and managerial importance followed by an explanation of why the opinions 
of the particular respondent would be valuable. Confidentiality and anonymity were 
guaranteed. Each covering letter was printed on University of Sheffield headed paper and 
was highly personalised, including salutation, job title and signature. Letterhead 
stationery is important, partly because of its integral connection to personalisation efforts. 
The structure of the letter is based on the suggestion made by Saunders et al. (2002) and 
includes the following content: the purpose and importance of the study; promise of 
confidentiality and anonymity; correspondence details of researchers; expression of 
thanks to the respondent for their support. A sample copy of the cover letter is produced 
in Appendix B and C. 
Survey Sponsorship: The likelihood of participating in a mail survey is higher when there 
exists some kind of approval from an organisation valued by potential respondents. 
Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1996) suggest that company executives are in 
particular more positively disposed towards surveys emanating from academics. They 
maintain that the nature of university-sponsored research (i. e. non-profit seeking) 
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contributes to a higher response rate by executives. The likelihood of participation in a 
mail survey is higher when the study is undertaken with the approval from an 
organisation valued by potential respondents. The situation is reflected in the cover letter 
by the signatures and job descriptions of the researchers participating in the study and the 
logo of the University of Sheffield. 
Questionnaire Design: The physical nature of the questionnaire for the most part 
conformed to Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch's (1996) suggested procedures as 
indicated in Table 3.1. While there is controversy about whether the response rate will be 
higher using short rather than long questionnaires, the literature shows that response rates 
are not depressed when long questionnaires are used (de Chernatony, 1990). What 
matters is to make the questionnaire look attractive. The questionnaire used for this study 
is reproduced in Appendix D. 
Anonymity / Confidentiality: Assurances were provided that all responses would be 
treated confidentially and neither the respondent nor his/her organisation would be 
identified during the analysis and report stages of the study. This statement conveys an 
ethical commitment not to release results in a way that any individual's responses can be 
identified as their own. Such assurances were incorporated in the cover letter and served 
to put the respondent's mind at ease regarding subsequent information disclosure. A 
promise of anonymity/confidentiality was also reiterated at the beginning of the 
questionnaires. Research by Singer, Von, Thurn and Miller (1995) has suggested that 
unnecessary detailed explanations of confidentiality can discourage people from 
responding. 
Postage: The mail-outs for the foreign parent questionnaires were processed through the 
University of Sheffield postal service (franking machine) and were posted first class. The 
use of first-class mail is consistent with the image of importance that is being sought. 
First-class mail is delivered at a higher priority and does not usually get held temporarily 
in each of the distribution centers through which it passes. Although the inclusion'of a 
stamped return envelope is recognised as important in terms of encouraging response, 
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this practice is less feasible when administering an international mail survey due to cost 
constraints. The impact on the response rate of not using a stamped envelope in an 
international study is not clear. Examination of the returned envelopes with the 
completed questionnaires shows that they were automatically processed through a 
franking machine. Thus it was usual for the respondent's firm (not the respondent) to pay 
for the return postage. Overall the non-response effect of not using a stamped envelope 
appears to be minimal. 
Non-monetary incentive: Only one type of non-monetary incentive reward, an offer of a 
summary of the study's findings (with anonymity maintained), was given to respondents 
to positively influence the likelihood of response. 
3.6 Survey Sample - Foreign Equity Ventures in Turkey 
The initial aim of the study was to incorporate and compare responses from foreign 
partner firms and local partner firms in Turkey to analyse the management and the 
performance of joint ventures. The study initially aimed to examine the managerial 
perceptions in the parent firms and the Turkish joint venture. The General Directorate of 
Foreign Investment (GDFI) database was used to delineate the pattern, trend and 
characteristics of FDI activity in Turkey. All foreign equity ventures operating in Turkey 
are recorded by the GDFI. General Directorate of Foreign Investment within the Treasury 
has been authorized to guide and assist foreign investors, receive and process foreign 
investment application and implement following policies effectively. All foreign 
investments not exceeding the value of $150 million are subject to the approval of the 
GDFI. The GDFI database also provides information about country of origin, location of 
the investment, the sector of operation, proportion of foreign equity shareholding, total 
paid-in capital, the formation type of the company and entry date. 
The database of GDFI consists of all foreign equity investments in Turkey since 1947 
and includes 6,838 foreign equity ventures. Table 3.2 shows the characteristics of the 
whole sampling frame in terms of foreign equity shareholdings, sector of operations, time 
of formation, country of origin, location of investment and size. The foreign equity 
119 
ventures with Eastern European, Arabic and other Islamic investors were removed from 
the database as it was assumed that these investors were unlikely to reply and to 
participate in the survey. A joint venture is defined here as an affiliate where foreign 
ownership falls between 10 per cent and 90 per cent. Therefore, the foreign equity 
ventures with ownerships less than 10 per cent and more than 90 per cent were not 
included. These processes resulted in 1096 foreign ventures and the mail addresses of 
these were checked to make sure they were up-to-date. 
3.7 Response Rate: Mail Survey to Foreign Equity Ventures in Turkey 
A warm-up letter was sent to 1096 foreign equity ventures in Turkey at the beginning of 
February 2007, prior to the mailing of the survey questionnaires. This letter identified the 
researcher, explained the research purpose and assured confidentiality. It also requested 
the names of the executives and the addresses of the local and foreign companies in 
charge of the Turkish equity ventures. This brief letter was personalised with University 
of Sheffield letterhead, address and signature. 
The purpose of this letter was to provide a positive and timely notice that the recipient 
will be receiving a request to help with an important study or survey. Unfortunately, only 
16 warm-up letters were completed with the required information and returned by 
fax/post. This was not sufficient in order to identify and to mail the questionnaires to the 
local and foreign parents of the foreign equity ventures in Turkey. The alternative 
strategy was to identify the foreign partners of these equity ventures in Turkey and mail 
the questionnaires to these companies. 
The list of 1096 equity ventures in Turkey contained the names of the foreign parent 
companies but it did not have the names of the executives or the addresses of these 
companies. Most of the foreign partners were individual traders or businessmen and these 
were removed from the list. The remaining foreign partners were searched for on a search 
engine, Google, in order to identify the postal addresses of the companies and the names 
of the executives to contact in these companies. A total of 231 questionnaires were sent 
by first-class mail to foreign parents located in the USA, Europe, Russia and Far East. 
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Table 3.2 Characteristics of the Turkish Sampling Frame 
No % 
Foreign Equity Shareholding 
Minority JV 1259 18.4 
Co-ownership 852 12.5 
Majority JV 1450 21.2 
WOS 3277 47.9 
Broad Sector of Operations 
Agriculture and mining 271 4.0 
Manufacturing 1642 24.0 
Service 4925 72.0 
Time Period of Formation 
Pre 1980 76 1.1 
1980-89 1448 21.2 
1990-99 3619 52.9 
2000 and later 1695 24.8 
Country/Region of Origin 
Germany 1216 17.8 
UK 516 7.5 
Netherlands 508 7.4 
France 358 5.2 
Italy 289 4.2 
Other EU 650 9.5 
Switzerland 284 4.2 
USA 488 7.1 
Arab and other Islamic 1259 18.4 
Far Eastern 320 4.7 
Eastern Europe and former USSR 642 9.4 
Others 308 4.5 
Size 
CI-Small 4846 70.8 
C2-Medium 1134 16.6 
C3-Large 861 12.6 
Total 6838 100.0 
Source: General Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI) 2006 
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Despite these various attempts with this sample of foreign equity ventures in Turkey, it 
did not prove to be productive. A total of 11 questionnaires were completed and returned, 
resulting in a response rate of 4.76%. Some of the respondents were contacted by phone 
(where the company phone numbers were available) in order to follow-up, to remind the 
respondents to answer to the questionnaire and to state each respondent's importance to 
the study. Unfortunately, the replies received were mostly that the respondent was out of 
town, busy or not willing to participate. It was concluded that no more progress could be 
made with this sample and the responses could not be increased any further. Therefore, 
the sampling frame for the research study had to be changed and this new sampling frame 
was to be drawn from the OSIRIS database, which is explained in detail next. This 
change in the sampling frame would not affect the research objectives and the same 
research methods could be used. 
3.8 Survey Sample - OSIRIS Database 
OSIRIS is a comprehensive database of financial information, ratings, earnings estimates, 
stock data, ownership data and news on global publicly listed companies, banks and 
insurance firms around the world. With coverage of over 125 countries, OSIRIS contains 
information on over 37,000 companies. This data is sourced from a variety of 
Information Providers, each being an expert in its region or discipline. OSIRIS allows 
searching by any combination of criteria including: geographic location, ownership, stock 
data, industry code or activity description, number of employees, statement items, ratios, 
ratings and more. It is possible to search OSIRIS using one or multiple criteria and each 
criterion offers various options for targeting companies. 
A geographic location search option allows searching for companies using the place of 
their incorporation as the search criteria. The companies can be searched by Countries 
and non-sovereign territories, World regions, Cities or US States. It was decided to target 
the companies in the UK, USA, Canada and Australia as it was assumed these English 
speaking countries would find it easier to answer the questionnaire and would be more 
likely to respond to a UK study than would companies in other countries. Therefore, the 
companies were searched in OSIRIS database by the Countries and non-sovereign 
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territories search criteria. The list of companies matching the search criteria were 
displayed after each search as identified by country. 
Data can be exported from OSIRIS for use in other software programs such as 
spreadsheets, databases and word processors. The directory, the set of companies, the 
format and the layout of the export are chosen and exported to a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. As a result of this operation the companies for each country were 
downloaded from the OSIRIS database and saved in a separate spreadsheet. The 
breakdown of companies for each country was as follows as saved in an individual 
spreadsheet: 4000 UK companies, 10309 USA companies, 2124 Canadian companies and 
2010 Australian companies. 
The OSIRIS database allows the information downloaded to be customised by the user. 
For each company the following information was downloaded: the company name, the 
postal address, phone number, fax number, website address, the names and the titles of 
the executives. OSIRIS does not provide any information on joint ventures i. e. whether or 
not a particular company has a joint venture. Therefore, the only possible way to identify 
whether the companies downloaded from OSIRIS had any joint ventures was through the 
company history pages of the individual company websites or through a search for the 
company on the Google search engine. This was a lengthy and a time consuming process. 
For certain companies, it could not be determined whether or not they had any joint 
venture operations as no information could be found. These companies were included in 
the sample in order to avoid the risk of not including them when they actually had 
established a joint venture. 
Companies that may have either joint ventures or international joint ventures were 
included in the sample. It was assumed that including both types of joint ventures would 
create a bigger sample size and therefore, a higher response rate. This process resulted in 
a total of 931 companies with the possibility of having joint ventures or international 
joint ventures. This does not constitute a definite figure for the sampling frame as it was 
not possible to identify with certainty whether or not some of the companies had joint 
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ventures or international joint ventures, as indicated earlier. The total number of 
companies identified from the OSIRIS database and the breakdown by countries are 
shown in Table 3.3. 
In small organisations, all incoming correspondence may be seen by the owner. In very 
large organisations, CEOs are unlikely to open their own mail and mail that is handled by 
someone else may not make it to their desk. This heterogeneity creates the challenge of 
having to find the "right person" to fill out a survey in large businesses, while in one- 
person businesses there is no such problem. Business surveys introduce the possibility, 
and in some cases the likelihood, of having to go through someone to reach the 
appropriate respondent. These situations may require quite different strategies for 
obtaining a survey response. 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter and Thompson (1994) have formulated and tested a theory of 
why organisations do not respond to surveys. The theory argues that non-response is less 
likely to occur when the requested respondent clearly has the authority to respond (e. g. 
centralised decision-making), the capacity to respond (e. g. knowledge of requested 
information) and motive to respond (e. g. it is in the respondent's interest to do so). The 
respondents were identified after a long and thorough assessment of their personal 
information given by each company's website. Therefore, for each company one or two 
persons were selected and included in the survey sample i. e. for some companies more 
than one questionnaire was sent to potential respondents. Most of the executives were 
holding positions within their organisations as chairman, chief executive officers, 
business development managers, managing directors and commercial managers. A total 
of 1767 questionnaires were posted to 931 companies and the breakdown by country is 
shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Number of companies identified and number of questionnaires posted 
Country No. of companies identified No. of questionnaires posted in total 
UK 279 335 
USA 444 1069 
Canada 114 220 
Australia 94 143 
Total 931 1767 
Each cover letter was personally addressed to the individual respondent by name. Paxson, 
Dillman and Tarnai (1995) found that knowing the likely respondent's name resulted in 
significantly higher response rates than when sending questionnaires to the 
"owner/manager". The ability to add a person's name above the name of the organisation 
on the address label helps make sure that each contact is made with the same person. 
That information helps greatly with being able to target all communications and to avoid 
repeating the same information in each of them, which may occur when a different 
person receives subsequent mailings. The letters were similarly addressed on the 
University of Sheffield letterhead stationery and each letter was individually signed. 
The research objectives of the study and the questions in the self-administered 
questionnaire are not dependent on the sampling frame and therefore do not have to be 
changed or tailored according to a specific country. The same questionnaire was used for 
this mail survey as was used for the sample of foreign equity ventures in Turkey, which 
was described earlier in this chapter. The cover letter had to be modified slightly to 
address the new sampling frame. A sample copy of the cover letter used for the sample of 
foreign equity ventures in Turkey is produced in Appendix B and a sample of the cover 
letter used for the OSIRIS sample is produced in Appendix C. 
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3.9 Reasons for Low Response Rates to Mail Surveys 
Research has shown that failure to return a mail questionnaire can be traced to many 
different aspects of survey implementation. Kulka, Holt, Carter and Dowd (1991), in an 
analysis of why people did not return, found that some people did not recall receiving it, 
others recalled receiving it but did not open it and still others opened it but did not start to 
fill it out. Further, some of those who started to fill it out did not finish and some who 
finished did not mail it back. Reasons offered for not completing and returning a 
questionnaire range from "not thinking it's important" or "not interested in the topic" to 
"concern about confidentiality" or simply "just not getting around to it". 
Most people who answer questionnaires will do so almost immediately after they receive 
them. A questionnaire that lies unanswered for a week or more is much less likely to be 
returned. A questionnaire that is well constructed and accompanied by a carefully 
composed cover letter is often laid aside with the vague intention of looking at it later. As 
each day passes without the questionnaire being looked at, it becomes a lower priority, 
until it is completely forgotten, lost or thrown away. The reasons for the original 
questionnaire not reaching them extend well beyond getting lost in the mail. For some 
respondents this is the first time they learn that a questionnaire was sent to them. In some 
cases, another company employee opens the envelope containing the questionnaire and 
fails to give it to the desired respondent. 
Many organisations have policies that address whether they will cooperate with survey 
requests and an approval process for questionnaires that do get completed. A policy of 
not responding to questionnaires provides a convenient means of immediately 
dispatching requests for completion of questionnaires with the simple statement, "It's 
against company policy". In many organisations, the person who opens the mail and 
answers the telephone often screens requests for survey participation, even without 
knowing what the request is about. The questionnaire may be thrown away without the 
person to whom it is addressed even knowing it was received. Organisational recipients 
of a letter can easily delay having to respond by ignoring it or sending it to someone else 
in the hope that it will disappear somewhere within the organisation. 
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Frequently, the address at which the company is registered is not the same as the address 
of corporate headquarters. The OSIRIS database provides the company registered address 
but not the address of corporate headquarters, making sampling and coverage issues 
particularly difficult to handle. Lists become outdated very quickly as some businesses 
terminate or are sold while other businesses are being created. The researcher has little or 
no feedback from respondents. This lack of feedback, other than the knowledge that a 
previous message did not produce the desired response, makes it impossible to vary the 
appeal to address the major concerns of each respondent. At best, the researcher can only 
guess at the predominant reasons for non-response and incorporate appeals to overcome 
them into each follow-up contact. 
3.10 Follow-Up Contact: E-mail Survey for OSIRIS Database 
In two studies that essentially disregard personnel costs, Mehta and Sivadas (1995) and 
Jones and Pitt (1999), the authors concluded that Internet-based surveys are less costly 
than mail surveys. These conclusions stem from the fact that Internet surveys do not 
incur postage and printing costs whereas postal mail surveys do. Most studies have 
concluded that Internet-based surveys are conducted more quickly than surveys sent by 
postal mail. This conclusion is usually based on the fact that e-mail and other forms of 
online communication can be instantaneously transmitted whereas postal mail must be 
physically delivered, which of course takes more time. Gill and Johnson (2002) suggest 
that relative to postal surveys, e-mail surveys entail major cost savings, are much quicker 
to conduct, non-responses are easier to identify and chase up, and responses are easier to 
analyse using SPSS because of their electronic form. The possibility of accessing larger 
research samples and accessing previously difficult to contact research populations 
presents important opportunities for the management researcher. 
Obtaining questionnaire responses from some members of a sample by one method and 
other members by a second or even third method is the most common type of mixed- 
mode survey. Sometimes the follow-up is used to reach people who cannot be found 
through the initial procedure. A large number of failed attempts to reach someone by 
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mail may become a repetitive stimulus that is increasingly easy to ignore. Using a 
different mode offers an opportunity for the researcher to provide new information to the 
respondent in a new way. Evidence exists that people prefer certain modes (Groves and 
Kahn, 1979) and if such preferences are significant it stands to reason that people who 
have not responded to one mode because they dislike it may be receptive to a change in 
approach. In addition, the mere fact of switching modes tends to emphasise the 
importance of the study. There can also be no doubt that switching modes is effective in 
improving response rates beyond those that can be obtained by reliance on a single 
method. Supporting evidence is available from government and university sponsored 
surveys on a variety of topics (e. g. Mooney et al., 1993; Petrie et al., 1998). 
An attempt was made first to collect as many responses as possible by mail. This effort 
was followed by an attempt to locate everyone who either had not responded or for 
whom the mailing address was no longer current. The mixed-mode solution was to 
collect information from most respondents by e-mail and use paper questionnaires to 
collect information from the remainder (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998). An e-mail survey 
was conducted to obtain quick and inexpensive responses. By introducing a second 
survey mode in this way, it may be possible to avoid the potential measurement 
differences that must be considered for the other mixed-mode possibilities but also 
benefit the coverage and response qualities of the survey effort. 
The e-mails and the attached questionnaires were sent to the same companies and the 
executives or directors to which the mail survey was sent. The OSIRIS database does not 
provide the individual e-mail addresses of the executives and directors. The general 
format of the e-mail addresses for each company was found by searching on the company 
websites for contact details or on the Google search engine. The e-mail addresses for 
each executive or director were then formed by following the general format of the e- 
mail addresses for each company and by inserting the name of the executive or director. 
More than one executive or director was e-mailed for each company as there is no cost of 
sending an e-mail unlike mail surveys. The e-mail survey was a follow-up for the mail 
survey posted to the sampling frame identified from the OSIRIS database consisting of 
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UK, USA, Canadian and Australian companies. The e-mails were sent to the same 
executives holding positions within their organisations as chairman, chief executive 
officers, business development managers, managing directors and commercial managers 
identified for the mail survey. Therefore, the e-mail follow-up was sent to a total of 931 
companies with 1767 respondents receiving a reminder to participate in the survey. 
Observations of how people handle e-mail suggests that many people try to handle it in 
batches and quickly process each message only once. Messages that appear to be of 
minimal interest are often deleted after the recipient peruses only the first line or two of 
the message. In this context, introductory information and the first item on the 
questionnaire have much influence on response. The first lines of the e-mail simply state 
that a questionnaire was sent to the respondent previously and why. However, for some 
respondents this is the first time they learn that a questionnaire was sent to them. The e- 
mail has a tone of insistence that the previous contacts lack. Its strongest aspect is the 
first paragraph, in which recipients are told that their completed questionnaire has not yet 
been received. 
Most of the e-mail was devoted to a restatement of each respondent's importance to the 
study in terms quite different from those used in previous mailings. The social usefulness 
of the study was also re-emphasised, implying that the usefulness of the study is 
dependent on the return of the questionnaire. The recipient was also reminded which 
member of the organisation was to complete the questionnaire. The e-mail was 
completed by mention of the attached replacement questionnaire and the usual note of 
appreciation. It is essential to send a replacement questionnaire with the follow-up letter. 
The time that had elapsed since the first questionnaire mailing made it probable that the 
original questionnaire, if it had not been lost or thrown away, would be difficult to find. 
3.11 Response Rate - Turkish sample and OSIRIS sample 
A sample of foreign equity ventures for the study was drawn from the GDFI database on 
the basis of the following selection criteria: (i) having foreign parents from Europe, USA, 
Russia and the Far East: it was decided to concentrate on these foreign parents because of 
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the ease of administering questionnaires and the likelihood of participating in the survey; 
(ii) the proportion of foreign equity shareholding being between 10 per cent and 90 per 
cent. Omitting those foreign equity ventures (FEVs) that did not meet the above 
requirements resulted in a sample frame of 1096 FEVs. 
Of the 1096 companies initially contacted by a warm-up letter in February 2007,15 
stated they had no joint ventures and 167 letters were returned as addressed unknown. 
Unfortunately, only 16 warm-up letters were completed with the required information 
and returned by fax/post. This was not sufficient in order to identify and to mail the 
questionnaires to the local and foreign parents of the foreign equity ventures in Turkey. 
The alternative strategy was to identify the foreign partners of these equity ventures in 
Turkey and mail the questionnaires to these companies. For the list of 1096 equity 
ventures in Turkey, the postal addresses of the foreign parent companies and the names 
of the executives to contact in these companies were identified. A total of 231 
questionnaires were sent by first-class mail to foreign parents located in USA, Europe, 
Russia and Far East in March 2007. Despite these various attempts with this sampling 
frame of foreign equity ventures in Turkey, it did not prove to be productive. A total of 
11 questionnaires were completed and returned, resulting in a response rate of 4.76%. 
It was concluded that no more progress could be made with this sampling frame and the 
responses could not be increased any further. Therefore, the sampling frame for the 
research study had to be changed and this new sampling frame was drawn from the 
OSIRIS database. It was decided to target the companies in the UK, USA, Canada and 
Australia as it was assumed these English speaking countries would find it easier to 
answer the questionnaire and would be more likely to respond to a UK study than would 
companies in other countries. This process resulted in a total of 931 companies with the 
possibility of having domestic joint ventures or international joint ventures. This does not 
constitute a definite figure for the population size as it was not possible to identify with 
certainty whether or not some of the companies had domestic joint ventures or 
international joint ventures. For each company one or two persons were selected and 
included in the survey sample i. e. for some companies more than one questionnaire was 
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sent to potential respondents. During June 2007, a total of 1767 questionnaires were 
posted to 931 companies. Of the 1767 questionnaires mailed, 30 questionnaires were 
completed and returned, 23 refused to participate in the study stating the confidential 
nature of information and 30 were returned as address unknown 
An attempt was made first to collect as many responses as possible by mail. This effort 
was followed by an attempt to locate everyone who either had not responded or for 
whom the mailing address was no longer current. An e-mail survey was conducted to 
obtain quick and inexpensive responses. The e-mails and the attached questionnaires 
were sent to the same companies and the executives or directors which the mail survey 
was sent. The e-mail survey was a follow-up for the mail survey posted to the sampling 
frame identified from the OSIRIS database consisting of UK, USA, Canadian and 
Australian companies. Therefore, the e-mail follow-up was sent to a total of 931 
companies with 1767 respondents receiving a reminder to participate in the survey. This 
follow-up mode proved to be productive resulting in 90 completed questionnaires, 20 
refused to participate in the study stating the confidential nature of information and 21 
stated that they had no joint ventures. 
Each mailing is likely to bring reactions other than a completed questionnaire from a few 
recipients. Among the more frequent were: 
" The executive or director is out of town or has a busy schedule and will not be 
able to complete the survey before the deadline. 
" The executive or director has only worked in the company for a few months and 
does not have the sufficient knowledge to answer the questionnaire. 
" The executive or director requests how his/her contact details were obtained. 
As a result, regarding the OSIRIS sample, consisting of UK, USA, Canadian and 
Australian companies, 30 questionnaires were received by the mail survey and 90 
questionnaires were received by the follow-up e-mail survey. In total, 120 completed 
questionnaires were obtained from the OSIRIS sample, 22 of the questionnaires were 
completed with regards to domestic joint ventures and 98 questionnaires were completed 
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with regards to international joint ventures. However, the aim of the study is to examine 
the management and the performance of international joint ventures. Hence, it was 
decided to exclude the questionnaires that were completed with regards to domestic joint 
ventures (22 questionnaires) from the analysis and to use these completed questionnaires 
for future research. Therefore, 98 usable questionnaires were obtained from the OSIRIS 
sample and 11 usable questionnaires were obtained from the sample of foreign equity 
ventures in Turkey, resulting in a total of 109 usable questionnaires. 
3.12 Content Validity and Instrument Reliability 
There are many different ways of assessing the reliability and validity of a survey 
instrument. In this research the validity of the instrument (i. e. the extent to which it 
measures what it intends to measure) was assessed by investigating its content validity. 
Reliability (i. e. the extent to which measurement is precise, repeatable and consistent) 
was assessed using Cronbach's alpha coefficient. 
Churchill (1987) notes that the validity of a measuring instrument can be assessed by 
seeking evidence of its pragmatic content and construct validity. Content validity refers 
to the agreement among professionals that a scale logically appears to accurately reflect 
what it intends to measure (Zikmund, 2003), although its determination is subjective and 
judgemental (Emory, 1980). The content validity of the survey instrument was 
established in several steps. First, an extensive literature review was undertaken to 
develop the questionnaire items. Next, the preliminary questionnaire instrument was 
discussed with two academicians in the relevant field. Finally, a pilot study with three 
UK firms was conducted in order to give the final shape to the data collection instrument. 
While there are different methods for measuring the reliability of an instrument, for this 
study scale reliability was established by using Cronbach's alpha coefficient which is one 
of the most widely used reliability measures (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). Alpha is based 
on internal consistency of a test, i. e. it is based on the average correlations between items 
within a test. In order to initially assess the internal consistency of the scales, an item 
intercorrelation matrix is constructed for each scale. Those items which have a relatively 
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low correlation with the other items in their scale are deleted, prior to further analysis. 
Cronbach's alpha is then calculated for each scale (Cronbach, 1951). Although an alpha 
value of 0.70 is often considered the criterion for internally consistent established scales, 
Nunnally (1978) suggests the alpha value of 0.50 to 0.60 is acceptable in the early stages 
of research. 
Sample size is also an important consideration in the discussion of internal consistency, 
as the tests of significance were explicitly developed for large samples (Nunnally, 1978). 
More confidence is placed in the accuracy of the alpha values which are derived from a 
large sample. However, a sample size of 30 or more is statistically sufficient for 
calculating alphas which is achieved by the sample reported in this study. The Cronbach 
alpha results for the constructs are reported in each of the relevant chapters. 
3.13 Data Analysis 
Data analysis reported in Chapters 4 to 8 was conducted using the SPSS statistical 
package for Windows. An important issue in data analysis is the examination of data in 
terms of a number of criteria. The data were examined with respect to normality, 
linearity, homogeneity of variance and outliers and missing values. The initial 
examination also checked for any violation of assumptions of parametric statistical tests 
by means of graphical and descriptive summary statistical measures such as histogram, 
scatter-plots, skewness and kurtosis. The statistical methods employed included 
frequencies, cross-tabulations, the Chi-square test of independence, two-sample t-test, 
ANOVA, factor analysis and ordinal regression. 
3.14 Sample Characteristics 
Respondent company nationality: Due to the relatively small proportion of European 
respondent companies in the sample, the European nationalities were grouped into this 
broad but distinctive geographic location. As shown in Table 3.4,41 respondent 
companies (37.6 % of the total) are from UK, 19 (17.4%) from rest of Europe, 32 
(29.4%) from North America and 17(15.6%) from Australia. 
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Respondent company's equity share in joint venture: Of the 109 joint ventures, 35 
(32.1%) respondent companies held more than 50% of the joint venture's equity, 33 
(30.3%) had less than 50% of the joint venture's equity and 41(37.6%) had equal to 50% 
share of the joint venture equity. Hence the equity distribution in this sample indicates 
the respondent companies and their partner companies were holding equal share of the 
joint venture equity. 
Table 3.4 Sample Characteristics 
n % 
Respondent Company 
Nationality 
UK 
Rest of Europe 
North America (USA and Canada) 
Australia 
41 
19 
32 
17 
37.6 
17.4 
29.4 
15.6 
Respondent Company's 
Equity Share in Joint Venture 
More than 50% 
Less than 50% 
Equal to 50% 
35 
33 
41 
32.1 
30.3 
37.6 
Respondent's Job Title President or Executive Director 
General Manager or Managing Director 
Functional Manager / Director 
59 
20 
30 
54.1 
18.3 
27.5 
Partner Company Nationality UK 
Europe 
North America U. S. A. and Canada) 
Australia 
Other 
9 
43 
13 
2 
42 
8.3 
39.4 
11.9 
1.8 
38.5 
Industry of Joint Venture Manufacturing 
Tertiary 
50 
59 
45.9 
54.1 
Joint Venture Termination Yes 
No 
24 
85 
22.0 
78.0 
Joint Venture Age Group Young 
Old 
71 
38 
65.1 
34.9 
Joint Venture Age (years) Mean = 9.20 Standard Deviation = 8.03 8 
N= 109 
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Respondent's job title: Out of the 109 respondents, 79 (72.4%) were from top-level 
management, holding positions such as president or executive director (54.1%) and 
general manager (18.3%). The remaining 30 (27.5%) respondents also held important 
positions in the parent companies including business development manager, commercial 
manager and other functional heads. 
Partner company nationality: As shown in Table 3.4,9 partner companies (8.3 of the 
total) are from the UK, 43 (39.4%) from rest of Europe, 13 (11.9%) from North America, 
2 (1.86%) from Australia and 42 (38.5%) rest of the world. Due to the relatively small 
proportion of parent companies from several other nationalities in the sample, the various 
nationalities from the rest of the world were grouped into this broad geographic location. 
Industry sector of joint venture: 50 of the joint ventures (45.9%) operated in the 
Manufacturing sector (including food/drink manufacturing, metals and minerals, energy, 
construction, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, computers, telecommunications, other 
electrical, automobiles and other manufacturing) and 59 joint ventures (54.1 %) operated 
in the Tertiary sector (including transport, distribution, financial services and other 
services). 
Joint venture termination: 24 of the joint ventures (22.0%) were terminated since 
formation and 85 of the joint ventures (78.0%) continued to operate. 
Joint venture age and distribution: The mean of the joint venture age, calculated as the 
difference between the time of data collection or joint venture termination and the year of 
the joint venture formation, was 9.20 years with a standard deviation of 8.038 years. The 
year of joint venture formation ranged from 1962 to 2006, in which 38 joint ventures 
(34.9%) were formed during 1962-1997 and 71 joint ventures were formed during 1998- 
2006. Choosing the end of 1997, the age of 9, as a dividing point is justified because the 
mean age for the sample of the IJVs was 9.20. The joint ventures that had been 
established for 9 years or less were classified as "young", whereas, the joint ventures that 
had been established for more than 9 years were classified as "old". 
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3.15 Summary 
This chapter discusses the methods by which the primary data for the study were 
collected. The issue of which survey method to employ to collect primary data involved a 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of personal interviewing, telephone 
interviewing and mail questionnaire. Given the nature of the information being sought 
(both factual and opinion based covering several key areas of JV activity) and in order to 
elicit the required information from as large a sample as possible within the cost and time 
constraints of the study, it was decided to administer a mail questionnaire as the most 
appropriate method. The final form of the questionnaire was derived from a process that 
included questions reported in the extant literature and information obtained from semi- 
structured personal interviews with managers who were knowledgeable about their 
companies' joint venture operations. In administering the mail survey, the study 
attempted to follow several of the guidelines suggested by Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch (1996) in order to enhance the rate of response. 
A sample of foreign equity ventures in Turkey was drawn from the GDFI database. Of 
the 1096 companies initially contacted by a warm-up letter, only 16 warm-up letters were 
completed with the required information and returned by fax/post. For the list of 1096 
equity ventures in Turkey, the postal addresses of the foreign parent companies and the 
names of the executives to contact in these companies were identified. A total of 231 
questionnaires were sent by mail to foreign parents located in the USA, Europe, Russia 
and the Far East. Despite these various attempts with this sample of foreign equity 
ventures in Turkey, a total of 11 questionnaires were completed and returned, resulting in 
a response rate of 4.76%. 
The sampling frame for the research study had to be changed and this new sampling 
frame was drawn from the OSIRIS database. It was decided to target companies in the 
UK, USA, Canada and Australia as it was assumed these English speaking countries 
would find it easier to answer the questionnaire and would be more likely to respond. A 
total of 931 companies were identified but this does not constitute a definite figure for the 
population size as it was not possible to identify with certainty whether or not some of 
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the companies had domestic joint ventures or international joint ventures. For some 
companies more than one potential respondent was identified and a total of 1767 
questionnaires were posted to 931 companies. An e-mail survey was conducted as a 
follow-up for the mail survey and sent to the same potential respondents identified from 
the OSIRIS database. The e-mails and the attached questionnaires were sent to the same 
companies and the executives or directors which the mail survey was sent. 
As a result, 30 questionnaires were received from the mail survey and 90 questionnaires 
were received from the follow-up e-mail survey. The aim of the study is to examine the 
management and the performance of international joint ventures. Hence, it was decided 
to exclude the questionnaires that were completed with regards to domestic joint ventures 
(22 questionnaires) from the analysis and to use these completed questionnaires for future 
research. Therefore, 98 usable questionnaires were obtained from the OSIRIS sampling 
frame and 11 usable questionnaires were obtained from the sampling frame of foreign 
equity ventures in Turkey, resulting in a total of 109 usable questionnaires. 
The analysis of the primary data is presented in Chapters 4 to 8. The background 
literature, definition and operationalisation of variables and research hypotheses of the 
study are detailed in each of the respective chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NATURE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN IJVS 
4.1 Introduction 
A remarkable phenomenon in international business over the last two decades has been 
the dramatic growth in the number and importance of international joint ventures (IJVs). 
More Western firms are now opting for IJVs as a method for continued growth and 
survival in light of maturing local markets and increased international competition 
(Morris and Hergert, 1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Glaister and Buckley, 1994). 
However, despite their increasing number and the strategic advantages they provide, IJVs 
emerge as a problematic organizational form in terms of performance (Beamish and 
Delios, 1997; Robson et al., 2002; Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006). It is therefore not 
surprising that performance of JVs has been a prominent theme of research over the past 
two decades (see Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1988; Geringer and Hebert, 1989,1991; 
Geringer, 1990; Makino, 1995; Beamish and Delios, 1997; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; 
Child and Yan, 2003; Lopez-Navarro and Camison-Zornoza, 2003; Mohr, 2006; Lin and 
Wang, 2007; Ng et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2007; Ozorhon et al., 2008). 
Parkhe (1993) has identified four major dimensions of JV study in the prior literature: 
motives for JV formation, partner selection characteristics, control/conflict, and JV 
stability/performance, and in reviewing these lines of study he concludes that researchers 
have non-cumulatively focused on different dimensions. It is the purpose of this study to 
attempt to relate two of the four core dimensions of JV study identified by Parkhe (1993), 
those of the management/control of JVs and JV performance. The focus of this chapter is 
the investigation of the relationships between the factors influencing the management and 
the performance of IJVs. 
A critical determinant of IJV performance appears to be the control exercised by parents 
over a venture's activities (Rafii 1978; Killing 1983; Schaan 1983). Although each 
partner must, by definition, relinquish some control over an IJV's activities, such a move 
is often accompanied by great consternation. Insufficient or ineffective control over an 
IJV can limit the parent firm's ability to coordinate its activities, to utilize efficiently its 
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resources and to implement effectively its strategy (Stopford and Wells 1972; Anderson 
and Gatignon 1986). Control is a complex and multidimensional concept (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1989; Gray and Yan, 1992). This feature may help explain why researchers have 
used different approaches to study control in IJVs. These differences are particularly 
evident in the conceptualization and operationalization of control. 
The perspective of this chapter is an empirical investigation of the nature of management 
control exercised by the parent firms over the joint ventures. The focus of the chapter is 
to provide new evidence on the relationships between the dimensions of management 
control and the performance of a sample of JVs. The main goals of the chapter are to 
identify the dimensions of management control for a sample of IJVs with parent 
companies from Europe, North America and Australia and to formulate and test 
hypotheses on the relationship between dimensions of control and the performance of 
IJVs. 
The rest of this chapter is set out in the following way. The next section reviews the 
literature relating to prior empirical research on management control of IJVs and the third 
section sets out the hypotheses of the study. The measures of variables are described in 
the fourth section. The fifth section presents the results and discussion. A summary is 
provided in the last section. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Control refers to the process by which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the 
behaviour and output of another entity (Ouchi, 1977) through the use of power, authority 
(Etzioni, 1965) and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms 
(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Typically, as organizations expand in size, there are 
concurrent increases in the complexity and differentiation of their structures (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967), as well as in the risks of conflicts, opportunistic behaviour and 
competing goals between units. As a result, top management are confronted by the 
increasingly crucial need to monitor, coordinate and integrate the activities of the 
organization's business units, including IJVs (Child 1977; Mintzberg 1979). The main 
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purpose of control in JVs is to ensure that the benefits the parents seek are actually 
obtained without undue costs. However, the distinguishing characteristic of the JV as a 
co-operative organisation means that the ability of a parent to exercise control is a 
function both of the influence it has over the JV mangers and its influence in relation to 
other parent companies (Child et al., 1997: 186). 
In their detailed consideration of the prior literature relating to JV control, Geringer and 
Hebert (1989) identified three dimensions of management control: the mechanisms or 
means the parents use to exercise control, the extent or degree of control achieved by 
parents over a JV, and the focus of control or the areas of the JV's operation in which 
control is exercised. It is extremely difficult to compare the results of prior studies on 
management control of JVs because they have tended to focus on different dimensions of 
control (Yan and Gray, 1994: 1481). In the prior literature, parent control of the JV has 
been suggested as a critical factor that determines performance. Despite the presumed 
relationship between management control and performance, empirical research on this 
relationship has produced conflicting results (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). Geringer and 
Hebert (1989: 246) concluded that "the empirical evidence regarding the control- 
performance relationship in IJVs is limited. The importance and direction of this 
relationship have yet to be established, tested and clarified". 
Selekler-Goksen and Uysal-Tezolmez (2007) evaluated the relative significance of 
different control mechanisms in creating control and analyzing the impact of control on 
performance. Investigation of the impact of different control mechanisms on strategic and 
operational control revealed that capital and non-capital resource contributions, and 
particularly the latter, emerge as significant sources of control. While equity ownership 
was positively associated with strategic control, board representation did not have a 
significant relationship with either control type. Rather than `forcing' their partners 
through the legal rights that emerge from ownership or board representation, local parents 
seemed to rely more on their expertise and local connections to `convince and lead' them. 
As far as the relationship between control and performance was observed, while strategic 
and operational control may have affected various financial returns to the local parents, 
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they were not creating a difference in terms of goal actualization. Local parents were 
satisfied with the extent to which they have been able to actualize their objectives and 
this seemed to be the case even when they did not exercise high degrees of control 
To deal with the complexity of management control of joint ventures, Kamminga and 
Van der Meer Kooistra (2006) developed a new theoretical model which pays specific 
attention to the characteristics of the parents' contributions and the three dimensions of 
management control of joint ventures. A conclusion from the findings of the case studies 
was that the characteristics of the parents' contributions have an important impact on 
joint venture control. The cases gave support to the basic argument of the theoretical 
model that, due to the low level of information asymmetry, a parent can exercise tight 
control over the joint venture activities which relate to its own contributions. A more 
refined understanding of the exercised control requires more in-depth knowledge about 
the whole range of the parents' activities and expertise as well. When considering the 
theoretical model developed, the different joint venture types have different suitable 
control characteristics. According to Kamminga and Van der Meer Kooistra (2006), if 
there is a good match between joint venture type and control characteristics, all types 
may have a satisfactory performance. 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
Depending on the role played by each partner in the decision-making of the joint venture, 
Killing (1983,1988) distinguished the following types of joint ventures; "the independent 
venture in which the venture general manager is given a great deal of autonomy to 
manage as he sees fit, the dominant parent venture in which one parent plays a dominant 
managerial role, the split control venture in which each parent plays a separate and 
distinct role, and the shared management venture in which both parents play an active 
managerial role so all significant decisions are shared" (Killing, 1988: 62). 
Choi and Beamish (2004) consider control as a "conduit through which parents' firm- 
specific advantages are transferred to the venture" (p. 202). From this control 
perspective, they argue that a split control venture would perform better than the other 
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types. As each parent has the best capabilities of managing the application of its own 
contributions to the joint venture, each parent should be involved in those joint venture 
activities which are related to its own contributions. At the same time, by choosing a split 
control venture instead of a shared management venture, advantages with respect to 
division of labour can be gained. 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) argue that a significant contribution of the locus of decision- 
making perspective to the JV literature was to conceptualize control as a continuous 
variable, rather than merely an absolute, dichotomous variable representing parents' 
exercise of either total control or no control over the JV. A particular criticism of this 
perspective is its implicit suggestion that parent firms seek to control the overall JV, 
rather than targeting specific activities or processes perceived as crucial for achievement 
of the JV's or the parents' strategic objectives. Schaan (1983) demonstrated that firms 
tended to seek control over specific `strategically important activities' rather than over 
the whole JV. Schaan's (1983) finding that control also had a focus dimension, i. e. that 
parents may choose to exercise control over a relatively wider or narrower scope of the 
JV's activities was supported by Geringer's (1988) study of 90 developed country JVs. 
Further, this suggests that the exercise of effective control should emphasize selective 
control over those dimensions a parent perceives as critical, rather than attempting to 
control the entire range of the JV's activities. The first hypothesis relates to the 
distinction between the extent and focus of control revealed in the prior literature, with 
certain studies emphasising that JV parents will seek to control particular aspects of the 
venture rather than striving for overall control. 
Hypothesis 1: Parent firms will seek to focus their control over particular activities of the 
JV rather than attempting to achieve overall control of the venture. 
From a transaction cost perspective, IJVs replicate the characteristics of hierarchies more 
closely than other alliances because of the equity shares held by the alliance members 
(Osland et al., 2001; Casciaro, 2003). While equity is seen as a primary mechanism of 
control in transaction cost theory literature (Makino and Beamish, 1998), it is equated to 
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the extent of control a parent has by some bargaining power theorists (Blodgett, 1991). 
According to Blodgett (1'991), equity is the result of the negotiations between the parents 
and thus a sign of their relative power. Although some recent studies on alliances do not 
see control as an automatic consequence of equity (e. g. Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), its 
significance should be recognized in developing countries as developed country firms 
also use equity as a source of control in their IJVs based in developing countries 
(Beamish, 1985). 
There is a great deal of support in the literature that equity ownership leads to strategic 
control (e. g. Lee et al., 1998; Wang et al., 1998; Yan and Child, 2004). However, there is 
disagreement regarding its impact on operational control (Child et al., 1997; Child and 
Faulkner, 1998; Yan and Gray, 2001). According to Child and Faulkner (1998), 
ownership cannot result in operational control, as implementation of the strategic policies 
requires contribution from the other parent. Child and Faulkner (1998) look at the issue 
mainly from the foreign parent's point of view and underline the dependence of the 
foreign parent on the local parent, who is more proximate to the IJV, for decision 
implementation. Their approach may be valid for foreign parents since other mechanisms 
of control, such as appointment of key managers, can be a more influential means of 
exercising control for them. However, given the local parent's proximity to the IJV, 
equity ownership can facilitate local parent's ability to exert operational control by 
increasing its bargaining power over the foreign parent. Thus, equity is expected to be 
positively related to the extents of both strategic and operational control that the local 
parent enjoys. 
Results of JV studies of equity ownership on controls have been inconclusive. Some 
authors have found evidence that the degree of ownership increases control (Youseff, 
1975), while others have reported inconsistent results (Dang, 1977). Groot and Merchant 
(2000: 606) speculated that "unequal ownership may have significant effects on decision- 
making (controls)". Mjoen and Tallman (1997) found no linkage between equity and 
strategic controls or between equity and operational controls (e. g. the allocation of 
decision-making responsibility and the use of manager performance incentives). This 
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finding is consistent with earlier work that reported the use of specific control 
mechanisms to be of more relevance than overall equity control to JV partners (Geringer, 
1986; Schaan, 1983). Chalos and O'Connor (2004) tested the effects of partner equity 
ownership, knowledge dependence and asset specific investments on JV controls. 
Controls included expatriate staffing, socialization practices, delegated decision 
responsibilities, parent company communications and incentives. Based on field visits 
and survey data, Chalos and O'Connor (2004) found that partner equity ownership 
influenced expatriate staffing but none of the other control mechanisms. 
Traditionally, the main mechanism of JV control has been majority ownership or voting 
control (itself largely determined by majority equity shareholdings). Behrman (1970), and 
Friedman and Beguin (1971) suggested, however, that control is not a strict and 
automatic consequence of ownership, but rather that a variety of mechanisms were 
available to firms for exercising effective control such as the right to veto the decisions of 
the JV managers, representation in management bodies and special agreements relating to 
either technology (e. g. licensing) or management (e. g. management services). 
Participation in the management of a JV's operations may also be obtained by a parent 
firm through its technical superiority and managerial skills. Managerial control can also 
be exercised in the nomination of one of the parent firm's managers as the JV general 
manager or other key positions in the JV, as well as the employment of different 
ownership structure arrangements (Rafii, 1978; Gullander, 1976; Schaan, 1988; Yan and 
Gray, 1994). 
Otterbeck (1981) has also pointed out that while administrative systems are introduced 
for co-ordination, performance evaluation and decision-making of certain kinds, the 
desire for control should lead parents to try to impose their own administrative 
procedures and policies upon the JV. The literature emphasizes the way in which 
minority shareholders in JVs are able to leverage control of the venture through the 
establishment of alternative mechanisms of control. Where the parent is a minority 
shareholder it might be expected that some attempt would be made to lever control of the 
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venture by organizing more of the control mechanisms than the non-minority 
shareholders. This suggests the second hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: If a parent is a minority shareholder, then more of the other mechanisms of 
joint venture control will be derived from this parent 
Boards of directors can fulfill certain duties that can be categorized under the headings of 
control, service and resource acquisition. The control role entails directors' monitoring of 
managers as representatives of the shareholders (Johnson et al., 1996). In IJVs, boards 
provide a context for controlling not only the managers some of whom may be appointed 
by another parent but also the other parent. The service role involves provision of advice 
and counsel to management on administrative and other managerial issues (Johnson et al., 
1996; Young et al., 2001). In the fulfillment of this role, board members may take an 
active role in shaping the firm's strategic goals and plans and thereby acquire control 
over the firm's strategic actions. Thus, board representation of a parent can be seen as 
another mechanism of strategic control (Yan and Gray, 1994; Child and Yan, 1999). 
Although the voting control on board is related to the ownership structure, there is not 
necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between ownership and board structures. 
Additionally, boards may confer control rights to the parents irrespective of their 
ownership shares. A partner with a minority representation on the board also has the 
chance to voice its opinions about the strategic issues of the IJV. Because relying on 
voting control on a continuous basis may lead to the breakdown of the IJV eventually, a 
larger or even a majority partner needs to pay attention to these opinions (Killing, 1983; 
Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
Hypothesis 3: If the parent company has contributed fewer members to the joint venture 
management team (i. e. the source of the management team is mainly derived from the 
partner company), more of the other mechanisms of control will be derived from this 
parent. 
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Past literature on IJVs (e. g. Killing, 1983; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Mjoen and 
Tallman, 1997; Yan and Child, 2004) recognizes the control exercised by the parents 
over the IJV as a significant determinant of performance. Insufficient control over an IJV 
may not only limit a parent's ability to actualize its objectives and to protect the strategic 
competencies it shares with the IJV but also decrease the IJV's ability to effectively 
utilize the resources provided by this parent (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Child and 
Faulkner, 1998). Thus, establishment of a sound control structure is significant for both 
fulfilling the parents' performance expectations and the satisfactory performance of the 
IN as an independent entity. 
The subjective assessment of JV performance by a parent firm is likely to be significantly 
influenced by the degree to which the parent exercises management control over the JV. 
Yan and Gray (1994) in a case analysis of US-China JVs found that the pattern of 
management control was directly related to JV performance. Data showed that when the 
partners' control was even, each partner's performance, as assessed from its own 
perspective, was equal. However, when control was unevenly shared by partners, the 
prediction of performance was less straightforward. While in some instances finding that 
"the partner who exercises a higher level of management control achieves a higher level 
of performance from its own point of view" (Yan and Gray, 1994: 1499), and "the 
balance or unbalance in partners' management control is associated with a similar pattern 
of performance assessed in terms of the achievement of both partners' strategic 
objectives" (p. 1500), this was not consistent across all cases. 
Building on these arguments, a distinction can be made between "high control parents" 
and "low control parents", the former being JV parents that exercise the greater degree of 
authority over the dimensions of management control. A high control parent will have a 
greater responsibility for the performance outcomes of the JV than is the case for a low 
control parent. The high control parent is, therefore, more likely to associate its degree of 
control with JV performance and will, in consequence, be inclined to adopt a more 
favourable perspective on the performance outcomes of the JV. With the low control 
parent, and a reduced responsibility for JV performance, there will be a weaker perceived 
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association between its management of the JV and JV performance, and in consequence 
there will be less of a tendency to view JV performance favourably. 
The more a parent firm has responsibility for the dimensions of JV management control, 
ceteris paribus, the greater will be the level of satisfaction with JV performance 
expressed by that parent. This general argument underpins each of the particular 
dimensions of JV management control identified in the literature. Thus, where a parent 
dominates the main mechanisms of JV control it would be expected that this parent 
would be more likely to view favourably the performance of the JV. Conversely, where a 
parent company does not dominate the main mechanisms of JV control, this parent would 
be less likely to view the performance of the JV in favourable terms. At a more 
disaggregated level, where the extent of management control is measured in terms of the 
decision-making responsibility of the parent (Killing, 1983), the subjective measure of 
satisfaction would be expected to be higher where the parent had decision-making 
responsibility. It follows that a similar argument applies to the focus of management 
control. Where the focus of management control is measured in terms of the most active 
partner in the set of management functions of the JV, the subjective measure of 
satisfaction would be expected to be higher in those JVs where the partner was the most 
active. In other words, those JVs where the partners have focused on particular aspects of 
management control will be given higher subjective values of performance. 
This 
reasoning leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Parents who dominate or have responsibility for management control will 
have a higher perceived level of satisfaction of JV performance than those parents who 
do not dominate or have responsibility for management control. 
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4.4 Measurement of the Variables 
The measurement of the management control and the performance variables is 
summarised in Table 4.1. The prior literature makes it clear that a large number of 
variables may be employed to control a joint venture. In order to achieve some parsimony 
in terms of the number of variables under study, a representative set of control variables 
was identified from the literature as follows. 
Mechanisms of control 
The mechanisms of control were considered in terms of. (i) the source of the management 
of the JV; (ii) the general manager appointment of the JV; (iii) the equity shareholding of 
the respondent company (i. e. at the time of data collection. If the JV has been terminated, 
the equity shareholding of the respondent company is the equity shareholding before 
termination); (iv) the power of veto. 
Extent of control 
The respondents were asked the extent to which the decision-making was taken jointly 
regarding nine operating decisions: product pricing, product design, production process, 
quality standards, replacing a functional manager, budget sales targets, budget cost 
targets, budget capital and expenditures (this draws on Killing's (1983) measure). 
Focus of control 
The focus of control was measured across a set of management functions-finance, 
R&D, production, distribution, planning, marketing and HRM-according to whether the 
respondent company, the partner company or both were the most active. 
Perception of Performance 
One subjective measure was obtained: the respondent company's subjective level of 
overall satisfaction with the JV's overall performance. The respondents were asked the 
extent to which they were satisfied with the JV performance on a five-point scale (1 = 
`very dissatisfied' to 5= `very satisfied'). 
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Table 4.1 Measurement of management control and performance variables 
Mechanisms of control: 
Source of JV management team Respondents were asked to indicate whether the 
source of the JV management team was: (i) mainly 
from the respondent company; (ii) mainly from the 
partner company; (iii) drawn equally from both 
partners (iv) mainly recruited externally. 
JV General Manager Appointment Respondents were asked to indicate whether the 
general manager of the JV was: (i) originally 
appointed from the respondent company; (ii) 
originally appointed from the partner company; (iii) 
originally from the JV. 
Equity share The respondent company's relative equity 
shareholding at the time of data collection was 
measured as a trichotomous variable according to 
whether the respondent company had more than 
50%, less than 50%, or exactly 50% of the 
shareholding in the JV. 
Power of Veto Respondents were asked to indicate whether the 
power of veto over the decisions of JV management 
team rested with: (i) the respondent company; (ii) 
the partner company; (iii) both partners (iv) neither 
parent. 
Extent of control: 
Responsibility for product pricing, 
product design, production process, 
quality standards, replacing a 
functional manager, budget sales 
targets, budget cost targets, budget 
capital, expenditures. 
Focus of control: 
For each area of responsibility, the respondents 
were asked to assess the extent to which the 
decision-making responsibility was taken jointly by 
the partner companies on ordinal scale from 1= "no 
extent" to 5= "great extent". 
Most active in finance, R&D, For each functional area, the respondents 
production, distribution, planning, were asked whether the most active company was 
marketing, HRM. the respondent company, the partner company or 
both. 
Perception of Performance: 
Satisfaction Ordinal scale from 1= "very dissatisfied" to 5= 
"very satisfied". 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 
Evidence relating to H1, which maintains the parent firms will seek to focus their control 
over particular activities of the JV rather than attempting to achieve overall control of the 
venture, is set out in Table 4.2. For each functional area, the focus of control was 
measured according to whether the most active company was the respondent company, 
the partner company or both. Table 4.2 shows for each functional area, the frequencies 
and the percentages according to whether the most active company was the respondent 
company or the partner company and both companies. According to HI, the frequencies 
and the percentages will be higher for certain functional areas than others where the 
respondent company is the most active. There is a good deal of evidence from the sample 
that parent firms seek to focus their control on particular aspects of JV activity, with a 
least a third of respondent firms focusing on a particular area of decision-making. For the 
respondent firms, the greatest areas of focus are in R&D, finance and planning. This is 
followed by IT, production and marketing, with the lowest areas of focus in distribution 
and HRM. This indicates that parent firms have a hierarchy of focus areas, with the most 
focus being in some of the key strategic areas of IJV activity, with less focus where the 
IJV can be expected to have the greatest local understanding of decision-making. 
Table 4 .2 Focus of' joint 
decision-making by parent firms 
Our Company Partner Company or Equally 
N%N% 
Finance 52 47.7 57 52.3 
R&D 53 48.6 54 49.5 
Production 45 41.3 60 55.0 
Distribution 37 33.9 62 56.9 
Planning 46 42.2 63 57.8 
Marketing 43 39.4 65 59.6 
HRM 42 38.5 67 61.5 
IT 46 42.2 62 56.9 
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Hypothesis 2 
Evidence relating to Hypothesis 2, which maintains if a parent is a minority shareholder 
then more of the other mechanisms of control will be derived from this parent is set out in 
Table 4.3. Hypothesis 2 was tested by considering differences in mean rank of the 
mechanisms of control variables by employing the Mann-Whitney Test as appropriate. 
Table 4.3 shows that for respondent companies with equity share of less than 50%, the 
mean rank of the source of management is significantly higher (p < 0.01) than where the 
respondent company has equity share of more than 50% of the shareholding in the JV. 
The mean rank of the general manager appointment is significantly higher (p < 0.01) 
where the respondent company has equity share of less than 50% of the shareholding in 
the JV. The mean rank of the power of veto over decisions of JV managers is 
significantly higher (p < 0.01) where the respondent company has equity share of less 
than 50% of the shareholding in JV. These findings indicate that those parent firms with 
less than 50% of the IJV equity, i. e. those with less control associated with equity share, 
are more likely to be responsible for the source of the JV management team, to be 
responsible for the appointment of the JV general manager and to have the power of veto 
over the decisions of the JV management team. The findings demonstrate that where a 
parent firm has an equity share of less than 50% of the shareholding in JV then this 
parent will seek other mechanisms of JV control. This indicates that parent firms are able 
to gain control of an IJV even with less than 50% of the equity shareholding. 
The 
findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Evidence relating to Hypothesis 3, which maintains if the parent company has 
contributed fewer members to the joint venture management team, more of the other 
mechanisms of control will be derived from this parent is set in Table 4.4. Hypothesis 3 
was tested by considering differences in mean rank of the mechanisms of control 
variables by employing the Mann-Whitney Test as appropriate. Table 4.4 shows that the 
mean rank of the general manager appointment is significantly higher (p < 0.01) where 
the source of the JV management team is mainly derived from the partner company (i. e. 
fewer members are contributed by the respondent company). The mean rank of the equity 
share is significantly higher (p < 0.01) where the source of the JV management team is 
mainly derived from the partner company. The mean rank of the power of veto over 
decisions of JV managers is significantly higher (p < 0.1) where the source of the JV 
management team is mainly derived from the partner company. These findings indicate 
that those parent firms with the source of the JV management team mainly derived from 
the partner company, i. e. fewer members are contributed by these parent firms, are more 
likely to be responsible for the general manager appointment, will have greater equity 
shareholding in the JV and have the power of veto over the decisions of JV managers. 
The findings demonstrate that where a parent firm contributes fewer members to the JV 
management team then this parent will seek other mechanisms of JV control. This 
indicates that parent firms are able to gain control of an IJV even if these parent firms 
contribute fewer members to JV management team. The findings provide support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Evidence relating to H4, which maintains that parents who dominate or have 
responsibility for management control will have a higher perceived level of satisfaction 
of JV performance than those parents who do not dominate or have responsibility for 
management control is set out in Table 4.5 for each of the identified dimensions of 
management control. Table 4.5 shows the mean level of satisfaction for the group of 
firms that had management control over the various dimensions of control and those that 
did not. Hypothesis 4 was tested by considering differences in means of the two groups 
of firms by employing a t-test as appropriate. 
For the source of JV management team, the parents will dominate or have responsibility 
for this mechanism of control if the source of the JV management team is drawn mainly 
from this parent company. According to Hypothesis 4, the respondent company's 
satisfaction with JV performance will be higher where the source of the JV management 
team is drawn mainly from the respondent company. The mean of the respondent 
company's satisfaction with JV performance where the source of the JV management 
team drawn mainly from the respondent company was compared with the mean of the 
respondent company's satisfaction with JV performance where the source of the JV 
management team drawn mainly from the partner company, equally from both partners 
or mainly recruited externally. The mean of the respondent company's satisfaction with 
JV performance is higher where the source of the JV management team is drawn manly 
from the respondent company but not significant. 
For the general manager appointment of the JV, the parents will dominate or have 
responsibility for this mechanism of control if the general manager of the 
JV was 
originally appointed from this parent company. According to 
Hypothesis 4, the 
respondent company's satisfaction with JV performance will 
be higher where the general 
manager of the JV originally appointed from the respondent company. 
The mean of the 
respondent company's satisfaction with JV performance where the general manager of 
the JV originally appointed from the respondent company was compared with the mean 
of the respondent company's satisfaction with 
JV performance where the general 
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CHAPTER 5: THE AUTONOMY GRANTED TO JOINT VENTURES 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of how much autonomy, if any, to grant an international joint venture (IJV) has 
been identified as a major issue faced by both researchers and practitioners (Newburry 
and Zeira, 1999: 263). This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms, each of 
which is economically and legally independent of the other (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987: 
547). Lyles and Reger (1993: 399) concluded that "instead of accepting the premise that 
JVs should be controlled to the same extent as wholly-owned subsidiaries or the 
assumption that control should be divided among parent firms, more fruitful research 
may begin with the notion that significant autonomy should rest with the JV 
management". Giving an IJV management enough autonomy to genuinely run an 
independent business, but at the same time making sure that major strategic decisions are 
taken by equity partners, is a delicate task (Glaister et al., 2003). Research on the nature 
IJV autonomy is a relatively neglected area in the examination of IJV activity. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide new evidence on the nature of autonomy in a 
sample of IJVs with parent firms from Europe, North America and Australia. The overall 
concept of autonomy is examined by discussing differences in the management and 
control of decision-making as categorized by operational versus strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, the influence of IJV performance and IJV duration on autonomy is 
considered. The rest of this chapter is set out in the following way. The next section 
reviews the literature relating to prior empirical research on IJV autonomy and the third 
section sets out the hypotheses of the study. The measures of variables are described in 
the fourth section. The fifth section presents the results and discussion. A summary is 
provided in the last section. 
5.2 Literature Review 
Autonomy is the extent to which joint ventures have the freedom to make decisions over 
certain key areas of their operations. Hill and Hellriegel (1994) defined autonomy in a 
more formal manner as `the degree of decision making latitude allowed to the joint 
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venture management by the partners. According to Newburry and Zeira (1999), a key 
intervening concept in the distinction between formal definitions of autonomy and 
control is authority. Formal control refers to the authority that IJV parents have over their 
IJV, which they allocate between themselves. Formal autonomy, by contrast, refers to 
authority that the IJV receives from the parents. The distinction between control and 
autonomy also becomes evident when examining how these two concepts have been 
previously measured (Newburry and Zeira, 1999). Control studies have generally 
concentrated on obtaining data from parent-level sources. Autonomy studies have usually 
utilized IJV level sources, concentrating on IJVs' abilities to act independently. 
One explanatory model for the degree of autonomy of joint ventures comes from 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This theory states that the 
power of one organization to influence decision-making in another organization depends 
upon the extent to which that other organization is dependent upon the first for resources. 
The joint venture is dependent upon the parents, usually for finance, perhaps also for 
other inputs, or for providing access to markets for products. The greater the dependence 
of the joint venture upon the parents the less we might expect the autonomy of the joint 
venture to be and the greater the influence of the parents over decision-making (Moxon et 
al., 1988). The parent companies are also dependent upon the joint venture for certain 
outputs whether these be production of finished products, intermediate components, 
research and development, or other factors. 
Transaction cost theory gives a different perspective upon the management of joint 
ventures. Underlying the transactions costs approach is a theory about the managerial 
cost of making the necessary decisions to maintain control over a joint venture. 
The 
parent companies expect to receive a return on their investment from the 
joint venture but 
they have the problem of managing the related transactions. According to Butler and 
Sohod (1995), when the objectives of the joint venture are ambiguous and there is 
lack of 
clarity over what the joint venture is doing greater managerial effort 
is needed on the part 
of the partners, which may involve greater 
direct involvement in decision-making and 
hence less decision-making autonomy for the joint venture. Combining the two 
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explanatory models, Butler and Sohod (1995) conclude that the condition of minimum 
joint venture autonomy would therefore tend to appear under high resource-dependence 
and high transaction ambiguity, while maximum autonomy would appear under low 
resource-dependence and high transaction specificity. 
As noted by Lyles and Reger (1993), there appears to be a general assumption that IJVs 
should not have complete autonomy in their actions. Harrigan's (1985, p. 334) research 
revealed that too much autonomy may result in IJV termination when the IJV evolves 
quicker than expected into a strong organization with the ability to stand alone. At this 
point, the IJV may have become too strong for its parents to manage effectively, and 
accordingly the parents may no longer gain the benefits for which the IJV was pursued. 
By limiting an IJV's autonomy, a parent company can guide the policy and actions of its 
IN as well as monitor, coordinate and integrate the IJV's activities with those of the 
parent (Geringer, 1993). 
Zeira and Shenkar's (1990) findings indicate that when the goals of IJV parents differ, 
this causes a state of confusion within the IN, especially when one parent's hidden 
agenda of disarming another parent becomes known to the IJV managerial team. Hence, 
incompatibility in goals can be managed by autonomy because local management 
generally knows what works best in local circumstances, and acts to initiate programmes 
which are in the best interests of the IN. Prahalad and Doz (1987) stated that usually 
headquarters managers lack an understanding of the skills and limitations involved in 
operating in environments dissimilar to that of the parent companies and hence 
headquarters executives should be aware of this shortcoming. This suggests that the 
greater the environmental dissimilarities, the higher the recommended venture autonomy. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1991) concluded that autonomy is necessary to allow IJVs the freedom 
of action required to successfully accomplish their goals because of confusing directions 
given by multiple parents and a need to be able to adapt to a changing environment. In 
support of granting IJV autonomy, Killing (1983) describes a failure cycle where poor 
IJV performance leads to lower IN autonomy, subsequently leading to inefficient 
decisions and even poorer IN performance. 
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5.3 Hypotheses Development 
There is a clear distinction between strategic and operational control in organizations, 
which applies also to IJVs. Child and Faulkner (1998, p. 190) point out that it is effective 
for IJV parents to exercise control selectively over those activities and decisions the 
parent regards as critical. Furthermore, Child, Yan and Lu (1997) point out that the 
transactions costs of managing some areas of IJV activity may be less for one partner 
because of its acquired competence and familiarity in so doing than for another partner. 
These considerations support `the notion of parent firms' parsimonious and contingent 
usage of resources for controlling IJVs' (Geringer and Hebert, 1989, p. 240). They imply 
that IN owners may seek to concentrate on providing certain resources and on 
controlling key decision areas and activities. Child and Faulkner (1998, p. 187) argue that 
a distinction that may inform this selection is that between strategic control and 
operational control (Yan and Gray, 1994,1996). 
Glaister et al. (2003) examined the concept of autonomy in decision-making in a sample 
of UK-European equity joint ventures. The findings of Glaister et al. 's (2003) study show 
that there is a spectrum of autonomy across decision-making areas. IJV managers have a 
relatively high degree of operational autonomy but relatively low levels of strategic 
autonomy in decision-making. The findings further show that operational decision- 
making by IJV managers takes place within the context of a set of constraints established 
by the partners and decided through the board of the IJV. As long as IJV managers 
provide the necessary information through the board and they act in the way they are 
expected, they are allowed a relatively high degree of operational autonomy. 
Extending 
this line of argument to the notion of autonomy, it is likely that parents will seek to 
exercise more control over issues relating to the strategic management of the 
IJV and 
grant autonomy to the IJV with respect to operational management. 
This discussion leads 
to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: IJV managers have a relatively high degree of operational autonomy 
but 
relatively low levels of strategic autonomy in 
decision-making. 
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The performance of the IJV is likely to be a moderating variable on IJV autonomy. 
Killing (1983) noted that JV parents loosen or increase control over their ventures as a 
response to their performance. Yan and Gray (1994) reported data that suggests that 
performance also shapes the relative levels of bargaining power and the pattern of the 
sharing of management control between parents. In general it may be argued that where 
the parents perceive the performance objectives of the IJV to be at least satisfactory and 
to be improving beyond some minimum requirement then they are more likely to grant 
greater decision-making autonomy to the IJV management. In contrast, where IJV 
performance is unsatisfactory in terms of objectives or generally declining, then the 
parent firms are more likely to withhold or withdraw autonomy and take a greater role in 
the decision-making of the IJV. A key finding from Glaister et al. 's (2003) study is that 
in general greater IJV autonomy is positively associated with perceived performance of 
the IJV, but that the nature of this autonomy needs to be carefully specified. It appears 
that partners allow IJV management autonomy as long as performance is acceptable to 
them, but only in certain areas of decision-making. The following hypothesis therefore 
concerns the extent to which satisfaction with IJV performance is related to the perceived 
extent of IJV autonomy. 
Hypothesis 2: If the IJV is performing well then the IJV management will be afforded a 
high level of autonomy. If the IJV is performing poorly then the autonomy of the IJV 
management will be curtailed. IJV autonomy will be positively associated with the 
perceived performance of the IJV. 
Another moderating variable on autonomy is likely to be the duration or age of the IJV. 
The `parent-child relationship' (Harrigan, 1986) emphasizes the extent to which the IJV 
is dependent upon the partner firms. However, over time, the nature of the relationship 
between the partners and the IJV may change fundamentally. In particular, as IJVs age 
they may gain more autonomy from the parent firms (Lorange and Roos, 1992). In new 
and immature IJVs the parent firms are likely to scrutinize carefully the decisions of the 
IJV management and to control tightly the decision-making process. As the IJV matures 
and as the parents' confidence in the IJV management grows it is likely that the partners 
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will grant increased autonomy to the IJV management. Glaister et al. (2003) conclude 
that their findings are mixed with regard to IJV duration and autonomy. Some aspects of 
decision-making are likely to be granted to the IJV management as the venture matures 
while other areas, particularly those associated with propriety technology are not. The 
third and final hypothesis thus concerns the extent to which the age of the IJV is related 
to the perceived extent of autonomy of the IJV. 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of autonomy will be expected to increase as the IJV matures. 
5.4 Measures 
Perception of autonomy 
Respondents were asked to assess the overall level of IJV autonomy on a five-point scale 
(1 = `no autonomy' to 5= `complete autonomy'). This perceptual measure of autonomy 
across the IJV system provides information regarding the extent to which the IJV is 
viewed as autonomous by the parent firm. 
Decision-making autonomy 
Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the IJV was autonomous in its 
decision making across a range of 16 decision areas on a five-point scale (1 = `no 
autonomy' to 5= `complete autonomy'). The 16 decision areas were: hiring and firing 
non-technical personnel, hiring and firing technical personnel, pricing, distribution, 
marketing, day-to-day management, hiring and firing JV senior managers, cost control, 
manufacturing, patents and trademarks, technology and engineering of products, process 
technology, R&D, financing of the JV, deciding capital expenditures and JV location. 
Performance measures 
The subjective and objective performance measures were broadly derived in the manner 
followed by Geringer and Hebert (1991). One subjective measure was obtained: the 
respondent company's subjective level of overall satisfaction with the JV's overall 
performance. The respondents were asked the extent to which they were satisfied with 
the JV performance on a five-point scale (1 = `very dissatisfied' to 5= `very satisfied'). 
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One objective performance measure was obtained: JV duration was measured by the 
number of years between the JV's formation and either its termination or the collection of 
performance data, whichever came first. 
5.5 Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 Perceptions of IJV Autonomy 
Respondents were asked to assess the overall level of IJV autonomy on a five-point scale. 
This was a broad, preliminary assessment of the perception of autonomy in the IJV, as 
precursor to a more fine-grained examination of the concept in detail. For the sample of 
respondent firms, the mean score measuring the level of IJV autonomy (Mean = 3.64; 
S. D. = 0.845) was above the median measure, indicating the perception of a fair (but 
certainly not a complete) degree of autonomy of decision-making on the part of IJV 
managers. 
5.5.2 Autonomy in Operational Decisions and in Strategic Decisions 
Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the IJV had autonomy in 16 
decision-making areas. Due to potential conceptual and statistical overlap, an attempt 
was made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine the underlying primary 
dimensions of decision-making autonomy for the sample data. Exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation was used to extract the underlying constructs. One 
of the variables, hiring and firing JV senior managers, had low factor loadings and 
therefore was eliminated from further analysis. The remaining 15 variables were factor 
analysed and produced five underlying factors which make good conceptual sense and 
explained a total of 77.7 per cent of the observed variance, as shown in Table 5.1. 
The five factors may be summarized as: Design and Technology Management, Marketing 
Management, Strategic Management, HRM and Operational Management. Cronbach 
alphas for the underlying factors range from 0.64 to 0.92 with all values being 
substantially over 0.70, which suggests a satisfactory level of construct reliability 
(Nunnally, 1978). Glaister et al. (2003) identified a continuum of decision-making in 
IJVs that ranged from strategic decisions to operational decisions. An a priori ordering of 
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the five factors shown in Table 5.1, from the most operational to the most strategic in 
nature, suggests the following: Operational Management, HRM, Marketing Management, 
Design and Technology Management and Strategic Management. 
Factor 1 (Design and Technology Management) 
The first factor had high positive loadings on four decision-making criteria: patents and 
trademarks, technology and engineering of products, process technology and R&D. The 
first factor was therefore interpreted as a decision-making dimension relating to design 
and technology management aspects of IJV autonomy. 
Factor 2 (Marketing Management) 
This factor had high positive loadings on three of the decision-making criteria: pricing, 
distribution and marketing. It was interpreted as a decision-making dimension that is 
associated with the marketing aspects of autonomy. 
Factor 3 (Strategic Management) 
This factor had high positive loadings on the following three decision-making criteria: 
financing of the JV, deciding capital expenditures and location of the JV. Therefore, this 
factor was interpreted to be a decision-making dimension concerned with the strategic 
aspects of IJV autonomy. 
Factor 4 (HRM) 
The fourth factor had high positive loadings on two decision-making criteria: hiring and 
firing of non-technical personnel and hiring and firing of technical personnel. This factor 
was therefore interpreted to be a decision-making dimension relating to HRM aspects of 
IJV autonomy. 
Factor 5 (Operational Management) 
The fifth factor had high positive loadings on three decision-making criteria: day-to-day 
management, cost control and manufacturing. This factor was therefore interpreted to 
be 
a decision-making dimension relating to operational aspects of IJV autonomy. 
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Evidence relating to Hypothesis 1, which maintains that IJV managers have relatively 
high degrees of operational autonomy but relatively low degrees of strategic autonomy, is 
set out in Tables 5.2. The mean responses for all categories of respondent are shown in 
Table 5.2. For the full sample the individual elements of the factors that are the most 
operational in nature, HRM and Operational Management, have the highest mean scores 
each averaging above 4. It is clear from Table 5.2 that the greatest level of IJV autonomy 
is in the day-to-day management of the IJV, with a mean score well above 4, indicating a 
relatively high level of IJV autonomy. Table 5.2 also shows that four other decision- 
making areas achieved a mean score above 4, indicating a relatively high level of 
autonomy in hiring and firing of non-technical personnel and technical personnel, 
manufacturing and cost control. Each of the elements of the Marketing Management and 
Design and Technology Management factors have mean scores above 3 but less than 4, 
indicating a medium level of autonomy. In contrast the individual elements of the 
Strategic Management factor each have a mean score less than 3, indicating relatively 
little IN management autonomy in the decisions to locate the IJV, its financing and 
deciding capital expenditures. 
It is apparent from Table 5.2 that while there is a perception across respondents of a 
reasonable amount of autonomy, there is a spectrum of local control across decision- 
making areas. IJV managers have most decision-making freedom in regard to daily 
management and ongoing operational issues and least autonomy in regard to longer-term 
financial issues and senior management appointees. This indicates that managers have a 
relatively high degree of operational autonomy but relatively low levels of strategic 
autonomy in decision-making. The ranking of the individual elements of the factors by 
their mean scores clearly shows that autonomy increases along the continuum of decision 
making autonomy from strategic decisions to operational decisions. The greatest 
autonomy is granted in HRM and Operational Management followed by Marketing 
Management and Design and Technology Management while lowest autonomy is granted 
in Strategic Management. The factor analysis demonstrates a spectrum of autonomy, 
indicating a relatively high degree of operational autonomy but relatively low levels of 
strategic autonomy in decision making, providing strong support for Hypothesis 
1. 
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Table 5.2 Decision-making Autonomy Granted to the International Joint Venture 
Rank Mean S. D. 
Design & Technology Management 4 3.37 1.162 
Patents and trademarks 12 3.14 1.393 
Technology and engineering of products 9 3.58 1.281 
Process technology 10 3.51 1.175 
R&D 11 3.30 1.327 
Marketing Management 3 3.80 1.030 
Pricing 8 3.64 1.151 
Distribution 6 3.98 1.131 
Marketing 7 3.81 1.096 
Strategic Management 5 2.39 1.117 
Financing of the JV 15 2.20 1.231 
Deciding capital expenditures 13 2.64 1.229 
Location of the JV 14 2.31 1.366 
HRM 1 4.33 0.911 
Hiring and firing non-technical personnel 2 4.42 0.965 
Hiring and firing technical personnel 3 4.23 1.015 
Operational Management 2 4.23 0.698 
Day-to-day management 1 4.57 0.672 
Cost control 5 4.04 0.927 
Manufacturing 4 4.05 1.114 
5.5.3 IJV Performance and Autonomy 
Hypothesis 2 maintains that the IJV autonomy will be positively associated with the 
perceived performance of the IJV. Chi-square test was carried out between respondents' 
perceptions of performance and perceptions of autonomy. The null hypothesis is that 
satisfaction with JV performance and autonomy granted are independent. Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis is that satisfaction with JV performance and autonomy granted are 
not independent. For the sample of respondents, the chi-square test statistic between the 
satisfaction with performance and autonomy granted was significant (X2 = 4.867; p< 
0.05). As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted, implying that perceptions of performance and autonomy are not independent. 
The chi-square test provides reasonable support for the view that there is a relationship 
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between the respondent company's satisfaction with performance and autonomy granted 
to the IN managers and provides reasonable support for Hypothesis 2. 
To further examine this hypothesis, correlation between perception of performance and 
perception of autonomy was calculated. For the sample of respondents, the correlation 
between the satisfaction with performance and autonomy granted was significant (p = 
0.235; p<0.05). There is a positive significant but moderate level of correlation, 
providing support for Hypothesis 2 and support for the view that the better the IJV 
performance the greater the level of autonomy provided by the partners to the IJV 
management. If the IJV is performing well then the IJV management will be afforded a 
high level of autonomy; however, if the IJV is performing poorly then the autonomy of 
the IJV management is curtailed. 
More detailed evidence relating to performance and autonomy is shown in Table 5.3, 
where correlations between the perception of satisfaction of performance and the 
perception of the extent of autonomy across a number of dimensions of decision-making 
are reported. Significant positive correlations were expected between performance and 
the various areas relating to decision-making autonomy. For the sample of respondent 
firms, significant positive correlations are found for hiring and firing non-technical 
personnel (p < 0.05) and technical personnel (p < 0.01). Clearly, for the respondents as a 
whole as IJV performance improves there is an expectation of the granting of autonomy 
to the IJV managers in terms of hiring or dismissing the key personnel of the IJV. Other 
significant positive correlations are found for pricing (p < 0.05), distribution (p < 0.1) and 
cost control (p < 0.01). 
The strongest positive and most significant correlations are in the three most operational 
areas of activity, i. e. Operational Management (p < 0.1), HRM (p < 0.01) and Marketing 
Management (p < 0.01), with the strength of correlation and level of significance 
increasing as the factor of autonomy becomes more operational. In clear contrast, the 
more strategic the factor is, the weaker the correlation with none of the correlations 
significant. As anticipated, this implies that the better the perceived level of performance 
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the greater the level of autonomy granted to IJV managers, however, this only applies to 
operational autonomy. The implication is that as the operational aspect of decision- 
making increases the greater the likelihood that autonomy is afforded to IJV managers as 
performance improves. In contrast as the strategic aspect of decision-making increases 
there is little likelihood of autonomy even if performance improves. 
Table 5.3 Correlation between satisfaction with performance and autonomy granted 
(Spearman's rho) 
Extent of JV Autonomy 
Design & Technology Management 0.118 
Patents and trademarks 0.081 
Technology and engineering of products 0.080 
Process technology 0.163 
R&D 0.161 
Marketing Management 0.222** 
Pricing 0.214** 
Distribution 0.185* 
Marketing 0.154 
Strategic Management 0.103 
Financing of the JV 0.059 
Deciding capital expenditures 0.113 
Location of the JV 0.064 
HRM 0.266*** 
Hiring and firing non-technical personnel 
0.207** 
Hiring and firing technical personnel 
0.270*** 
Operational Management 0.161* 
Day-to-day management -0.008 
Cost control 
0.257*** 
Manufacturing 0.026 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
Contrary to expectations there is a negative correlation reported 
in Table 5.3. The 
negative correlation for 
day-to-day management is not significant but it is close to zero; 
implying autonomy is largely independent of performance. 
It may be recalled from Table 
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5.2 that day-to-day management is ranked first and has the highest mean score for 
decision-making autonomy. In other words for this highly operational aspect of decision- 
making, the parents may be willing to grant autonomy to JV management almost 
irrespective of JV performance 
A key finding from this study is that in general greater IJV autonomy is positively 
associated with perceived performance of the IJV, but that the nature of this autonomy 
needs to be carefully specified. It appears that the respondent firms allow IJV 
management autonomy as long as performance is acceptable to them, but only in certain 
areas of decision-making. If performance deteriorates, or is below what is expected, then 
there may be greater parent involvement and intervention in the operational running of 
the IJV and in the IJV decision-making processes. Overall, evidence from this study 
supports the view that the level of autonomy granted to IJV managers and IJV 
performance are correlated, providing support for Hypothesis 2. 
5.5.4 IJV Age and Autonomy 
Autonomy is not a static concept so the nature of the autonomy extended to the IJV 
management is likely to change over the evolution of the IJV. Hypothesis 3 maintains 
that the degree of autonomy will be expected to increase as the IJV matures. Chi-square 
test between the age of the joint venture and perceptions of autonomy for the respondents 
was carried out. The null hypothesis is that the age of the joint venture and autonomy 
granted are independent. The chi-square statistic between the age of the joint venture and 
autonomy granted (X2 = 1.380) was not significant. As a result, the null hypothesis is 
accepted, implying that the age of the joint venture and autonomy granted are 
independent. The chi-square test does not provide support for Hypothesis 3 and there is 
no relationship between age and autonomy. 
To further examine this hypothesis, correlation between the age of the joint venture and 
perception of autonomy was calculated. The correlations were weak and not significant 
(p = 0.089), providing no evidence of a relationship between the age of the 
joint venture 
and autonomy granted to the joint venture. This indicates that 
for the broad conception of 
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autonomy there is no underlying relationship of increased autonomy as the IJV matures, 
providing no support for Hypothesis 3. 
More detailed evidence relating to age and autonomy is shown in Table 5.4, where 
correlations between the age of the joint venture and the perception of the extent of 
autonomy across a number of dimensions of decision-making are reported. The only 
significant positive correlation in Table 5.4 is the location of the JV (p < 0.1). However, 
the location of the IJV is unlikely to change as the IJV matures and it cannot be expected 
that partners will increasingly grant autonomy to IJV management in this area. 
Table 5.4 Correlation between the age of the joint venture and decision-making 
autonomy (Spearman's rho) 
Extent of JV Autonom 
Design & Technology Management 0.017 
Patents and trademarks 0.041 
Technology and engineering of products 0.032 
Process technology 0.021 
R&D 0.011 
Marketing Management 0.128 
Pricing 0.137 
Distribution 0.105 
Marketing 0.073 
Strategic Management 0.097 
Financing of the JV 0.033 
Deciding capital expenditures 0.051 
Location of the JV 0.160* 
HRM 0.050 
Hiring and firing non-technical personnel 0.043 
Hiring and firing technical personnel 0.039 
Operational Management 0.113 
Day-to-day management 0.035 
Cost control 0.112 
Manufacturing 0.093 
*p<0.1 
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Overall, the findings of the study show no significant correlations between IN duration 
and autonomy. Hence, these results do not provide support for Hypothesis 3. Broadly, the 
evidence from this study indicates that autonomy cannot be expected to increase simply 
as the IJV matures; autonomy is only granted if performance is appropriate. 
5.6 Summary 
The perceptual measure of autonomy shows that the respondents consider that there is a 
relatively high degree of autonomy afforded the IJVs in this study. The findings of the 
study show that there is a spectrum of autonomy across decision-making areas. IJV 
managers have a relatively high degree of operational autonomy but relatively low levels 
of strategic autonomy in decision-making. The relationship between IJV performance and 
autonomy is not clear cut. As performance improves, an extension of autonomy is likely 
to be granted in some decision-making areas. There was no relationship found between 
the age of the IJV and autonomy. In broad terms IJV management cannot presume that 
there will be a simple extension of autonomy of decision-making as the venture matures. 
IJV autonomy is a rather fuzzy concept unless the distinction is drawn between strategic 
autonomy and operational autonomy. Giving an IJV management enough autonomy to 
genuinely run an independent business, but at the same time making sure that major 
strategic decisions are taken by equity partners, is a delicate task. The difficulty of this 
task is compounded by the dynamic evolutionary nature of the partner-management 
relationship over the life-cycle of the IJV. Further, IJV management autonomy is not 
guaranteed but is conditional on IJV performance satisfying partner goals. 
This chapter detailed the background literature, the measures of variables, the hypotheses, 
the results and discussion related to the autonomy granted to joint ventures. Chapter 6, 
which follows next, examines the perceptions of cultural differences and the management 
of culture. 
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